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Abstract 
A Smart Grid (SG) is a modern electricity supply system. It uses information and 
communication technology (ICT) to run, monitor and control data between the generation 
source and the end user. It comprises a set of technologies that uses sensing, embedded 
processing and digital communications to intelligently control and monitor an electricity 
grid with improved reliability, security, and efficiency.  
SGs are classified as Critical Infrastructures. In the recent past, there have been cyber-attacks 
on SGs causing substantial damage and loss of services. A recent cyber-attack on Ukraine's 
SG caused over 2.3 million homes to be without power for around six hours. Apart from the 
loss of services, some portions of the SG are yet to be operational, due to the damage caused. 
SGs also face security challenges such as confidentiality, availability, fault tolerance, 
privacy, and other security issues. Communication and networking technologies integrated 
into the SG require new and existing security vulnerabilities to be thoroughly investigated.   
Key management is one of the most important security requirements to achieve data 
confidentiality and integrity in a SG system. It is not practical to design a single key 
management scheme/framework for all systems, actors and segments in the smart grid, since 
the security requirements of various sub-systems in the SG vary. We address two specific 
sub-systems categorised by the network connectivity layer – the Home Area Network 
(HAN) and the Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN). Currently, several security schemes 
and key management solutions for SGs have been proposed. However, these solutions lack 
better security for preventing common cyber-attacks such as node capture attack, replay 
attack and Sybil attack. We propose a cryptographic key management scheme that takes into 
account the differences in the HAN and NAN segments of the SG with respect to topology, 
authentication and forwarding of data. The scheme complies with the overall performance 
requirements of the smart grid. 
The proposed scheme uses group key management and group authentication in order to 
address end-to-end security for the HAN and NAN scenarios in a smart grid, which fulfils 
data confidentiality, integrity and scalability requirements. The security scheme is 
implemented in a multi-hop sensor network using TelosB motes and ZigBee OPNET 
simulation model. In addition, replay attack, Sybil attack and node capture attack scenarios 
have been implemented and evaluated in a NAN scenario. Evaluation results show that the 
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scheme is resilient against node capture attacks and replay attacks. Smart Meters in a NAN 
are able to authenticate themselves in a group rather than authenticating one at a time. This 
significant improvement over existing schemes is discussed with comparisons with other 
security schemes.    
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade the term “Smart Grid” has been used to indicate the fulfilment of typical 
requirements of energy systems, such as conservation of resources, saving operational 
expenditure (OPEX) and effective control. The term Smart Grid generally refers to an 
advanced electricity grid in which the distribution, transmission, generation, and control of 
power systems are better coordinated, monitored and controlled by the integration of the 
Smart Grid infrastructure with an advanced information and communication technologies 
(ICT) infrastructure for improving the reliability, efficiency, economics, security and safety 
of the electricity grid. It enables a two-way digital communication between utility company 
and consumer, to communicate to/from smart meters and similar intelligent monitoring 
systems [2]. However, research on Smart Grids is currently at a fairly early stage; therefore, 
there are several issues being researched. An essential issue is that Smart Grids must be 
operationally secure in order to withstand security threats from malicious elements. Secure 
end-to-end communication is crucial. A fundamental requirement for a secure Smart Grid is 
to use a key management scheme for secure communication. This thesis addresses key 
management in secure schemes for the Smart Grid.    
This chapter is organised as follows. First, the topic of the thesis is presented and the aims 
and objectives of the study are enumerated. Second, the novel contributions of the new 
approach to security in the Smart Grid in the thesis are presented. Third, an overview of the 
thesis chapters is presented and followed by a summary of the chapter. 
1.1 Smart Grid overview and characteristics 
A Smart Grid comprises a set of technologies that uses sensing, embedded processing and 
digital communications to intelligently control and monitor an electricity grid with improved 
reliability, security, and efficiency. It is a meta-system that, unlike current wireless or other 
computer networks, uses a complex network to communicate with many heterogeneous 
devices and systems with different sub-systems [3]. The complexity of the network is a 
consequence of the services provided by the Smart Grid and the roles played by each of its 
functional components. It is divided into seven functional components, namely, Customer, 
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Service Provider, Power Generation, Transmission, Distribution, Operations and Markets. 
Each of these components serves a specific role and needs to communicate with other 
components to be able to provide an efficient service. The typical characteristics of a Smart 
Grid are listed below:  
 Improved reliability, efficiency, security and environment by increasing use of 
digital information and control systems. 
 Grid operation and resources in dynamic optimisation with cyber security.  
 Integrate distributed resources and generation.  
 Integrate distributed demand response.  
 Distribution of intelligent technologies for communication, meter, AMI and 
substation automation [4] .  
 Integration of intelligent applications and real-time pricing.  
 
Figure 1-1: Communication domains in a smart grid 
The Smart Grid is a modern power electricity system. It operates with sensors, 
communications, monitoring, automation and computer to achieve safety and security, 
flexibility, efficiency and reliability in the electricity system. It is an electricity system, 
which deals with a large number of customers and has an intelligent communications 
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infrastructure. It enables timely, safe, secure and adaptable information flow needed to 
provide power to the 
evolving digital economy. There are many benefits of the Smart Grid, such as operation 
based on real-time data, two-way power flow and renewable power generation. 
 
Figure 1-2: Smart Grid - a heterogeneous network 
A Smart Grid can be considered as a heterogeneous network, as shown in Figure 1-2, based 
on the integration of multiple networks such as the Home Area Networks (HANs) for 
effective energy monitoring, control and management at the consumer end; the 
Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN) for providing advance metering infrastructure to 
meter and monitor the HANs; and the Wide Area Network (WAN) to integrate automation 
on to the Smart Grid backbone [5]. The HAN interconnects to the WAN via a Smart Meter 
(SM), which is part of the NAN. The majority of the devices in the HAN and NAN are 
wireless communication nodes. The interconnectivity of SMs into the NAN is collectively 
referred to as advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and is the focus of this thesis. The 
NAN is an interconnection of SMs creating a network (with different topologies), consisting 
of smart meters and gateways that relay data. The functional layered model is indicated in 
Figure 1-3. Our focus is on the communication layer in this model. 
1.2 Security Challenges and Attacks in Smart Grid 
Recently cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure have highlighted security as a major 
requirement for Smart Grids [6]. Despite its numerous advantages, there are many security 
HAN – Home Area Network
S
M
SMs
Substation LAN
Backhaul Network
NAN – Neighbourhood Area Network
FAN - Field Area Network
WAN – Wide Area Network
NAN/FAN/AMI 
Demarcation
NAN/FAN/
AMI Demarcation
Core -Backhaul 
Demarcation
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challenges and issues in the Smart Grid, such as access control and identity management, 
connectivity, privacy, data analysis issues and minimizing cost [7]. 
 
Figure 1-3: Layered functional view of the smart grid 
The Smart Grid is classified as a critical infrastructure that provides an essential service to 
users. The challenge in securing the Smart Grid is that the security solutions should be easily 
deployable, integrate-able and useable without affecting the performance requirements. 
Many security solutions have been proposed to fulfil the security requirements of a Smart 
Grid. However, these solutions are specifically designed for specific security issues, based 
on a varied set of assumptions, and limited to portions of the functional Smart Grid 
infrastructure. 
Deploying a Smart Grid without adequate security might result in serious consequences such 
as grid instability, utility fraud, and loss of user information and energy-consumption data 
[8]. According to a report published by Krebson Security [9], the FBI investigated the 
hacking of Smart Grid meters in Puerto Rico, Brazil. The bureau distributed an intelligence 
alert about its findings to select industry personnel and law enforcement officials. The FBI 
said that it believed former employees of the meter manufacturer and employees of the 
utility company were altering the meters in exchange for cash, and training others to do so 
because of “the ease of exploitation and economic advantage to the hacker and the electric 
customer” 
Therefore, it is important to ensure that the data carried by the Smart Grid system is kept 
confidential and that no one but the right receiver can access the data [9]. 
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In this section we explain the major challenges faced in securing Smart Grids and then we 
relate the challenges to factors that caused recent attacks on Smart Grids.  
1.2.1 Smart Grid security challenges 
We list six major challenges faced in securing a Smart Grid. Note that these challenges 
eventually map on to the three major security requirements, namely, Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability. 
a. Access control and identity management: There are several challenges with 
the existing protocol including efficiency, delay, lower overhead and privacy 
[10].  It is a challenge to ensure that data transmitted via Smart Grids is kept 
confidential and that no one but the intended receiver is able to see the message. 
In addition, the Smart Grid contains many components that are interconnected 
[11]. Because of security concerns related to this, authentication is needed to 
verify the identity of the receiver in order to avoid any disruption or exploitation 
[12]. Access to the control centre, transmission, and distribution grids is allowed 
only for authenticated users, groups, and services [13]. 
b. Privacy and security policies: There is a challenge for suitable security policies 
to establish relationships among consumers, utilities, and third parties, although 
applying security and privacy policies should not result in unsatisfactory 
operational latencies. Information security policies define the guiding rules that 
security controls are applied to secure data, communication routing, processes 
and systems. In various cases, the information and network protection policies 
used by utilities need to update [14]. 
c. Threat defence: There are several vulnerabilities inherent in Smart Grids; 
therefore, it is a challenge to protect the grids from defined threats by building 
an effective, layered defence system to function broadly across the entire grid 
infrastructure. Threat defence provides network segmentation and access control 
to defend against denial-of-service (DoS) attack. In addition, it provides a suite 
of security technologies such as firewall, IPS and VPN [13].     
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d. Physical security: Smart Grid systems can have thousands, and often even 
millions, of remote points and field area networks. This makes it challenging to 
maintain the physical security of the Smart Grid. The geographical dispersion of 
these systems also means that it may be difficult to access all of the terminals for 
maintenance [15].  
e. Connectivity: Communications connectivity in Smart Grids implies a transition 
towards an Internet-like distributed environment in which huge numbers of 
devices are interconnected. This is one of the emerging challenges in this area 
and as such the application of protective techniques is important [13].  
1.2.2 Attacks on Smart Grids 
Assailants with different motives and skills can take advantage of weaknesses in the security 
of a Smart Grid system, and can cause different levels of damage to the system. Attackers 
at the top level include online hackers, terrorists, workers, opponents, clients, and so on. For 
example, a client may change data or information, and obtain power without paying for it. 
According to Rautmare et al. [16] “the exploitation of the network control system may result 
in disruption and breaks in operation. That may lead to disruption of service and loss of 
manufacturing, neither of which is allowable”. 
a. Cyber-attack on Ukraine's power grid: In 2016, when more than 100,000 
people in and around the Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk were left without 
power for six hours, the Ukrainian energy ministry accused Russia of launching 
a cyber-attack on the country's national energy grid [17].   
b. Stuxnet: In 2010, Stuxnet was discovered. It is an advanced and sophisticated 
malware program that targets industrial control systems. Industrial control 
systems targeted by Stuxnet are reprogrammed to hide any changes made by a 
Stuxnet attack. In the early days of Stuxnet attack infection, Iran was the most 
affected country [18]. However, since Stuxnet can self-replicate, other countries 
were affected, including Indonesia and India. Security specialists have found that 
Stuxnet is able to control the speed of motors, and is thus able to send nuclear 
centrifuges out of control [13]. It is a modern weapon in the cyber war. It was 
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used to transfer a payload for the target control system. It is the first industrial 
control system rootkit. It can self-update; in addition, it can inject code into the 
ladder logic of PLCs, and at that point alter the operations of the PLC, as well as 
hide itself by alarming false information back to the HMI. Moreover, it adapts to 
its circumstances [3]. 
c. Night Dragon: In 2011, McAfee reported the discovery of a series of 
coordinated attacks against energy, petrochemical and oil control systems. The 
attacks, which mainly began in China, were supposed to have commenced in 
2009, functioning ceaselessly and covertly with regard to data extraction [16]. It 
did not expand its influence and harm as far as the Stuxnet attack; however, it 
did involve the theft of sensitive and important data. Furthermore, it alarms and 
evidence of how outside attackers can possibility infiltrate critical systems. At 
that period, the intended use of the stolen data was unknown, and it could have 
been used for many motives [3]. 
d. Slammer Worm: Security Focus reported in 2003 that the Slammer Worm had 
passed through a computer network and targeted a nuclear power plant in Ohio. 
For almost five hours, the safety monitoring system at the plant was disabled. 
The infection did not cause any harm, but it alarmed the control system, due to 
it being under possible attack [13]. 
e. Node capture attack: On Smart Grid application by malicious users such as 
decrease the reading of meters “electricity bills” or to break the services on 
people life and so on. Since the Smart Grid reaches each building as well as the 
complex of communications [19], therefore, it makes it difficult to guarantee 
physical protection for all the components in the system [6]. 
f. Other possible attacks: One of the well-known attack is the man-in-the-middle 
(MITM), which is a type of attack whereby the attackers break into an existing 
connection to interrupt the exchanged data and insert false information into the 
Smart Grid [20, 21]. This involves eavesdropping on a connection, intruding into 
a connection, interrupting messages, and carefully modifying data. In 
addition, Denial-of-Service (DoS) takes place when a system denies service to 
authorised clients. This may be caused due to resource exhaustion by 
 
 
 
 
22 
unauthorised clients. It is difficult to avoid the DoS in a Smart Grid. Also, it is 
difficult to stop an on-going attack since the victim and its client may not catch 
the attack. In this kind of attack, the attacker prevents legal users from having 
access to information and services by targeting the victim’s device and the 
network connection; this attack stops the user from making outgoing connections 
on the Smart Grid. Jamming is a DoS attack which targets wireless 
communication frequency in the Smart Grid [22]. When they are in close range, 
large amounts of noise may be generated in these appliances. The 
communication can be jammed so as to make the signal noise very low, and this 
could lead to the Smart Grid not functioning [23].   
1.3 Security requirements for a Smart Grid 
In this section, a general and brief review about security requirements in the Smart Grid will 
be presented including availability, data confidentiality, data integrity and authentication. 
In the Smart Grid, the security requirements are one of the main considerations that should 
be addressed, as malicious users and attackers can modify customers’ data or cause any type 
of attack on an unsecured Smart Grid. Therefore, we should take into account the following 
factors when considering the security requirements of a Smart Grid:  
a. Availability: Availability is one of the primary requirements for a Smart Grid. It 
is the availability of data in the entire network. The best way to achieve this aim 
is to have network management and supervision by implementing a reliable and 
suitable transport layer solution. Therefore, resources should be available in the 
nodes throughout the whole network. All components should have the capability 
of self-healing in case any of them fails [24-26]. For example, in the case where 
power to a node is lost, the other nodes need to reorganise themselves to maintain 
availability [27].  
b. Confidentiality: to make sure that data is not changed or lost. Only permitted and 
authorised entities should be given access to the data. One of the best ways to 
achieve confidentiality in a Smart Grid is by using a key management solution 
[1, 8, 28-30] for encrypting data and establishing a shared secret key among 
nodes.  
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c. Integrity: the authenticity of the data received must be confirmed; during the 
transfer, it must be protected from attackers who are trying to manipulate it. 
Identity should be confirmed through strong verification. It should implement an 
implied refusal policy such that access to the network is granted only through 
precise access permissions [31, 32].  
d. Security Weaknesses: Checks must be carried out to ensure that components that 
interface with the border are protected. In some situations, customer activities 
can start possible security weaknesses [33]. As such, awareness applications 
should be put in place to inform the system’s customers about the best protection 
methods when using network resources and applications [27]. 
e. Devices must know the resources and destinations with which they connect. This 
is achieved through common verification methods, applying Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) or Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [34]. A reliable 
authentication method is needed while interacting between Smart Grid events. 
The authentication protocol must function in real-time adhering to restrictions 
such as lowest computational cost, low interaction expense, and sturdiness to 
withstand strikes especially Denial-of Service strikes.  
f. Authorisation: Authorization is another key requirement for a Smart Grid. It is 
important that the components of the HAN, NAN and WAN get authorised and 
is thus allowed to connect with other components. Moreover, it is a good way to 
make sure that Smart Grids are protected and no malicious node exists in the 
communication session, as such a node can obtain important information such as 
the cryptographic key or the secure ID [35]. 
1.4 Problem definition 
1.4.1 Key Management in Smart Grid  
Key management is crucial process to achieve data confidentiality (secure communication 
and information protection) for smart grid. Therefore, many key management schemes are 
proposed for smart grid. A smart grid comprises several distinct functional segments, which 
require exchanging data. Secure accesses as well as secure data transportation are two key 
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requirements for smart grid services. Most key management [8, 28-30, 36-45] schemes 
available are proposed for specific part of the Smart Grid.  Those cannot be integrated due 
to different security requirements. Therefore, any schemes meant for the Smart Grid as a 
whole require being able to scale to the size of the network and handle a large concurrency 
of authentication and/or data transfer and/or command control requests. Bulk command 
control requests are necessary when addressing demand response situations or an emergency 
situation on the smart grid network. In addition to such situations, the scheme in place 
requires to scale in size when new segments of smart meters are added to the network. Such 
segment sizes can be considerably large (connecting a high-rise residential building or 
connecting an industrial estate). The security schemes require being able to scale to 
accommodate such additions and should not impact the storage and processing resources of 
the devices. These resources are typically used for storing shared keys and generating new 
hashes or keys. Therefore, scalability is an issue when considering key management for a 
secure scheme in a smart grid.  
 A consequence of scalability is the topology of the network. Quite often, the key 
management schemes are affected by the topology of the network of devices. For example, 
a tree based hierarchical topology provides a simple means of generating keys for 
downstream nodes in the sub-trees, whereas, for a mesh network, the key distribution can 
become a significant overhead, depending upon the degree of connectivity of the nodes. 
When the network is scaled, it is not unusual to resort to a clustered-tree approach (a mix of 
tree and mesh, aka partial-mesh) where a cluster head is responsible for the downstream 
nodes and requires relatively higher storage, if not processing resources. Topology is 
therefore a significant issue in terms of impact on the resource availability on the devices in 
smart grid networks. A good key management scheme must therefore be able to have the 
least impact on the resource requirement on the devices, regardless of the topology of the 
network. 
The data flow within the smart grid extends from the home devices up to the NOC of the 
provider. A single security scheme that can cover the entire path of the data flow is an ideal 
requirement. However, while the technology limitations exist, the more important 
limitations are due to the two different administrative domains that the devices belong to. 
The devices in the home and the associated group controllers are the private domain of the 
householder whereas the smart meter and associated devices up until the NOC are the private 
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domain of the provider. The smart meter interfaces, these two domains and there is a 
sufficient cooperative action necessary to be able communicate across these two domains. 
Each domain is viewed as a security risk to another, necessitating a clear boundary between 
the operations within the home, within the smart grid and between the home and the smart 
grid. There are no instances of such security schemes that operate across these two domains, 
in literature. Therefore, designing an integrated security scheme that is interoperable across 
the domains is a challenging issue until there are regulatory guidelines in place for such 
communications. 
Smart Grid is meta-system where many of systems and applications are integrated using 
highly complexity connectivity to handle huge amount of sensitive data and information 
figure 1-1. We should consider node capture attacks as a high threat for communication and 
data confidentiality. Moreover, ignoring security requirements related to sub-systems in 
Smart Grid can result in significant damage of data confidentiality or network performance 
to a Smart Grid. Where it is not practical to design a single key management 
scheme/framework for all systems, parties and segments in the Smart Grid, it is necessary 
to consider the security requirements of various sub-systems in the Smart Grid and design 
the security for the specific sub-system. A secure routing protocol on a smart grid builds 
logical connectivity among the nodes to form a network.  
1.4.2 Node capture attack  
A node capture attack involves physically capturing a node, extracting the stored 
information, use the node to send invalid data on the network or incapacitate it. This may 
lead to compromise of the entire Smart Grid communication. Moreover, the primary impact 
of a node capture is providing the attacker a means to launch other types of attack such as 
DoS, Sybil, Blackhole and other such attacks which affect of providing the proper services. 
Data confidentiality and customer privacy can be compromised, and that can be led by 
expansion of the huge amount of data that will be collected. The security of the HAN is not 
compatible with the security of the NAN. 
Therefore, in the event of one of the nodes being compromised, it should not cause the entire 
security process to break down. The rest of the services should remain secure and available. 
These requirements should be fulfilled over the available computing and storage resources 
of the Smart Grid components. Thus, data confidentiality and data integrity are critical 
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requirements in Smart Grid. Compromise of data confidentiality has a significant effect on 
users’ privacy, which is important consideration that should be addressed.  
There are various cryptographic key management solutions that have been proposed to 
deliver secure communication and decrease the impact of threat of node capture attacks on 
the Smart Grid. However, these solutions still suffer from its effects.  
1.4.3 Scalability  
The large-scale network in NAN poses far more challenges for the NAN’s nodes compared 
to nodes in HAN. The network topology in NAN is highly dynamic as nodes regularly join 
or leave the network session. The communication channel is also subject to many errors and 
interferences which illuminating unstable characteristics in terms of bandwidth and delay. 
In terms of solutions to these security challenges HAN and NAN, researchers have proposed 
different key management schemes [46-52] for secure communications. In the Smart Grid, 
these schemes try to provide better resilience against node capture attacks, However there 
is still a chance of the entire Smart Grid being compromised.  
Another main issue in key management is to design an adaptable and independent scheme, 
which can be applicable in different Smart Grid scenarios. Therefore, the solution has to 
take into account the practical and real network and the requirements for the Smart Grid. 
Giving this challenge, our intention is to develop a secure end-to-end communication 
solution for HAN and for large scale NAN. The specific objectives for the solution and the 
aims on the study are detailed in the next section.    
1.5 Research Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to present an integrated key management scheme that satisfies the 
communication layer (Figure 1-3) in Smart Grid (HAN, NAN) security requirements. 
Therefore, the integrated key management approach must be considered based on the 
communication network and associated security requirements. Thus, scheme should take 
into account the specific requirements of the Smart Grid system (HAN, NAN), such as 
availability, resilient to node capture attack, resilient to replay attack, resilient to Sybil 
attack, scalability, key freshness, and other related properties, such as low-energy 
consumption on devices. The scheme will secure the communication in the Smart Grid and 
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prevent any breaches due to malicious attacks. In the event of an attack or a compromise, 
the impact must be minimal and the operation of the rest of the Smart Grid infrastructure 
must not be affected in any manner.   
To achieve the above-mentioned aim, we have identified the following objectives:  
1. Design a key management scheme that offers secure communication for the 
HAN in the Smart Grid 
2. Implement the proposed key management scheme using TelosB motes in HAN 
3. Design a key management scheme that offers secure communication for the 
NAN in the Smart Grid 
4. Implement the proposed key management scheme using TelosB motes in NAN 
5. Design a secure authentication protocol that supports different communication 
topologies in the NAN 
6. A replay attack and Sybil attack scenarios have been implemented and evaluated 
in a HAN and NAN scenario. 
7. Implement the HAN and NAN network scenarios in a simulation environment 
using Riverbed simulation to measure performance. 
8. Evaluate the developed schemes for HAN and NAN by comparing them with 
existing solutions. 
1.6 Contributions 
In completing the above objectives, we have made the following contributions in this thesis: 
1. Key management scheme for a HAN:  
Our proposed key management solution is designed for fulfilling HAN security 
requirements. We identify the various devices in a home, which are networked. After that 
we group the devices based on operational/functional factors such as their power 
consumption and the control functions required. Then, we identify the resource availability 
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on each device and assess the impact of an attack on the device type. We then list the security 
requirements of each device group. Based on that we design a secure key management 
interaction scheme for the groups in HAN. The protocol has been evaluated using TelosB 
motes and Riverbed simulation. The evaluation results show an improvement in terms of 
data confidentiality and resilience against node capture attacks. The security analysis is 
detailed in in chapter five.  
2. Key management scheme for a NAN:  
The main components in NAN segment are smart meters, which form a large-scale network. 
Therefore, to manage a large scale NAN, organising the NAN into groups of SMs is 
considered in our scheme. Group key management for NAN has been proposed. In order to 
achieve a secure end-to-end communication we assign a unique key to each node in the 
group. This unique key is shared only with the utility company server, and sends encrypted 
data through other nodes to the utility company Server without decryption at any non-utility 
company server. We have shown in chapter 6 that using this technique we achieve end-to-
end confidentiality.  
3. A light-weight authentication scheme for devices in the NAN:  
In a large-scale environment such as the smart grid, network scalability and availability are 
two crucial design parameters for a secure scheme. Thus, organising the NAN into groups 
of SMs is necessary to with the obvious need for grouping SMs in a smart grid, group 
management is a necessary function within the smart grid. Identification of a group member, 
members joining/leaving the group is typical group management functions that require 
authentication.  The group members in NAN need to be validated as part of the group. Such 
validated members can communicate between themselves, primarily for purposes of 
forwarding data to/from the group head. Therefore, we have proposed a new, secure, group 
authentication scheme for NAN for Smart Grid. The scenario of a multi-hop network is 
considered where the nodes require multiple hops to communicate with the NOC, which is 
the entity that issues the keys. Two topology scenarios, star-star and mesh are considered 
and separate authentication processes are defined for their operation.  The main feature of 
our scheme is the ability to address security of all communication, which takes place in the 
network. Moreover, the scheme is specifically designed for NAN and centralized 
authentication. A detailed of the scheme found in chapter 5 of this thesis.     
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4. Development of HAN and NAN Test bed using TelosB motes  
The secure schemes on a Smart Grid build a logical connectivity among the nodes and 
components. To evaluate our proposed scheme by launching Replay, Sybil and node capture 
attacks. Therefore, presents an analysis of the impact of the replay attack and Sybil attack 
when the scheme uses multi-hop forwarding with the intermediate nodes re-encrypting it for 
a specific upstream node. 
a. Replay attack 
We choose to perform the implementation of replay attack on TelosB mote, for launching 
replay attacks. Which was programmed to capture data packets sent from a smart meter and 
re-sending them at a later point in time, expecting to authenticate and gain entry into the 
network. The implementation comprises of four programs done by a nesc program in a 
TinyOS, one each for the three SMs and the NOC. These programs communicate with each 
other using the packet content and packet format used by the secure scheme in Fig 3.  
The following steps are performed for the implementation of replay attack: 
 L-SM authenticates with NOC 
 Malicious node captures the authentication packets 
 Malicious node sends captured packets to NOC and attempts to authenticate 
 GW initially receives the packets, processes them and sends them to the NOC 
 NOC receives packets and processes them, identifies them as duplicate packets and 
discards them. 
 
b. Sybil attack 
The Sybil attack was done using a TelosB mote, which was programmed to change its ID 
randomly, between IDs 110 and 115 and attempt to authenticate with the NOC. The NOC 
key and the gateway key were stored in the memory of the mote, emulating a capture of an 
authenticated mote. The first two pairs of messages show successful authentications from 
node IDs 111 and 112. Node 110 is already authenticated. The captured node attempts to 
authenticate as node 110 in the third pair of messages.  
5. Topology independence for NAN interconnectivity 
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Node capture attacks in the proposed KM-NAN can significantly threaten network security 
as well as degrade performance. Based on the simulation results in figure 6-34, it is identified 
that partial mesh topology is more resilient topology as compared to star topology for KM-
NAN against node capture attacks. As compared to KM-NAN star, KM-NAN mesh 
topology is more flexible as it can allow smart nodes to choose between multiple routes to 
transmit/receive data to the target location, if one of the node(s) compromised. Due to the 
flexibility offered by mesh topology, it is not only resilient but also an ideal solution with 
easy to deploy in KM-NAN.  
1.7 Thesis Structure 
Chapter one introduction:  This chapter is organised as follows. First, the topic of the 
thesis is presented with its aims. Second, the novel contribution of the new approach posited 
in the thesis is presented. Third, an overview of the thesis chapters is presented. Finally, the 
chapter is summarised. 
Chapter two Smart Grid Background: In this chapter, Smart Grid technology has been 
discussed followed by Smart Grid architectural layers. The communication layer (HAN, 
NAN and WAN) has been of great interest as this layer play a crucial role in the deployment 
of a Smart Grid based on the integration of HAN, NAN and WAN. This chapter introduces 
different Smart Grid technologies including AMI, WAMS, and substation distribution 
systems and so on. We then discussed in detail the Smart Grid architecture including an 
application layer, communication layer and power control system layer. Finally, we describe 
the IoT and its role of in the Smart Grid.  
Chapter Three Security in the Smart Grid in this chapter discussed the main security 
issues in Smart Grid. We have explained general challenges related to communication and 
management where must be considered before Smart Grid benefits can be achieved. 
Moreover, this chapter provide a general and brief review about security requirement in 
Smart Grid will be presented including availability, data confidentiality, data integrity and 
authentication. 
Chapter Four Literature Review. This chapter presents a critical overview on literature 
review and research works relating to key management, authentication. It also includes 
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discussions on the existing solutions of key management for HAN, NAN, WSN, SCADA 
and other.  
Chapter Five Key Management Scheme for Communication Layer in the Smart Grid 
(KMS-CLSG). This chapter introduces our proposed solution. We have classified the 
solutions based on communication layer in Smart Grid networks, including Key 
management in HAN and NAN. The chapter provide detail of security analyses.   
Chapter Six Implementation and Evaluation. In this chapter we have explained the 
implementation and evaluation phase in our proposed solution. We have described the 
methodologies of the implementation including the attacks that have been addressing the in 
order to evaluate the proposed scheme such as replay attack, Sybil attack.  
Chapter Seven Conclusion and Future Work. This chapter provides a summary of our 
contributions. We highlight some issues that may be addressed in future including security 
of WAN, integration of Smart Grid with cloud and design of a simulation tool for Smart 
Grid communications security.  The thesis concludes by highlighting the work have been 
achieved and summary of results.  
1.8 Summary  
Over the last decade, the computer network, Internet of Things (IoT) and Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) have brought revolutionary changes to the means and forms of 
communication for a large number of applications including Smart Grids. The traditional 
energy networks have been modernised to Smart Grid to boost the energy industry in the 
context of efficient and effective power management, performance, real-time control and 
information flow using two-way communication between utility providers and end-users. 
However, integration of smart two-way communication in Smart Grids comes at the cost of 
cyber security vulnerabilities and challenges. It is a solution to such vulnerabilities that we 
address in proposing a secure end-to-end communication scheme for the HAN and NAN 
segments of the Smart Grid. 
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 Chapter Two: Smart Grid Background  
2. Background 
The advancement in information and communication technology (ICT) has not only given 
the world a smart and high-quality life but also an efficient power system, energy solutions 
and intelligent homes to live in. Energy is one of the fundamental requirements to fuel the 
smart technology and so a ‘smart’ way of living, and electricity is generally used as the 
primary source of energy. 
According to a report by [53], worldwide energy consumption is predicted to increase 
annually by 1.6% from 2011 to 2030, adding 36% to the global energy consumption by the 
year 2030. In addition to the continuous growing demand for energy and the environmental 
concerns, efficient and effective power performance and management and pricing are 
becoming more and more critical requirements. The traditional 20th century power grids are 
not designed to handle rising power demand, increasing proportion of renewable, fluctuating 
energy generation, electricity blackout, integration with advanced communication and 
controls, and smart metering infrastructure. The continually growing dependence on 
electricity and demand for efficient and reliable energy distribution have been constantly 
addressed to provide a modernised electric system to ensure efficient and effective power 
performance and management, real-time bidirectional control and information flow between 
utility providers and end-users and active monitoring. Therefore, the Smart Grid is the future 
of the power grid; it is designed to meet the future energy requirements that entail capacity, 
reliability, efficiency, security, sustainability and safety. 
To overcome the limitations and challenges experienced by traditional 20th century power 
grids and to fulfil the requirements of the 21st century, 20th century power grids have started 
to be replace by a modernised electricity system integrated with advanced communication 
and controls to enable responsive and resilient energy delivery. This modernised electricity 
system is known as a Grid System and is also defined as “electricity with a brain”, “the 
energy internet”, and “the electronet” [54]. 
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In this chapter, we present an overview of the various aspects of the Smart Grid including 
Smart Grid technologies, architecture and IoT. The chapter concludes with a summary of 
the important points.   
2.1 Smart Grid Technologies  
The market for Smart Grid technologies is growing rapidly as the demand for more 
responsive and resilient energy delivery rises across the globe. The fundamental technology 
to integrate intelligence into the grid has been in place for decades. However, recent times 
have seen fast-tracking technological developments and shifting priorities among utility 
companies. The integration of ICT and Smart Grid has shown various technologies such as 
advanced metring system (AMI), wide area measurement system (WAMS), substation 
automation system and common information models (CIF), which are discussed in the 
following sub-sections.   
2.1.1 Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) 
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is core technology to deliver the operational and 
business benefits towards the implementation of the Smart Grid system. AMI plays a major 
role in providing the necessary communication and control functions required to deploy 
energy management services such as pricing schemes, meter readings, demand response and 
power quality. The deployment of AMI ensures a granular control for consumers to monitor 
the utilisation of energy in addition to growing distributed energy resources (DER). Ensuring 
a secure AMI is crucial to satisfy both the consumers and service owners that Smart Grids 
are reliable and trustworthy [55] . 
It is a system that manages, gathers data, measures, analyses electricity usage and involves 
smart meters and service providers via two-way communication. AMI enables service 
providers to inform their users of electricity pricing at any time, and allow monitoring of 
demand in real time. Therefore, AMI is different from advanced meter reading (AMR) 
technology as it allows bi-directional meter communications [30]. According to the authors 
in [56], an AMI system involves different technologies and applications including smart 
meters, user gateways, home area network, wide-area communications infrastructure, and 
meter data management systems (MDMSs), which are integrated to perform as one system. 
Similarly, the authors in [57] state that AMI is a system used to collect, store, analyse, and 
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measure electricity usage data, which provides a fitting gateway between the consumer and 
electricity supply. Figure 2-1 below provides an illustration of the AMI network and how 
the components of this network communicate.   
 
Figure 2-1: The AMI network 
 
Figure 2-2: Four major components of the AMI [10] 
SMs are installed in domestic and commercial establishments, and have to be 
interconnected to communicate with upstream management entities [55]. They require a 
topology to be formed, and the topology depends upon how they are distributed within a 
specific wireless range. Ideally, a single hop to the upstream node, typically performing 
‘gatewaying’, ‘security/authentication’ and ‘data aggregation’ functions, is desired. This 
may be possible largely in dense areas such as structured high-rise buildings or shopping 
centres. In a sparsely inhabited area or condominiums, the limited wireless range of the SMs 
might require a multiple hop path to the upstream node in the NAN (Figure 2-2). This 
implies that the intermediate nodes in the hop path must provide an authenticated forwarding 
of data from the downstream nodes. The security mechanisms deployed must ensure that 
each node is authenticated centrally as well as by the group. The focus of this thesis is on a 
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secure authentication scheme for such multi-hop networks formed by SMs in the NAN. The 
SMs in a group in the NAN need to authenticate within the group, and the group should be 
aware of SMs joining and leaving the group so as to ensure that the security assets distributed 
reach only the intended members of the group [55]. This aspect of security in NANs will be 
further discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
2.2 Smart Grid Architecture  
In this sub-section, Smart Grid architecture is introduced. A discussion is put forward on the 
functionalities of each layer and related communication technologies are highlighted. Smart 
Grids heavily rely on high-speed, intelligent, reliable and secure bi-directional 
communication and control between utilities and consumers to coordinate the generation, 
distribution and consumption of energy effectively and intelligently. Due to a variety of 
communication components, the Smart Grid has been considered as a heterogeneous 
network infrastructure and generalised into four layers: application layer, communication 
layer, power control layer and power system layer, as shown in Figure 2-3.   
 
Figure 2-3: Smart Grid architecture - Overview [60] 
The power system layer involves electricity generation, distribution and customer premise. 
The power control layer is comprised of sensors, control systems (such as SCADA) and the 
power control system. The communication layer consists of WAN, NAN (field area 
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network), HAN/BAN. Finally, the application layer includes power transmission, customer 
application, and real-time pricing.  
The application layer can generally be categorised into customer-side applications and grid-
side applications. It provides Smart Grid applications for customers (such as information on 
energy usage or real-time pricing, critical peak pricing, automated controls for appliances 
and smart devices) and for the utility provider (such as substation monitoring, fault 
detection, integrated volt-VAR control [60]. 
The communication layer provides a network for the transport of data and information in a 
two-way, efficient, reliable and secure manner between the power systems and the data 
centre. As part of the communication layer, the HAN is initially a multi-supplier 
environment composed of smart appliances that need to be set-up together continuously 
using suitable standards such as ZigBee, and HomePlug NANs are employed for covering 
large geographical areas and distributed field devices. Typically, NANs use Wi-MAX 
(Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) or 3G/4G for wide-range 
communication. Table 2.1 presents a comparison of different communication protocols and 
standards.  
The WAN performs as the core network. It consists of the backbone network and the 
backhaul network. In the WAN, the backbone network connects the utility backbone and 
substation to provide high-capacity communication with minimal latency, and commonly 
uses optical fibres. To provide broadband connectivity to the NAN, the backhaul network is 
the link between the WAN and the NAN. In addition, it interconnects distributed systems 
such as sensors, SCADA, remote terminal units (RTU) and mobile workforces. The main 
task of the WAN is to transport the smart grid’s data to distant sites in an efficient and 
reliable way. Utility control centres have been operating WANs and managing the 
operations and processes in the grid for many applications, such as grid monitoring and 
SCADA [61]. 
The major components in Smart Grid architecture are Electric Household Appliances, 
Renewable Energy Resources, Smart Meter, Power utility Centre and Service provider [62], 
as illustrated in Figure 2-4.   
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Electrical Household Appliances (smart and legacy) are expected to be able to communicate 
with smart meters via a House Area Network (HAN), assisting efficient energy intake 
control to all home devices. The Smart Grid uses renewable energy resources such as solar 
and wind power to provide power to home devices. Smart meters contain a microcontroller 
that has memory, digital ports, timers, real-time, and serial communication facilities [63]. 
Smart meters sign-up the power intake generally and transmit it to the utility server, connect 
or detach a customer’s source of energy and send out alarms in case of a problem. The power 
utility communicates with the smart meters to control energy intake [62].  
2.2.1 Application Layer 
The application layer of a Smart Grid generally consists of consumer-end and grid-end 
applications. At the consumer-end it provides energy usage information, real-time cost, 
critical peak cost, and automated control for smart devices. At the grid-end, it provides 
substation monitoring and fault detection, etc. [60]. 
2.2.2 Communication Layer 
 
Figure 2-4: An overview of smart grid communication domains 
The Smart Grid is considered to be an intelligent network of meta-systems and 
subsystems providing energy cost-effectively and reliably. Figure 2-5 illustrates the 
communication network of a smart grid. It has a hierarchical structure, comprising three 
areas, Home Area Network (HAN), Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN) or Field Area 
Network (FAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN). Smart Grids derive benefit from the fact 
that homes can be automated using ubiquitous computing and such automation can help in 
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energy monitoring. It is the embedded Internet of Things that provides several services 
linked to physical devices or resource monitors and enables the management of the energy 
consumption of devices and appliances. The communication layer consists of three major 
IP-based and field-level communication networks: wide area networks (WAN), local area 
networks (LAN) and consumer area networks (CAN). The communication networks are 
further divided/categorised into more sub-communication networks, as listed below [60].  
2.2.2.1 Home Area Network (HAN) 
A home area network (HAN) is a sub-communication network at the CAN end, which helps 
to extend the Smart Grid capabilities into a home by exploiting various network 
technologies/protocols such as IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee, Wi-Fi, RFID, Ethernet, Z-Wave, 
HomePlug, Wireless M-Bus, Wavenis [64], as shown in Figure 2-5. The HAN is sometimes 
referred as a Business Area Network (BAN) or Industrial Area Network (IAN), as these 
networks share many common characteristics and design disciplines. A HAN, integrated 
with sensors and actuators, enables the consumer end to remotely interconnect as well as 
control various automated smart devices ranging from smart meters to in-house displays, 
renewable energy sources and storage, to smart appliances such as washing machine, 
refrigerators, TVs, oven, lights, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC), and 
plugs for electrical cars [64]. One of the important components of a HAN is the home energy 
management system (HEMS), which enables consumers to monitor how much power their 
household has consumed. The HAN enables dedicated demand side management (DSM) 
such as energy efficiency management and demand response through active involvement of 
power users and consumers [65]. A HEMS is the backbone of communication between SM 
and home appliance. To facilitate the interconnectivity in the HAN with external networks 
such as neighbourhood area network (NAN), which interconnects smart meters, an energy 
service interface (ESI) as a HAN gateway has been developed as part of the Utility AMI 
Open HAN Energy Services Interface. 
2.2.2.2 Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN) 
A Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN – sometimes referred to as a Field Area Network 
(FAN) or Last Mile Network (LMN)) is a sub-communication network at the LAN end. A 
NAN, as shown in Figure 2-6, consists of multiple HANs between the individual service 
connections to distribute electricity and information [66]. A data-aggregator unit (DAU) 
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within the NAN collects the data from HANs with smart meters using network technologies 
such as WiMax, Zigbee, PLC and ANSI C12 Protocols [67] [65]. The NAN behaves as an 
access network to forward data from consumers to the backhaul enterprise office. In addition 
to data collection, the DAU also consists of a NAN gateway, which enables NAN 
connectivity with the HAN and WAN. The NAN is one of the components of Smart Grids 
because it is responsible for transporting huge volumes of data and distributing control 
signals between utility (service) providers and smart devices connected at the consumer’s 
end.  
 
 
Figure 2-5: HAN communication technologies 
2.2.2.3 Wide Area Network (WAN) 
A wide area network (WAN) acts as a bridge between HAN, NAN and utility network and 
enables connectivity between multiple distribution systems by covering a very large area. 
Based on various technologies such as Ethernet, cellular network, and broadband networks, 
WAN provides a backhaul network to connect utility networks to consumers’ premises for 
communication and NAN data transmission [65]. A WAN aggregates data from multiple 
NANs and relays it to the utility provider’s private networks. The utility service provider’s 
WAN is also responsible for delivering a two-way communication network, required for 
substation communications, power quality monitoring, and distribution automation, while 
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associating aggregation and backhaul for the AMI along with any demand response and 
demand side management applications [68]. 
2.3 Internet of Things (IoT) 
Through the years, the era of information technology and pervasiveness of digital 
technologies has showed an exponential growth, with an increase in the numerous 
technological improvements available, offering a wealth of new services. Recently, the 
Internet of Things (IoT) has attracted a great deal of attention, since it involves several 
applications, including smart grids, control systems, remote healthcare, smart mobility, 
managing traffic flow and so on. In addition, it is expected to grow in popularity in the 
future. The term IoT was used by Kevin Ashton in 1999 to mean that all things – including 
physical, digital or any entity that has a chip placed inside it or can be identified via an IP-
address – are connected through wired and wireless networks [73]. Basically, it is ubiquitous 
connectivity with everyday objects communicating and operating constantly. This is leading 
to a smart world with ubiquitous computing and provides services that enable remote access 
and intelligent functionality [74]. However, over the past decade, the term has been 
integrated into a wide range of applications such as healthcare, control and monitoring, 
utilities and transport [75]. According to Rose et al. [76], the term Internet of Things can 
refer to “scenarios where network connectivity and computing capability extends to objects, 
sensors and everyday items not normally considered computers, allowing these devices to 
generate, exchange and consume data with minimal human intervention”. 
Table 2-1 Different communication technologies in a smart grid 
Technology Application Data rates Approx. Coverage 
ZigBee Used for HAN, home 
appliances and AMI 
250kbps 10 to 100m 
HomePlug It is a power line used for 
electricity wiring to 
communicate in HAN [64] 
14Mbps 
200Mbps 
300m 
WiMAX Demand response, 
AMI/wireless automatic meter 
reading (WAMR) 
75 Mbps 
 
50Km 
Cellular 
G3-PLC 
 
 
SCADA and controlling for 
RTUs AMI, demand response, 
monitoring for remote site 
[65]. 
240kbps 
33.4 kbps 
50Km 
6km 
 
 
 
 
41 
Satellite 
 
AMI, WAN 450 Kbps Depends on number of 
satellites and their beams 
  
Pervasive and ubiquitous sensing enabled by Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technologies 
has transformed the way we drive our personal and professional lives. In this technology-
oriented globe, WSN technologies are driving the economy and look like they can offer 
numerous opportunities in various applications by enabling the ability to measure, gather 
and realise environmental indicators, from mild ecosystems and natural resources, to urban 
environments and control systems. With the global attention on energy and water 
management and conservation, the Internet of Things is of great interest to extend the 
associated benefits of Smart Grids beyond automation, distribution and monitoring [77].  
2.3.1 Role of IoT in the Smart Grid 
 
Figure 2-6: Role of IoT in smart grids [79] 
The IoT scope provides three essential layers: perception (sensing layer), reliable 
transmission (network layer) and intelligent processing (application layer). The IoT enables 
real-time analysis of big data flows that could improve efficiency, reliability and economy 
of systems, for example, connecting all appliances in the smart house to save electricity or 
provide better monitoring. Therefore, the IoT is convenient, sustainable and makes things 
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intelligent everyday of future life [78]. From the Smart Grid perspective, the IoT provides a 
distributed computing intelligence across the whole infrastructure with the help of 
embedded nodes to achieve an efficient and effective management of Smart Grid 
infrastructure. From HAN to NAN and WAN to utility providers, the IoT, along with its key 
technologies such as radio frequency identification (RFID), sensor networks (WSNs), smart 
technology and nanotechnology, takes a dominant place due to the fact that it helps to 
provide real-time, accurate and comprehensive communication, data transmission and 
monitoring over power transmission and distribution [79]. The role of the IoT in the context 
of Smart Grids can be visualised from Figure 2-7 [79]: 
The growth of the IoT and Smart Grids is mutually supportive. On the one hand, the IoT 
used in a Smart Grid plays a crucial role to promote the development of Smart Grids and 
achieve real-time information gathering, monitoring and controlling of important operating 
parameters [80]. On the other hand, the intelligent communication networks have become a 
driving force towards the development of the IoT network paradigm [81]. 
2.3.1.1 Cloud of Things (CoT) 
The CoT represents an important extension of the IoT. The CoT refers to the virtualisation 
of IoT infrastructure to provide monitoring and control. IoT deployments typically generate 
large amounts of data that require computing as well as storage. A cloud infrastructure that 
can provide these resources can effectively offload the computing and storage requirements 
within the IoT network to the cloud. An added benefit is the ability to virtualise the 
underlying IoT infrastructure to provide monitoring and control from a single point. An 
application using IoT could therefore become a smart application. A CoT connects 
heterogeneous appliances to the virtual cloud domain. Both tangible and intangible objects 
(home appliances, sensor-based and network-enabled) and surrounding people can be 
integrated on a network or into a set of networks [82]. The CoT suggests a model consisting 
of a set of services (or commodities) that are delivered just like the traditional commodities. 
In other words, the CoT can provide a virtual infrastructure which can integrate analytic 
tools, monitoring devices and visualisation platforms [83]. Moreover, the CoT is a recent 
technological breakthrough that can enable end-to-end service provisioning for users and 
businesses to directly access applications on demand from anywhere, anytime [82].The 
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emerging CoT services will enable a new generation and intelligent use of a collection of 
applications that will be fed with real-time data and analysis, as shown in Figure 2-6. 
In a smart grid, the occupant expects to be able to monitor and control various systems in a 
home using a Home Management System, a typical CoT application. The operation is based 
on real-time data and two-way communication with renewable power generation. One of the 
main purposes of a smart home is to adapt to the green, energy saving, environmentally 
friendly concepts that have emerged in recent years. There are many applications involved 
with smart homes, including demand response, dynamic pricing, system monitoring, cold-
load pick-up, and the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions [84]. A CoT for a HAN is 
expected to play an important role in smart grids. The obvious benefits of deploying a CoT 
based on Smart Grids are improved storage, computing offload from the sensors and devices 
and faster access via the Internet [84]. The following are the summarised benefits of utilising 
a CoT in a smart grid: 
a) Better-quality storage ability, memory, and maintenance of the resources 
b) Reduced energy consumption of devices 
c) Real-time control and fast, extensive analytics 
d) Capability to support several platforms and OS. 
 
Figure 2-7: CoT for a smart grid 
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The efficiency and reliability of a Smart Grid severely depends on it having reliable and 
secure communication and control systems. These systems are becoming more and more 
sophisticated to achieve better and more reliable control. The high degree of reliability 
corresponds sophisticated security schemes to cope with cyber-attacks and breaches. The 
lack of strong security in power grid systems can cause severe damage to a nation’s economy 
and growth development, from small scale to large scale. In 2003, due to a Slammer Worm 
attack via a dial-up network connection on a computerised safety monitoring system, the 
Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio was turned down and it took a couple of hours to 
restore the service to normal [97]. In March 2008, the Hatch nuclear power plant in Georgia 
had an outage of over 48 hours due to the date on the control system being reset and badly 
damaging the safety system after a security update was applied and the machine was 
rebooted [98].  
Stuxnet is considered to be one of the first malicious coding attacks targeted at industrial 
control systems responsible for monitoring and controlling large-scale industrial facilities 
like power plants. In 2009 and 2010, Stuxnet, a 500-kilobyte computer worm, targeted Iran’s 
industrial sites and infected at least 14 sites and destroyed a thousand or more centrifuges at 
a uranium-enrichment plant [99]. A great threat is also posed by cascading power system 
failures, which allow intruders to bring down grid components, causing the collapse of the 
power transmission and blackouts such as the 2003 blackout in northeast US, a 2011 
blackout in California, Arizona and Mexico, and a 2011 blackout in 2012 [2]. In addition, 
the cyber-attack on Ukraine’s power network also highlighted the importance and challenges 
of security in the Smart Grid context [17].    
2.5 Security Challenges in the Smart Grid 
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Figure 2-8: Security requirements 
In smart grids, cyber security and privacy have been regarded as one of the 
biggest challenges due to the fact that power transmission and the communication network 
can be vulnerable in physical as well as cyberspace. According to the US National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), a Smart Grid must be able to cope with three severe 
security challenges: confidentiality (C), integrity (I) and availability (A), as shown in Figure 
2-8 [100]. This section provides an overview of security challenges in smart grids, including 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy as well as key management challenges and 
cyber-attacks.  
Figure 2-9 shows a taxonomy of security challenge concerns in the smart grid, where 
security challenges have been categorised based on host level, architectural level and 
credential level. The architectural challenges are further categorised under policy mapping, 
denial of service (DoS) to impact system’s availability and information security. The 
information security challenges such as confidentiality, integrity and authorisation 
challenges can be achieved through a cryptography mechanism with efficient key 
management approaches. 
Confidentiality
IntegrityAvailability
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Figure 2-9: Taxonomy of security challenges in the smart grid [101] 
2.5.1 Data Confidentiality 
In the context of Smart Grid authentication, the security parameters involve identifying the 
person authorised to get into the Smart Grid system and so thwart malicious activities. In 
order to secure the Smart Grid from unauthorised access to maintain the confidentiality. 
Abuse of confidentiality results from exposure of private information and, with the 
increasing accessibility of customer information over the communication network, ensuring 
confidentiality has become a significant challenge. Some examples of attacks targeting 
confidentiality are: illegitimate access to device memory, spoofing of payload, altering of a 
smart meter software, message replay and data injection attacks [102]. Therefore, it is very 
vital for the grid system to identity the legitimate and illegitimate users using secure 
authentication approaches and strategies to main confidentiality. To counter such attacks, 
encryption/decryption through secret key management approaches has been considered, in 
addition to device configuration reset, and replacing/removing compromised nodes.  
2.5.2 Integrity  
The integrity parameter of the security refers to the protection of the sensitive data against 
any interception and/or damage by illegitimate users. In the Smart Grid context, system 
integrity refers to the protection of measured sensitive data such as metering data, voltage 
readings, device status and control commands. The risk to integrity (i.e. system integrity, 
process integrity and data integrity) in a Smart Grid can come from various threats, such as 
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replay and data injection attacks and allowing intruders to get access to the entire network 
[92].  
2.5.3 Availability 
In the Smart Grid context, the availability parameter must be considered as the first priority 
since the availability of a power system plays a vital role in our everyday lives. Therefore, 
it is crucial to ensure that all the components of a Smart Grid are available and accessible to 
provide services to consumers. Malicious threats like denial-of-service (DoS) and/or 
distributed DoS (DDoS) can severely damage the system’s availability, such as causing 
degraded performance and blackout, impacting society as well as business. To counter such 
attacks, the replacement of a tempered attack, transmitting messages over a different channel 
frequency and updating secret keys have been considered. Consequently, there is a massive 
need to assess the impacts of and countermeasures for such attacks on a Smart Grid. 
2.5.4 Privacy  
With the advancement of savvy networks, the amount of sensitive data included and 
exploited within Smart Grids has significantly expanded in recent years. The deployment of 
Smart Grids and intelligent electronic devices (IED) can provide a massive amount of 
personal and sensitive information about consumers such as electricity usage, living pattern 
and habits, and their availability [103]. The privacy of consumers’ personal and sensitive 
data is vital to successful adoption and the deployment of smart grids, as poor privacy can 
expose both the consumer and the utility service provider to their competitors and malicious 
activities [45]. Therefore, a secure Smart Grid must integrate a framework to ensure that the 
measured data is going to be gathered, utilised and revealed under conditions offering strong 
protection.  
2.5.5 Key Management 
As a countermeasure to security threats and to enhance confidentiality, integrity and privacy 
within Smart Grid systems, encryption and authentication approaches based on 
cryptography keys are of great interest. The cryptography mechanisms have been 
categorised as symmetric and asymmetric/public key cryptography. The former mechanism 
(symmetric cryptography) is based on a single key shared between communication devices 
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whereas the latter mechanism (asymmetric cryptography) is based on a combination of 
public and private keys. Asymmetric cryptography mechanisms such as RSA [104] and 
Diffie-Hellman key [105] have been considered infeasible for IoT/sensor nodes because of 
the high computational complexity [45]. On the other hand, a symmetric cryptography 
mechanism, based on a single key, is faster and preserves less power; however, it presents 
the key management with challenges in maintaining confidentiality and integrity.  
A secure key, responsible for encrypting and decrypting data, is crucial to ensure secure 
communication. Unauthorised or illegitimate access to a secure key will result in a 
vulnerability threat to sensitive information, personal information, billing information, 
living style, habits and system control. It is, therefore, a secure management and validation 
of a secret key is a fundamental requirement for key management approaches and to enhance 
Smart Grid security and establishing a relationship of trust.  
2.5.5.1 Key Management Issues in the Smart Grid 
Due to a variety of communication components, the Smart Grid has been considered as a 
heterogeneous network infrastructure and generalised into four layers: application layer, 
communication layer, power control layer and power system layer, as shown in Figure 2-3. 
The selection and implementation of cryptography mechanism and thus the key management 
is vital in the Smart Grid context, due to heterogeneous infrastructure and resource-
constrained nature of the integrated nodes. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the network, 
a single key management approach is not an ideal approach for all networks – such as smart 
meter, AMI, NAN, and SCADA – in the Smart Grid [69]. Therefore, the key management 
approach must be considered based on the communication network and associated security 
requirements. According to [45], a secure and efficient key management approach is the 
combination of various processes such as key generation, key distribution, network joining 
and leaving process, key renewal, revoking and destruction process, additional node joining 
and replacement. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the network, network topology, 
transmission pattern and resource-constrained nature of the sensor nodes, key management 
has been a challenging issue.  
Due to the different network topologies of NAN networks (such as star, tree and mesh/partial 
mesh), the scope of key management varies significantly. The connectivity between 
neighbouring nodes in all three topologies varies significantly, therefore, a secure key 
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management scheme must be able to cope with the appropriate topology while ensuring all 
the vital processes of a secure and efficient key management approach, such as key 
generation, key distribution, network joining and leaving process, key renewal, revoking 
and destruction process, additional node joining and replacement [106]. 
In addition to network topology, network transmission (i.e. unicast, multicast and broadcast) 
can severely weaken the key management approach. A NAN can communicate via unicast, 
multicast and broadcast transmission; therefore, a key management scheme must be able to 
cope with all types of communication while maintaining security. In [45], a key management 
scheme based on a key graph was proposed for the AMI considering unicast, multicast and 
broadcast transmission. The key management scheme provides the key generation, key 
freshness, authentication and integrity, and forward and backward security. However, it 
lacks the key distribution, key destruction, key renewal/revoking and node replacement 
phases to ensure security.  
According to [45], a secure and efficient key management approach is a combination of 
various processes such as key generation, key distribution, network joining and leaving 
process, key renewal, revoking and destruction process, additional node joining and 
replacement. Considering the fact that a Smart Grid consists of millions of interconnected 
devices spread across a large number of locations, the key management scheme must be 
scalable to dynamically adapt the network to integrate all key management processes. 
2.5.5.2 Meta-system Interconnections  
The Smart Grid is a type of meta-system where a single computing resource composed of a 
heterogeneous group of autonomous computers (HAN, NAN and WAN) is linked together 
by a network. The meta-system interconnections raise various challenges, a critical one of 
which is security, as it opens doors for an intruder to execute an attack from any component 
of the meta-system. Key management for securing communication between components in 
a Smart Grid is a fundamental requirement. However, due to the meta-system and 
heterogeneity of the smart grid, a single key management scheme is not ideal to fit all 
components [107]. Therefore, the security requirement in a meta-system like a Smart Grid 
must be considered based on the components involved in communication.  
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In addition to security, interconnections in meta-systems generate exceptional volumes of 
data, speed and complexity with ad-hoc data exchange in which centralised coordination 
and control is very difficult to achieve [108]. The management of metadata in Smart Grid 
meta-systems is a highly challenging task. A suitable information and communication 
architecture is required to allow seamless communication and data exchange to avoid data 
uncertainty, vastness or integration issues.  
2.6 Attacks on the Smart Grid 
Smart Grids are vulnerable to various threats and attacks like node capture (NC) attacks, 
denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks, replay attacks, data 
injection/alteration attacks, identity spoofing attack, and compromised key attack. Some of 
the critical attacks are discussed below.  
2.6.1 Node Capture Attack 
In the Smart Grid context, a node capture (NC) attack is one of the most severe threats due 
to the unattended nature of the integrated sensor nodes. As the name implies, a NC attack 
allows an intruder to capture a node and get access to the system by compromising the secure 
key, node identification, and the data transmitted between node and network [109] [110]. In 
the context of HAN and NAN, a node can easily be compromised due to a node capture 
attack. Figure 2-10(a) shows the NAN topology with normal nodes without any 
compromised node, whereas Figure 2-10(b) shows the NAN topology with two 
compromised nodes due to a node capture attack as a threat to NAN topology.  
In Kifayat et al. [111] , three critical factors responsible for opening a door and leading 
intruders to capture and compromise the node and so the entire network, have been 
highlighted. These three critical factors are cryptography, node deployment and node 
density. 
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Figure 2-10: NAN topologies - impact of compromised nodes 
 Cryptography: Cryptography and key management are considered to enhance the 
security of data transmitted across the AMI and authenticate the involved nodes. A 
weak and poor key management approach can become a threat for the entire network 
as a compromised node can allow an intruder to get access to sensitive information.  
 Node Deployment: A node deployment plays a critical as it defines the NC attack’s 
scope. In the Smart Grid context, a neighbourhood area network (NAN) can be 
deployed in the form of star, tree and mesh topology. The impact of an NC attack on 
a Smart Grid can vary based on the network topology, such as the fewer the 
communication links between neighbouring nodes (such as tree topology), the 
greater the possibility for an intruder to threaten the entire network, as evident in 
Figure 2-11(a). In contrast to tree topology, mesh topology provides a higher number 
of communication links, reducing the possibility for an intruder to threaten the entire 
network. Thus, mesh topology provides more routes between neighbouring nodes, 
and is therefore more resilient to NC attacks.  
 Node Density: A Smart Grid such as a NAN with high node density can be severely 
threatened by an NC attack as the higher the node density, the larger the network for 
the intruder to target.  
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Figure 2-11: NAN topologies (Tree, Mesh and Star) 
2.6.2 Denial of Service (DoS) 
The denials of service (DoS) and/or distributed denial of service (DDoS) are a common type 
of attack on communication networks. The DoS/DDoS attacks target the system availability 
by thwarting message delivery through delaying, blocking or corrupting the communication 
between Smart Grid components. The availability of a Smart Grid is its fundamental 
requirement and therefore the Smart Grid system must be secure enough against the DoS 
attacks at all communication layers, such as physical layer, MAC layer, network and 
transport layer [107]. Table 2.2 shows the DoS attacks based on the communication layer in 
the context of power system. 
Table 2-2: DoS attacks in Power Systems [107] 
Communication Layer Attacks in Power System 
Physical layer Jamming in substations 
MAC layer ARP spoofing 
Network/Transport layer Traffic flooding, Buffer flooding 
 Physical Layer: The data flow between the network components in a Smart Grid 
significantly relies on the communication channel. If the communication channel 
between nodes and the control centre becomes the target of a DoS attack (i.e. 
jamming the communication through injecting a large number of packets) by an 
intruder, then it can significantly affect the power substation system’s performance 
due to delayed delivery of time-critical messages [112]. Due to the delay-constrained 
nature of the Smart Grid infrastructure, even a low-level DoS attack (jamming the 
network to add delay) can cause severe damage by adding to the delay for time-
critical control communication. 
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 MAC Layer: In addition to jamming at the physical layer, spoofing (i.e. 
masquerading as another device to inject fake information) is a relatively severe 
threat at the MAC layer as it targets both the system’s availability and integrity. From 
the Smart Grid perspective, a compromised node can broadcast fake address 
resolution protocol (ARP) packets to bring down the connectivity of smart nodes to 
substation nodes [113]. 
 Network and Transport Layer: Network and transport layers are vulnerable to DoS 
threats due to the TCP/IP protocol model and the multi-hop communication. DoS 
attacks such as distributed traffic flooding and worm propagation over the Internet 
via network and transport layers can cause severe damage to the entire network 
[107]. In a study by Jin et al.[114]. The impact of a buffer-flooding DoS attack on a 
DNP3-based SCADA network was evaluated. DNP3 protocol has been widely used 
in power SCADA systems to communicate the observed sensor state information to 
the control centre. It is highlighted that SCADA systems are quite vulnerable to DoS 
attacks like buffer flooding. 
In the context of HAN and NAN, a node can easily be compromised due to a node capture 
attack. The compromised node can be used to trigger a DoS attack, where a compromised 
node illegitimately sends a large number of malicious packets or performs malicious activity 
at a rate, which can severely upset the communication between nodes. In the context of 
HAN/NAN, where multi-hop communication is common, the DoS attack can exhaust nodes’ 
storage, computing and processing capability. The scope of the attack can vary based on the 
network topologies, as shown in Figure 2.11. It is therefore clear that Smart Grids must be 
secured to avoid DoS/DDoS attacks.  
2.6.3 Sybil Attack 
A Sybil is a malicious and masquerading type of attack in which a malicious or compromised 
node represents multiple forged identifications similar to other normal/honest nodes. The 
normal nodes, due to their lack of ability to distinguish forged nodes, are misled into 
communicating with malicious nodes [115]. This enables malicious and compromised nodes 
to attack routing, data aggregation, fault-tolerant schemes, resource allocation and 
misbehaviour detection protocols and sensitive data flowing in the network to damage the 
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system’s efficiency, confidentiality and integrity [116]. Zhang et al, discussed three Sybil 
attack domains, named as community, social and mobile domain, in the context of IoT to 
define the edge and the capability of the intruder, as shown in Figure 2-12 [117].  
 
Figure 2-12: Types of Sybil attacks [117] 
In the community Sybil attack as shown in Figure 2-12, intruders build the connections with 
the Sybil community with other malicious nodes. In community-level Sybil attacks, the 
connectivity with normal/honest nodes is not strong, due to limited connectivity. As 
compared to a community Sybil attack, a social Sybil attack shows that a malicious node 
can connect with other Sybil nodes as well as with normal/honest nodes. Due to more social 
connectivity, Sybil social attack is more vulnerable to Smart Grid as AMI is more exposed 
to the intruder. As compared to both community and social Sybil attacks in the mobile 
domain is dependent on the dynamic topology due to the node mobility. Due to its dynamic 
nature, it is less vulnerable to attack compared to community and social Sybil attack as the 
latter attacks allow intruders to attack a static network.  
In the context of the HAN and NAN, a node can easily be compromised due to a node 
capture attack. The compromised node can be used to trigger a Sybil attack, where a 
compromised node illegitimately claims multiple identities as Sybil nodes to the HAN and 
the Gateway. Figure 2-13(a) shows the NAN topology with normal nodes without any 
compromised node or Sybil attack. Due to a node capture attack, a node (SM) has been 
compromised, as shown in Figure 2-13(b), as a threat to the whole NAN topology. The 
intruder exploits the compromised node to initiate a Sybil attack, as shown in Figure 2-13(c), 
where a compromised attack represents the multiple forged identifications as SM w, x, y, 
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and z to other nodes in the NAN to retrieve confidential data, mislead other nodes, severely 
affect the network traffic and report false readings. 
 
Figure 2-13: Sybil attack due to compromised node in the NAN 
The interconnectivity of SMs in the NAN is collectively referred to as advanced metering 
infrastructure (AMI) and is vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Detecting and eliminating a Sybil 
attack quickly and accurately has been a key challenge due to the resource-constrained 
nature of sensor nodes integrated into the Smart Grid as they present a trade-off between 
security and adopting learning to defend against a Sybil attack. The integration of strong 
cryptography and authentication approaches can be used to prevent a Sybil attack by 
restricting compromised node from pretending to be legitimate nodes.  
2.6.4 Replay Attacks and Data Injections  
Intruders can deploy a replay attack by secretly capturing, intercepting and resending 
(replaying) the data packets back into the system. A message secretly recorded by an intruder 
can hold secret information, allowing the intruder to intercept/modify by injecting data and 
then resending the data packet with the same privileges to gain access to the system. In the 
Smart Grid context, an intruder can secretly record the data transmitted from a consumer to 
smart meters and evaluate it to get the consumer’s power usage routine. Based on the 
analysis, the intruder can exploit access to the smart meter by injecting the control signals 
into the system, such as AMI [118]. Figure 2-14 shows an example of a replay and data 
injection attack, where an intruder exploits the compromised attack to listen, record, 
intercept and replay the data to mislead other nodes and report fraudulent readings. The 
access can be used to damage the system, reduce the system’s performance or steal 
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electricity. One of the prime examples of a replay attack is the Stuxnet worm, which targeted 
Iran’s nuclear programme [99]. The Stuxnet worm allowed intruders to remotely access the 
sensing and actuating devices to intercept and inject malicious code into the software 
program to initiate coordinated attacks against the SCADA infrastructure. In addition to 
damaging the system, replay attack and data injection can be used to steal energy[119]. 
Strong encryption and a secure key management scheme can protect Smart Grids against 
replay attacks and data injection. 
 
Figure 2-14: Replay and data injection attacks due to a compromised node in the NAN 
2.6.5 Repudiation Attack 
Considering the fact that a Smart Grid consists of millions of interconnected devices spread 
across a large number of locations, one of the fundamental requirements of the energy 
suppliers and end-consumer value-added energy service is the assurance that data flowing 
over the communication network is coming from the entities responsible for it. A lack of 
non-repudiation is one of the major barriers to building a trustworthy Smart Grid as it can 
cause energy theft, wrong meter readings and so affect the billing information [120]. 
Therefore, it is vital to have Smart Grid nodes should not be able to repudiate. Repudiation 
attacks can be controlled by integrating strong cryptography with efficient key management 
and mutual inspection strategies to ensure that data or control information has been issued 
by the actual source responsible for that action [102, 120]  
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2.6.6 Eavesdropping Attack 
Wireless communication is one of the fundamental forms of communication in smart grids. 
Wireless communication is carried out in open space and is therefore vulnerable to 
eavesdropping attacks by an intruder. Eavesdropping attacks can allow intruders to catch 
sensitive information from smart meters to analyse the consumers’ living patterns and 
damage confidentiality and integrity. Integrating strong cryptography with efficient key 
management can control such attacks.  
2.7 Summary    
Table 2-3: Attacks on a HAN and their impact 
 
The HAN and NAN are subject to a variety of attacks and require specific mitigation 
features to be built into any scheme that provides security for the NAN and HAN. We put 
down the potential attacks, their impact and the necessary mitigation features for each attack. 
From that, we derive the security features that the schemes we intend to design must possess 
to secure the HAN and the NAN. Table 2-3 provides the list of potential attacks in a HAN 
and their impact. Table 2-4 that provides the potential mitigation features required in the 
security scheme to be designed for the HAN follows it. A similar approach is taken to arrive 
at the necessary security features for the security scheme to be designed for the NAN, in 
Table 2-5. All these requirements are used to compare the features available in the security 
schemes available for smart grid security, in the following chapter where we review the 
existing literature available. 
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Table 2-4: Security requirements for a HAN 
 
Table 2-5 shows the most important attacks that could target the NAN. The security 
requirements from the NAN are drawn from the potential impact of the attacks. The table 
also summarises the potential mitigation techniques in the last column. The scheme for the 
NAN must take into account the attack mitigation factors drawn from this table. 
Table 2-5: Security requirements for a NAN 
Attacks Attack impact Security 
Requirements 
Potential mitigation  
NAN 
sniffing 
 Capture data and 
spurious data injection  
High Authentication (A)+ 
encryption (E) + time 
stamp (TS) 
NAN comm. 
blocking 
Block packets sent over 
the NAN 
Medium A+E 
NAN msg. 
tampering 
Tamper meter data in 
order to alter charges  
High A+E+TS 
Neighbor 
meter DoS 
Stop normal data traffic  High A+E+TS 
Concentrated 
node DoS 
Stop normal data traffic  High A+E+TS 
Node capture 
attack  
Steal all the information 
stored within the node.  
High A+E+TS 
Replay 
attack and 
Sybil attack  
Loss of control, spurious 
data injection, Stop 
systems work as normal.  
High A+E+TS 
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The research for Smart Grid technologies is growing rapidly as the demand for more 
responsive and resilient energy delivery rises across the globe. The fundamental technology 
to integrate intelligence into the grid has been in place for decades. However, recent times 
have seen fast-tracking technological developments and shifting priorities among utility 
companies, with renewable generation and increased consumer storage to achieve efficient 
and effective power performance and management and cope with rising power demand, the 
increasing proportion of renewables, fluctuating energy generation, and electricity 
blackouts. However, this raises various challenges ranging from reliability to efficiency, 
economics and energy storage technology, to big data management and integration, and 
privacy and security.  
In the Smart Grid context, cyber security and privacy have been regarded as one of the 
biggest challenges due the fact that the enormous amount of data storage and transmission 
might reveal personal information such as end-users’ activities, billing information, habits, 
their preferences, and energy usage. The enormous exchanges of information and messages 
have raised severe security threats. Therefore, the critical and sensitive information and 
control messages need to be protected against unauthorised access and vulnerability threats. 
In this chapter, various security challenges including secret key management and attacks 
have been discussed. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3. Introduction 
The Smart Grid contains heterogeneous communication networks, including small-scale 
(e.g., a substation system) and large-scale (e.g., the AMI system) networks, wireless and 
wire-line networks. Thus, it handles critical and sensitive information and control messages 
need to be protected against unauthorised access and vulnerability threats. The previous 
chapter, several security issues, challenges and security requirements including key 
management and authentication have been discussed.  
This chapter presents, highlights and considers various key management schemes. In 
general, it is observed that there are two approaches taken for the initial authentication with 
the network – using a pre-deployed key or dynamically generating a key. Most schemes 
prefer to use a symmetric key and justify its use with the low computing power required, the 
low computing delay and the low storage required due to the reduced key length (typically 
128 to 160 bits). However, there are schemes that choose to use asymmetric key 
cryptography, designating an upstream server as a trusted CA. Such schemes use 
asymmetric key cryptography for the initial authentication and key exchange. A symmetric 
key is used for encrypting data exchanged.  
Schemes that are originally designed for WSNs can be effectively implemented for Smart 
Grid use. Table 3-1 gives a brief comparison of the features of a WSN and a SG network. 
However, there are certain factors that determine the suitability of a specific key 
management solution. These factors depend upon the functional topology of the Smart Grid 
segment where the devices are deployed (i.e., a HAN or a NAN). The functional topology, 
in turn depends upon the data flow patterns (i.e., sensor-to-sensor or sensor-to-NOC), the 
direction of the flow, radio range and connectivity (single hop vs multi-hop) and the data 
reliability required. This impacts the type of communication that is used to distribute the 
keys – unicast and multicast/broadcast. Likewise, the choice of using a unique key per sensor 
or a group key is impacted. Added to these are the limitations of the sensor devices in terms 
of energy use, computing capability and memory storage. The various key management 
schemes presented address different aspects mentioned above. It is therefore evident that 
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each of the schemes is efficient for a specific set of factors and no single scheme claims to 
provide a generic solution, deployable across the Smart Grid, efficiently.  
Table 3-1: Major differences between WSN and SG networks 
Features WSN SG 
Connectivity Mostly, ad hoc Structured 
Security requirement High High 
Functionality Monitor and 
control 
Two way exchange data, monitor 
and control, new electricity 
generation facilities. 
Heterogeneous network  No  Yes 
Performance Limited-
resource devices 
Limited-resource and high-
resource devices 
The Smart Grid contains heterogeneous communication networks, including small-scale 
(e.g., a substation system) and large-scale (e.g., the AMI system) networks, wireless and 
wire-line networks. Moreover, it handles with critical and sensitive information and control 
messages need to be protected against unauthorised access and vulnerability threats. The 
security issues and challenges including key management and attacks have been discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
 It is not practical to design a single key management infrastructure to generate and distribute 
keys for all networks in the Smart Grid. Moreover, key management on a Smart Grid is to 
be performed and protected in its communication networks among various parties such as a 
smart meter, AMI, sensors, IED and SCADA. Therefore, it is not practical to design a single 
key management infrastructure to generate and distribute keys for all systems and parties in 
the smart grid. Furthermore, it is important to consider the security requirements of various 
systems in the Smart Grid for chosen key management schemes [121]. Many approaches 
have been proposed so far to implement a key management system for smart grids. In order 
to understand the key management issues and inconveniences for smart grids, we first need 
to review and compare these recently proposed approaches and architectures aimed at 
distributing and managing authenticated keys for Smart Grid systems.  
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In [106], a protocol is proposed that provides secure unicast, multicast, and broadcast 
communications in a Smart Grid network. This protocol applies a binary tree approach that 
supports these three kinds of secure communications. It reduces the computation overhead 
and protects communication in unicast, multicast, and broadcast scenarios. However, the 
efficiency of the computation overhead is unknown when one or more nodes leave or join 
the session. The communications overhead is also unknown. Dapeng et al. proposed a key 
management scheme for smart grids. They analysed the key management requirements for 
a Smart Grid such as the proposed scheme, and found that they have to be efficient and 
scalable due to the transmission and reception of the low-power sensors to ensure mutual 
authentication between a sensor and an aggregator [122]. They proposed a key management 
scheme for use in Smart Grids that meets these requirements. The proposed scheme is based 
on a public key and secure Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol. They tested the 
scheme by launching a man-in-the-middle attack, and the replay attack, which can be 
successfully rejected. Furthermore, they addressed the issue of additional vulnerabilities in 
session keys and communication. The main advantages of this scheme are high security, 
scalability, fault-tolerance, and accessibility. However, they mixed both PKI and trusted 
anchors, which increases complications for the Smart Grid since these schemes require at 
least two different types of server for the PKI and the trust anchors.  
Hasen et al proposed a novel key management protocol for data communication between 
the utility server and customers’ smart meters. The model is mainly between home smart 
meter and a security associate in the utility, which covers unicast and multicast 
communications [123]. The protocol improves the network overhead caused by security key 
management controlling packets, and at the same time it can prevent attacks like the 
aforementioned man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. However, the authentication method 
between the SM and the appliances inside the HAN has not been addressed.  
3.1 Key management in the Home area network (HAN) in a Smart grid 
Literature specific to key management in Home area networks is discussed in this section. 
A HAN is a network connecting home devices such as smart TV and other smart appliances 
into a utility provider’s smart meter system. In this way, energy demand could be better 
managed and load balancing will be more efficient. However, along with the economic 
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benefits it offers, the HAN is also exposed to potential attacks, and so key management is 
important to combat the potential threat. 
The authors in [22] presented a mutual authentication scheme and key management protocol 
for a HAN. The scheme allocates a Trusted Agent (TA) for every HAN with the assumption 
that the communication topology is mesh. Mutual authentication is performed between the 
nodes and a TA using a public/private key pair technique that is based on identity-based 
cryptography. Their scheme has two layers consisting of public/private key pair and a 
symmetric key. However, using public and private keys between the nodes and a TA for the 
HAN node that have limited resources contributes to increase in delay overheads and the 
energy budget. In [23], the authors presented a session key exchange scheme in a HAN to 
protect against replay attacks between HAN nodes and a smart meter by the use of a 
freshness counter. The solution offers protection against replay attacks by using 
handshaking and self-generating timestamps. 
 In [21], the authors presented an authentication and key exchange protocol for secure 
password verification and session key generation over an insecure communication channel. 
The protocol uses Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) and stores verifiers instead of the 
passwords. AKE uses a one-way hash function in computing the verifier and then stores the 
verifier in the server. Also compromising the server and finding the verifier is not enough 
since the password is still required. In SRP, the user enters a password and then a verifier is 
computed from the password along with a randomly generated password salt. The user 
name, salt and verifier are all stored in the server database. Finally, the client can now be 
authenticated to the server. 
[27] proposed an efficient scheme that mutually authenticates a smart meter of a home area 
network (HAN) and an authentication server in the Smart Grid (Smart Grid) by utilising an 
initial password, by decreasing the number of steps in the secure remote password protocol 
from five to three and the number of exchanged packets from four to three. Furthermore, the 
author proposes an efficient key management protocol based on an enhanced identity-based 
cryptography for secure Smart Grid communications using the public key infrastructure. 
These proposed mechanisms are capable of preventing various attacks while reducing the 
management overhead. The improved efficiency for key management is realised by 
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periodically refreshing all public/private key pairs as well as any multicast keys in all the 
nodes using only one newly generated function broadcasted by the key generator entity. 
3.2 Key management for NAN  
In their paper, Seo et al [26] proposed an efficient encryption key management mechanism 
for end-to-end security in the AMI. By applying certificate-less public key cryptography 
(CL-PKC) for smart meter key management, the approach eliminates certificate 
management overhead at the utility. Moreover, this mechanism is practical, because it does 
not require any extra hardware for authentication of the smart meters. In this approach, the 
utility supports a PKI and has its own public key certificate, but the smart meters are not 
required to have certificates. Instead of using certificates for the smart meters, the concept 
of using CL-PKC to generate and manage the smart meter keys is utilised. Unlike the utility, 
which is a static entity, smart meters are dynamic entities, which often leave or join the AMI. 
If smart meters are required to have certificates, the utility has the burden of managing these 
certificates. 
In CL-PKC, each user’s complete private key is a combination of a partial private key 
generated by a Key Generation Centre (KGC) and an additional secret generated by the user. 
The advantage of this approach is that the KGC is not prone to the problem of key escrow, 
because the KGC is no longer responsible for the user’s complete private key. Therefore, 
even if an attacker compromises the KGC, they cannot obtain the users’ private keys. 
Moreover, the special structure of CL-PKC allows a user to encrypt a message without 
having to verify the public key of the message receiver via a public key certificate. By 
utilising CL-PKC key settings for smart meters, the authors eliminate the utility’s overhead 
of certificate management.  
[28] proposed protecting consumers’ sensitive energy usage information by the use of a 
virtual ring architecture that can provide a privacy protection solution using symmetric or 
asymmetric encryptions of customers’ requests belonging to the same group. They 
compared the efficiency of the proposed approach with two recently proposed Smart Grid 
privacy approaches, namely, one based on blind signature and other based on a 
homomorphic encryption solution. They showed that this approach maintains the customers’ 
privacy while reducing the performance overhead of the cryptographic computations by 
more than a factor of 2 when compared with the scheme in [26]. It is further demonstrated 
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that the Smart Grid privacy solution is simple, scalable, cost-effective, and incurs minimal 
computational processing overheads. The proposed solution can support both symmetric and 
asymmetric encryption based authentication schemes. Furthermore, they demonstrated that 
the privacy solution is computationally more efficient and is more resilient to a wide range 
of attacks such as replay, known session key and man-in-the middle attacks. 
3.3 Key management in the IoT 
From the 1990s, large, multifunctional intelligent sensors were developed for various 
applications [4, 5]. This advancement continued with the fast development of sensors with 
radio, which became a trend in the field of sensor networks. Wireless sensor networks are 
designed to be low cost, have easy deployment and very low operation maintenance. Today, 
the application of wireless sensor networks is found in almost every endeavour, from 
hazardous environments such as earthquake and volcano monitoring [6] where it is 
dangerous for humans to take measurements, to medical sensors used in monitoring human 
health. Other applications include in the military, agriculture and the environment. Security 
has been a challenge to implement on sensor-based devices due to the constrained resource 
availability. Specifically, cryptographic implementations are limited by processing power, 
ability to generate random numbers and the ability to generate large primes. Key 
management experiences from WSN implementations are used to design the key 
management schemes for the smart grid applications.  
LEAP [128] is a Key Management protocol. It aims to increase the protection of non-
security protocols. It supports four kinds of keys to each node. One node is shared with the 
base station, which contains individual keys. Then pair-wise keys are shared with nearby 
nodes. Cluster keys are shared with a set of nearby nodes. Finally, one key, which is a group 
key, is shared with all nodes in the network. LEAP supports a protocol to authenticate local 
broadcast. Furthermore, it supports in-network processing for its key sharing. Therefore, it 
sufficiently protects the sensor networks from many security attacks. Finally, the LEAP 
scheme is effective for key creation and key updating while maintaining the necessity of 
small storage for each node.  
3.4 Group-Based Key management  
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Group-Based Key management is implemented for multicast communication to offer a common 
and efficient management solution to the deployment of a symmetric group key to all nodes. 
A group key management protocol is central to the preservation of privacy in the multicast 
communication in a Smart Grid and it computes the symmetric group key and forwards the 
partial keys to all genuine multicast nodes. When a member joins or leaves the group, the 
group-based key management protocol should update the shared key so that only current 
group members understand it. This process is also known as rekeying, and is grouped into 
either individual rekey or periodical batch rekey. The former rekeys the group key for every 
group membership update such as joining /leaving. The latter processes the joining and 
leaving requests in a batch at the end of each rekey interval.  
Harn proposed a Group Authentication Scheme (GAS), where the role of a group manager 
is responsible for registering all members of the group and issuing a distinct token to each 
member [10]. Subsequently, the members of the group authenticate and interact with each 
other without the need for the group manager’s involvement. They propose a non-interactive 
basic t-secure m-user n-group authentication scheme ((t; m; n) GAS), where t is the threshold 
of the proposed scheme; m is the number of users participating, and n is the total number of 
group members. This scheme, based on Shamir’s secret sharing [11], works for synchronous 
communications only. Therefore, they also propose an asynchronous (t; m; n) GAS, which 
can determine whether all users that participate in a group actually belong to that group [10]. 
The proposal in [10] is primarily for a many-to-many communication within a group (intra-
group). It enables autonomous authentication within the group as well as detection of invalid 
members. The requirement for a Smart Grid scenario that we consider does not necessarily 
require a many-to-many characteristic. In addition, the limiting factor for the authentication 
scheme is the threshold t. There is no estimate of the scalability of t or the generic suitability 
of the scheme to resource-constrained devices. In the specific scenario we consider, the 
proposal in [10] is over-dimensioned. 
Mahalle et al., present a Group Authentication scheme for IoT based on Threshold 
Cryptography-based Group Authentication (TCGA) [12]. They extend [10] to use Pallier 
Threshold Cryptography [13], using its properties, namely, homomorphic addition, 
indistinguishability, and self-binding. Primarily, they address the problem of different 
groups (applications) requiring communicating with each other. The authentication scheme 
has a pre-authentication phase where a group head does the key distribution and followed 
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by a group authentication phases where a secret session key is distributed. The group 
members rely on the group head to initiate all group communication. They demonstrate that 
their scheme performs better than [10]. However, the implementation is on WiFi based 
laptops and reflects a scaled performance of their scheme on IoT platforms. Our scenario 
does not require communication within the group. Group members do not need to 
communicate between themselves. The authentication is centrally done and the intermediate 
nodes verify that a downstream node is already authenticated.  We also intend to use only 
symmetric encryption on the motes to minimize any processing delays at the intermediate 
nodes.  
 Yang et al., propose a generic framework for group authentication [14]. Their scenario 
considers password-based authentication in one go, for a user group. The focus is on 
reducing the time taken for authentication, like in [13], rather than authentication of a 
member, anonymously. The scheme is fairly close to our application scenario since the 
hierarchy of authentication (NOC – Gateway - Device) is quite similar (Server - group 
authenticator – end user). However, there is no evidence that it is applicable for low resource 
devices that we consider or the fact that the scheme will work (similar to the proposal in [9]) 
for multi-hop scenarios where an intermediate device requires to perform authenticated 
forwarding, as in our case. 
Wang et al., present a group authentication and a group key distribution scheme for ad hoc 
networks [15]. They argue that conventional group authentication protocols cannot serve the 
requirements of ad hoc networks since there is no designated group leader and the fact that 
the number of nodes in the network are not known in advance and can change dynamically. 
Therefore, schemes such as those in [10, 13] cannot be deployed. The scheme proposed uses 
an identity based bilinear pairing. There are five distinct phases, which include a join and 
leave phases for the individual nodes. This is quite similar to the key management 
architecture schemes for SCADA networks discussed in [16]. Again, there is no specific 
mention of a multi-hop scenario requiring authenticated forwarding. Multi-hop scenarios are 
necessary for functional grouping as well as to build the radio path up to the NOC. Unlike 
in the case of WLANs used in [19], the radio range and the transmit power of the motes that 
we consider, are limited.  
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Nicanfar et al., address the authentication between a smart meter and the utility server 
termed as a Security Associate (SA). The SA is a dedicated server delegated to perform 
authentication by the central server at the NOC and is used for authentication by a group of 
SMs. They propose two separate schemes for authentication and key management, termed 
Smart GridAS and Smart GridKM, respectively. They propose a four-phase authentication 
approach, which has not been implemented and measured for performance [17]. They 
consider a mesh topology for SMs constituting the NAN, and use WiMax for 
interconnecting the smart meters. Their work is fairly close to the scenario we consider, 
from a topological perspective. Their functional requirement is similar to our requirement 
in that the authentication has to be done with a central entity. However, they delegate the 
central authentication autonomy to the SA. There are clear differences in the scenario we 
consider. Firstly, in our scenario such an intermediate node is merely a SM with the role of 
a gateway and with no autonomy. The risk of such delegation, we believe, is that the SA 
nodes are susceptible targets for attacks and can cause considerable impact in terms of the 
central server delegating the autonomy to a backup SA and the reachability of the SA from 
the end nodes. Secondly, They do not consider what we term as “authenticated forwarding”. 
The traffic from the downstream nodes is not validated at the intermediate nodes. Thirdly, 
they use an asymmetric encryption method for privacy and a broadcast mechanism for key 
distribution. We believe, which key distribution via broadcast does reduce the 
communication overhead, multicast is a more secure option. Our scenario uses a single 
central entity for authentication and individually distributes the keys to each of the nodes.  
Subir et al. [130] proposed a unified key management mechanism (UKMF) that can generate 
ciphering keys for multiple protocols of multiple communication layers from a single peer 
entity authentication procedure. The unified key management mechanism is suitable for 
Smart Grid use, especially for smart metering, where smart meters are assumed to be low-
cost wireless devices for which repeated peer entity authentication attempts for each 
protocol can be included to increase system overhead. The proposed mechanism is flexible 
in that peer entity authentication can be treated as either network access authentication or 
application-level authentication. However, the mechanism has established that information 
discovery for bootstrap application ciphering is an important and as yet missing piece in 
realising the unified key management framework vision. This part needs further analysis.  
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Yee et al. [29] proposed a key management for a wide area measurement system in a smart 
grid. The scheme targeted a concrete set of security objectives derived from NIST's security 
impact-level ratings. For multicasting, they identified multicast authentication as the 
primary challenge. In the scheme, they used TV-HORS for the multicasting authentication. 
A lightweight and distributed group authentication scheme for ad-hoc network devices is 
presented in [09]; however, performance analysis of the proposed scheme is not discussed 
in this work. In particular, they propose [12] a secure and reliable innetwork collaborative 
communication scheme to provide a secure and reliable AMI in a Smart Grid with smart 
meters interconnected through a multi-hop wireless network. Here, the AMI system 
approach can provide trusted services, data privacy and reliability by mutual authentications 
whenever a new smart meter starts and connects to the Smart Grid AMI network. Data 
integrity and confidentiality are accomplished through message authentication and 
encryption services respectively using the corresponding keys established in the mutual 
authentications. A transmission method is proposed to ease the data collection and 
management message delivery between smart meters and a local collector for AMI 
communications. The performance of the proposed security scheme is verified through 
simulations, and results show that the proposed method has a better end-to-end delay and 
packet losses compared with a basic security method, and the proposed method can provide 
secure and reliable communications for AMIs in Smart Grid systems.  
LiSH+ is a group key management scheme characterised by developing a secure self-healing 
mechanism with t-revocation and collusion resistance capability. For the key management, 
a dual direction hash chain is employed to guarantee both the backward secrecy and forward 
secrecy of the group key. The self-healing mechanism was implemented to ensure 
availability of group members in case of device failure and prevent the collusive users from 
exploiting the group key in the proposed scheme. When a node is compromised, the 
compromised users could be revoked from the group dynamically by the broadcasting 
message [29].  
In [12], the Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH), every group member contributes to 
the group key generation. It has the advantage of fault-tolerance. However, for group 
membership changes, it lacks scalability in terms of computational cost. TGDH has some 
other drawbacks. Every group member performs the expensive Diffie-Hellman key 
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exchange with times exponentiation operations for every group membership update where 
n is the group size. Secondly, every sponsor should sign and forward a large number of 
rekeying multicast messages to update a group key. This results in expensive communication 
overhead and computational costs. Table 5 shows other Benefits and Limitation of Group 
Key Management Schemes. 
In [12], the Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH), every group member contributes to 
the group key generation. It has the advantage of fault-tolerance. However, for group 
membership changes, it lacks scalability in terms of computational cost. TGDH has some 
other drawbacks. Every group member performs the expensive Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange with times exponentiation operations for every group membership update where 
n is the group size. Secondly, every sponsor should sign and forward a large number of 
rekeying multicast messages to update a group key. This results in expensive communication 
overhead and computational costs.  
A GSA [30] is a scheme that aggregates in three categories of SAs, namely: Categories 1 
and 2, which take place between the KD and a member, and Category 3, which takes place 
among members. The first category (SA-1) is for bidirectional unicast communication 
between the KD and a group member. It is initiated by a member, to “pull” GSA information, 
including the SA, keys and SA-3, from the KD, to either join the group, or re-join after 
getting disconnected. Hence, it is also referred to as the pull SA or registration SA. Only the 
KD and the corresponding member know this SA.  
The second category (SA-2) is required for the unidirectional multicast transmission of key 
management or control messages from the KD to every group member. Since the control 
messages include the update or replacement of SA-3, it can be said that SA-2 is used to 
update SA-3. SA-2 is used by the KD to “push” rekeying messages and the SA updates to 
the members. Hence, it is also known as the push SA or rekeying SA. The KD and all 
members know this SA. The third category (SA-3) is required for the unidirectional 
multicast transmission from member sender to member receivers. Since it is used to secure 
the data traffic, it is also referred to as the data security SA. The KD and all members of the 
group know this SA.  
3.5 Authentication and Key Management for AMI  
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The authors in [45] proposed key management for an AMI system which is built based on 
the key graph. They define the secure exchange between a Management Side (MS) (e.g., 
utility) and appliance or devices (SX) at the customer’s premises (i.e., smart meters). There 
are three different key management processes proposed in KMF to deal with the hybrid 
transmission modes: the contents of key management for unicast, broadcast, and multicast 
modes. Relatively simple cryptographic algorithms are chosen for key generation and 
refreshing policies due to the storage and computation constraints of SMs. The KMF has 
been defined as KMF = (U, K, R) where U is nodes in the AMI system; K denotes keys of 
nodes, gk is group of keys and R is the binary relation between U and K; therefore, user u 
knows key k if and only if (u, k) is in R.  
The proposed KMS is closely integrated and supports the unicast, broadcast, and multicast. 
The distribution of the keys and related data will not affect the normal network traffic in an 
AMI system. Moreover, the proposed scheme can deal with normal security attacks. 
Furthermore, forward and backward security is dealt with in the proposed scheme. The 
authors of [45] apply the hierarchy of keys or a rooted tree; therefore, every user is given a 
subset of keys which contains its individual key, a key for the entire group for group 
communications, and a key for its subgroup. However, the proposed scheme requires 
updating the key redistribution for each joining or leaving of the session. Furthermore, the 
network topology has not been taken into account, which will cause some unwanted nodes 
in a group to receive rekey messages. 
The authors in [129] propose a lightweight key distribution and management scheme 
tailored to AMI. Specifically, a group ID-based mechanism is proposed to establish the keys 
for a large amount of entities with a small overhead. They propose a group identifier-based 
mechanism to establish the symmetric keys, in which a gateway shares a different secret key 
with every single smart meter and the keys are generated based on the D-H algorithm, 
however, without authenticating the smart meters during the key generation phase. 
Moreover, they add a verification step to the pairwise key construction. Since the proposed 
scheme requires every single meter to have a symmetric key, it is not scalable for smart 
grids. Moreover, use of symmetric keys is vulnerable to MITM attack.  
Subir et al., in [130], proposed a unified key management mechanism (UKMF) that can 
generate ciphering keys for multiple protocols of multiple communication layers from a 
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single peer entity authentication procedure. The unified key management mechanism is 
suitable for Smart Grid use cases, especially for smart metering, where smart meters are 
assumed to be low-cost wireless devices for which repeated peer entity authentication 
attempts for each protocol can be contributed to increased system overhead. The proposed 
mechanism is flexible in that peer entity authentication can be treated as either network 
access authentication or application-level authentication. The authors present the details on 
an EAP-based unified key management mechanism and show that it is important to consider 
re-key efficiency of the ciphering keys bootstrapped from EMSK. The authors also discuss 
the test environment where the proposed unified key management mechanism is integrated 
with an ANSI C12.22-based smart metering application, and where PANA is used for both 
network access authentication and application-level authentication. The authors present 
preliminary implementation results achieved using a commercial microprocessor, typical of 
those deployed in smart meters, and using a general-purpose computer.  
The key management mechanism defines a unified key management function (UKMF) 
across multiple protocols within the same communication layer or across different 
communication layers. The conceptual model of the author’s framework is applicable to any 
protocol requiring a cryptographic operation at any communication layer. Ideally, there 
should be only one UKMF across all protocols with ciphering mechanisms.  In the partially 
unified model, mapping between a protocol and a UKMF or DKMF could be arbitrary. In 
both the fully and partially unified models, a protocol that uses a UKMF may also have a 
DKMF, where the latter may be managed by the UKMF. For example, some application 
protocols may be DKMF based on its own application-specific key management protocol, 
while the UKMF may generate a symmetric key to be used by the application-specific key 
management protocol to bind the UKMF with the DKMF. In both models, the initial peer 
entity authentication between a pair of UKMFs can be based on either network access 
authentication or application-level authentication. However, the mechanism has established 
that information discovery for bootstrap application ciphering is an important and as yet 
missing piece required to realise the unified key management framework vision.  
The authors introduce a new scalable and efficient key management scheme called Efficient 
and Scalable Multi-group Key Management for secure data communications in an Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (eSKAMI). It is based on a Multi-group Key graph structure that 
supports the management of multiple Demand Response (DR) projects simultaneously for 
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each customer. The authors demonstrate the new structure scales to large Smart Grids with 
dynamic Demand Response project membership while meeting Smart Meter constraints in 
terms of memory and bandwidth capacities. Figure 2 shows an example of the key graph 
with the MDMS providing four DR projects. Some users subscribe to only one of the DR 
projects while other users may subscribe to multiple DR projects simultaneously. 
 Nicanfar et al. propose using a CA as a Security Associate (SA) server in the utility network 
[123]. Their system has two secret values, with the SA keeping the first secret (the main 
part) and smart meters keeping the second secret value, which is only a counter generated 
by the SA and it is part of the system’s secret values managed by the SA. However, the 
authors do not consider the security issues when appliances are installed in the SM perimeter 
and focus instead on the security between the SM and the utility. 
In [31], the authors present a lightweight key management scheme with a novel key 
refreshment policy that decreases the network overhead, which makes symmetric keys to 
secure communications between SMs and MS using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) 
parameters and simple cryptographic algorithms like hash functions. Unicast messages are 
transmitted from MS to SM and reverse. To provide the confidentiality and integrity of the 
message sessions, the key is refreshed at every session. Figure 3-4 shows the scheme with 
the following process:  
 Sender generates the session key and uses it (SM or MS)  
 End system forms following packet, and sends it through communication channels 
 Message verification and decryption at receiving side 
For broadcast, messages are transmitted from MS to SMs. Similar to unicast messages, to 
ensure confidentiality and integrity; session keys should be refreshed before every broadcast 
session.  
 Sender generates the session key and uses it (MS to SMs)  
 MS forms the below packet, and broadcast  
Broustis et al., term the first scenario as reverse single sign-on and succinctly describe a 
framework for group authentication which is applicable for mobile telecom networks and 
extendible to the M2M context, which is relevant to our discussion [9]. They introduce a 
 
 
 
 
74 
gateway entity to coordinate/represent the group and this entity performs the required 
upstream authentication. The group authentication is based on a group challenge sent by the 
gateway to all devices. The devices individually respond to the gateway with their 
credentials. In the absence of the gateway, the upstream authentication server does the 
authentication and the overall saving in communication overhead remains one-sided (from 
the authentication server to the device group) [9]. The proposal in [9] is similar to our 
proposal in terms of having a gateway as an intermediary. In the scenario we consider, each 
node in the network authenticates with a central entity, the network operations centre (NOC). 
This includes all intermediate nodes (group leaders) that provide a path to the end nodes to 
reach the NOC.  Operationally, each group leader has no autonomy to authenticate a group 
member, but it has sufficient information to validate that a group member attempting to relay 
packets through it has indeed been authenticated, centrally. There could be a hierarchy of 
groups, if necessary functionally to reach the NOC, resulting in a multi-hop path from the 
end device to the NOC [9] does not discuss such an authentication requirement with multi-
hop paths. 
In summary, the key features that we intend to utilize for authentication and key 
management are a relatively simple authentication scheme for a group of devices, an activity 
monitor that characterizes the traffic from the devices as well as a means of authenticated 
forwarding. We have clarified what we mean by group authentication in our context and 
defined each of the features we require for our scheme and compare the availability of these 
features with the schemes discussed so far and establish the security requirements of our 
scheme. The  
Table 3-2: Gap in existing solutions for the HAN 
Features   Security Schemes for HAN  
 
Hasen et 
al   
Kim et al Tizazu, 
et al  
Zhao et 
al.,  
Our 
Proposal 
Topology - S/M/T M Binary tree M S Tree 
Multi-hop paths No No Yes No Yes, if 
required 
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requirements are drawn for the Smart Grid model detailed in section 3. These requirements 
are in addition to the basic security requirements, namely, confidentiality, integrity, non-
repudiation and forward/backward secrecy. 
3.6 Comparing schemes available for HAN and NAN  
Validated Forwarding 
at intermediate nodes 
Yes No Yes No Yes 
Symmetric 
Cryptography 
No Yes Yes No Yes 
Resilient to NC attack No No No No Yes 
Resilient to replay 
attack 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Resilient to Sybil attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Authentication at the 
Group Controller  
No No No No Yes 
Specifically designed 
for HAN  
No No Yes No Yes 
Nodes are not time 
synchronized 
No Yes Yes No Yes 
Scalability N/A No N/A No Yes 
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Table 3-3: Gaps in existing literature for NAN 
 
Over the previous chapter, we have looked at the elements of the HAN and NAN, their 
communication needs, the potential security threats and the mitigation features required. In 
this chapter, we have seen the various security schemes available in literature and how they 
address the security requirements in the scenarios they consider. In the HAN and NAN 
scenarios that we consider, we compare the existing solutions and locate the gaps in the 
existing solutions when applied to our scenarios. We begin with a comparison of the 
requirements for the HAN scenario. Table 3-2 compares the available HAN solutions that 
are closes to the scenario that we intend to propose a solution. Table 3-3 compares the 
available NAN solutions that are close to the scenario that we consider proposing a solution. 
The tables 3-2 and 3-3 list a common set of features that are considered for both the HAN 
and NAN. All comparisons in literature are made against these features and the gaps are 
identified. We pick features that have three or more “No”s listed against them and identify 
them as gaps to be addressed. We now briefly highlight three specific features that are 
important to be considered from the design perspective. 
1. Node capture attack is a harmful attack where a malicious user is able to steal 
information that is stored in nodes such as cryptographic keys and ID.  Based on our 
literature review, we have discovered that existing solution approaches [47, 
49,151,150] on node capture attack over smart grid network are still lacking in 
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providing effective solutions that mitigate such attacks and are vulnerable to them. 
Therefore, the proposed solution must be resilient to node capture attack.   
2. In addition, in a large-scale environment such as the smart grid, network scalability 
is crucial design parameter for a secure scheme. An increase in the smart gird nodes 
size should not affect the overall performance. Schemes proposed in [44, 133] apply 
public/private keys and session keys.  However, using public and private key 
between smart grid’s nodes and home appliances with limited resources will not be 
efficient and it’s possible that network might become worse as it scales. This is called 
negative scalability. Such as could cause significant delays. In addition, the task of 
distributing key pairs, revoking them and validating them are overheads that 
contribute to delays. Scalability is an essential design parameter to be considered in 
the design of our schemes. 
3. A topology independent for interconnectivity is necessary requirement in design 
security scheme for a large network environment such as the smart grid. Different 
sections of the NAN or a HAN could have different topologies for reasons of 
providing overlapping coverage. Mesh topology is more flexible as it can allow 
smart nodes to choose between multiple routes to transmit/receive data to the target 
location or group gateway. Partial mesh or cluster-tree topologies are often practical. 
Schemes [20,106] only consider star or tree topology. 
With these gaps specifically identified, we proceed to the next step of designing the security 
schemes for the HAN and NAN. 
3.7 Summary  
This chapter has presented the literature review of key management in Smart Grids – HAN 
and NAN, IOT and WSN and AMI. The authors proposed different key management 
protocols to secure wireless mesh network and Smart Grid communications. Smart Grid 
networks generally consist of multiple components and applications, which add to the 
difficulty in implementing key management. Key management is important for wireless 
mesh such as a Smart Grid network due to the potential threats to it. Key management 
includes initialisation of keys, key generation, key distribution, key updates and key storage 
with the goal of key management for node operations and prevention of attacks that could 
comprise a node. Wireless mesh networks generally comprise a number of low-cost, 
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resource-constrained nodes. These nodes tend to have low memory, computation, 
communication and energy capabilities. Key management consists of four principal areas: 
key deployment or pre-distribution, key establishment, node or member addition and node 
or member removal. Its functional requirements include: confidentiality, which means that 
the content of the information flowing in a wireless sensor network must be protected from 
disclosure to unauthorised parties; authentication, which means that the parties who are able 
to access the shared information should be identified and authenticated; data integrity, which 
means that data should not be changed between transmissions due to the environment or 
malicious activities; robustness is another requirement, which deals with node compromise 
and attack; overhead cost, which includes the need to keep the computation, communication 
and memory 
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Chapter Four: Key Management Scheme for 
Communication Layer in the Smart Grid (KMS-
CL-SG) 
4. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we provided a wide literature review of the areas of key management 
and authentication of smart grid (Smart Grid) communication including HAN, NAN, 
SCADA and AMI. We have highlighted missing requirements that need to be addressed in 
the security scheme. This chapter describes the scheme of our key management solution for 
a Smart Grid’s communication layer. Since a Smart Grid is a meta-system, it is not practical 
to design a single key management scheme for all systems, actors and segments in the smart 
grid, as the security requirements of various subsystems in the smart grid vary. Therefore, 
we have proposed a key management scheme for HAN and NAN. 
4.1 The Key Management Scheme for the Smart Grid Home Area Network 
(KM-HAN) 
In this section, we describe the security scheme that addresses the secure data transfers 
between the devices in the smart home up to the power company’s Network Operations 
Center (NOC) through the smart meter installed at the smart home. We start by illustrating 
the topology of the devices in the smart home, the smart meter and the power company’s 
NOC. This is followed by listing out the assumptions with regard to the devices, their mode 
of communication and a few configuration options implemented across this topology. 
 This section describes the HAN in smart grid system architecture, describes two 
classification groups and communication scenario, and threat model.   
4.1.1 Network Architecture 
  In general, a HAN connects the smart devices across the home with a smart meter. The 
HAN components can communicate using technologies such as Zigbee, wired or wireless 
Ethernet, or Bluetooth. There are two ways to interface the home depending on the countries 
where it is implemented. One way is through smart meter as the interface to network 
 
 
 
 
80 
operation centre and other actors.  The other way is to interface with WAN and NAN by 
using a separate control and aggregation node [131].  
The HAN components are divided into two groups based on [132]. Group one comprises 
appliances that require two-way communications such as smart electric vehicle, air 
conditioning (AC) and solar panel. Group two comprises home appliances that require one-
way communication such as smart TV, lighting system and charger. An example of group 
one is a solar panel that requires two way communications to provide unneeded power to 
utility company also, AC is expected to receive a signal from utility provider to reduce 
energy intensity during off-peak hours. However, group two members need only one-way 
communication to send the electricity consumption data. The devices in Group one have 
higher resources capabilities compared to those in Group two.      
4.1.2 Notations and Assumptions  
Before we begin to describe our scheme, we explain the notations and assumptions used in this 
chapter. 
Table 4-1: Notations used to represent the scheme 
𝐷 Smart device 
i The number of smart devices inside home, i= [1 … N] 
𝐻 Unique group of smart devices inside home, which have high resources capacities 
devices and the data exchange, is bidirectional. 
𝐿 Unique group of smart devices inside home, which have low resources capacities 
devices and the data exchange, is one way. 
𝐷𝐻,𝑖 Unique identity for a smart device in the group 𝐻. 
𝐷𝐿,𝑖 Unique identity for a smart device in the group 𝐿. 
𝐺𝐷𝐻  A home group controller node in the group 𝐻. 
𝐺𝐷𝐿  A home group controller node in the group 𝐿. 
𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐻 .𝐷𝐻,𝑖
 A unique symmetric key shared between the group controller 𝐺𝐷𝐻  and the smart 
devices 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 in the group 𝐻 generated by using the master key 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐻  and devices 
𝐷𝐻,𝑖 
𝑀𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐻  A symmetric master key for group controller 𝐺𝐷𝑗 
𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 A unique ID of a smart meter 
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𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐻,𝑖 A unique symmetric key shared between smart meter 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 and the smart devices 𝐷𝐻,𝑖. 
𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐿,𝑖 A unique symmetric key shared between smart meter 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 and the smart devices𝐷𝐿,𝑖. 
𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐻
 A unique symmetric key shared between smart meter 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 and the home group 
controller node in the group 𝐻 
𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐿
 A unique symmetric key shared between smart meter 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 and the home group 
controller node in the group 𝐿 
𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐿 .𝐷𝐿,𝑖
 A unique symmetric key shared between the group controller 𝐺𝐷𝐿  and the smart 
devices 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 in the 𝐿 group 
𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐻,𝑖 A time stamp of node 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 
𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿,𝑖 A time stamp of node 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 
The following assumptions are made in the proposed scheme 
1. We do not consider device to device 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 to 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 or 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 to 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 communication 
2. The smart device𝐷𝐻,𝑖, 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 and group controller use unicast communication.  
3. The home group controllers, 𝐺𝐷𝐻  and 𝐺𝐷𝐿are trusted devices. 
4. All smart meters 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 are registered on the group controllers 𝐺𝐷𝐻  and 𝐺𝐷𝐿. 
5. The smart devices 𝐷𝐻,𝑖, 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 are registered with the group controller 
6. The HAN interconnected as a tree with the devices as leaf nodes.   
7. An adversary could eavesdrop on all traffic or replay messages. 
8. Smart meter 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 is tamper-resistant. 
9. Time stamps are used for data freshness checking. The time is not synchronized 
across the devices on the HAN, but the time stamps are verified to ensure they are 
incremental and periodic. This requires that the devices that verify the data for 
authentication and/or freshness store the time stamp of the previously received data.   
4.1.3 Proposal Overview 
Group Key Management scheme for HAN has a set of features that address secure data 
transfers across the smart home. To achieve confidentiality between end-to-end 
communications, symmetric-key cryptography is employed where a unique key is assigned 
to each smart device. Data are collected from smart devices in an encrypted form and sent 
to smart meter. The scheme manages the key distribution and generation across nodes of the 
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network and exchanges these keys securely when necessary. Consequently, the secure data 
transfers are consistent and resilient to changes in the network.  
4.1.4 A Group Key Management Scheme for HAN 
   The operation of the scheme requires that the devices participating in the scheme be 
configured before deployment. This is termed as the pre-deployment phase. The activities 
in the pre-deployment phase are first illustrated. Then, it is followed by an explanation of 
the communication and authentication between the nodes within a group and their group 
controller and the group controllers and the smart meter.  
4.1.5 Pre-deployment Phase 
   The pre-deployment phase concerns the security configuration of the nodes of the HAN, 
prior to their functioning on the network. First, we present the steps for the pre-deployment 
of the two HAN groups comprising of the high resource devices 𝐷𝑖,𝐻 and the low resource 
devices 𝐷𝑖,𝐿 as well as their respective group controllers  𝐺𝐷𝐻 , 𝐺𝐷𝐿 and the smart 
meter 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔.  
 Assign unique ID to each smart device 𝐷𝑖,𝐻 and 𝐷𝑖,𝐿  
 Assign a unique master key 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐻  to group controller𝐺𝐷𝐻 . This master key is used 
to generate a shared key between 𝐺𝐷𝐻  and its devices 
 Yield and store a unique key 𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐻 ,𝐷𝐻,𝑖 by using the master key 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐻and node ID 
𝐷𝐻,𝑖 on 𝐷𝐻,𝑖  
 Assign a unique key 𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐿 .𝐷𝐿,𝑖  to group controller 𝐺𝐷𝐿and share it with 𝐷𝐿,𝑖.  
 Assign unique key 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐻,𝑖 to every smart devices  𝐷𝐻,𝑖  shared between 
𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 and 𝐷𝐻,𝑖.  
 Assign unique key 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐿,𝑖  to every smart devices  𝐷𝐿,𝑖  shared between 
𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 and𝐷𝐿,𝑖.   
4.1.6 The High Source Devices 𝑯 Group 
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   Each device 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 that is connected to the smart meter  
𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 will require storing unique key 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐻,𝑖 shared with smart meter𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔. The home 
group controller 𝐺𝐷𝐻  stores the its master key 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐻 and symmetric key 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐻     
Figure 4-1: Pre-deployment steps for the HAN 
4.1.7 The Low Sources Devices - 𝑳   Group 
   Each device 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 that communicates with the smart meter  
𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔  will store two unique keys 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐿,𝑖  shared with smart meter 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔  and 𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐿 ,𝐷𝐿,𝑖 
shared with its group controller. 𝐺𝐷𝐿 stores two keys, a symmetric key 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐿  which is used 
to encrypt data for secure communication between home group and smart meters and 
𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐿 ,𝐷𝐿,𝑖  which is used for  authenticating the device at the  group controller 𝐺𝐷𝐿.  
4.1.8 Communication phase  
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  In this section, we explain the communication (data transfers not relating to key 
management) phase for home area network. 
4.1.9 The High Source Devices 𝑯 Group 
   The smart devices 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 exchange data bi-directionally with the smart meter. 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 encrypts 
its data and time stamp sent to the smart meter encrypted using the shared symmetric key  
𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐻,𝑖  as 𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐻,𝑖
(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐻,𝑖  ).   𝐷𝐻,𝑖 , then uses 𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐻 .𝐷𝐻,𝑖  to generate a message 
authentication code (MAC),  𝑀𝐴𝐶.𝐷𝐻,𝑖 that will be verified by 𝐺𝐷𝐻  to authenticate 𝐷𝐻,𝑖. The 
encrypted data destined for the smart meter and the MAC are sent to 𝐺𝐷𝐻  as 
𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐻,𝑖
(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐻,𝑖  ), 𝑀𝐴𝐶.𝐷𝐻,𝑖) . After validating the MAC value, 𝐺𝐷𝐻  -encrypts the 
encrypted data destined to the smart meter, using the symmetric key 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐻 as 
𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐻
(𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐻,𝑖
 (𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐻,𝑖)).  Upon receiving this data, 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 decrypts the message 
it receives from the home group controller node 𝐺𝐷𝐻 , using the symmetric key 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐻  and 
further decrypts the message to retrieve the data and time stamp sent by 𝐷𝐻,𝑖. The data from 
the 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 will be available in an unencrypted form in the memory of the smart meter 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔. 
This is of concern from a security perspective.       
4.1.10 The 𝑳 Group    
   These devices communicate one way; they send data to the smart meter. 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 uses steps 
similar to the other group to send data to the smart meter.   𝐷𝐿,𝑖  encrypts its data as 
𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐿,𝑖
 (𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿,𝑖  ).  The encypted data destined for the smart meter is encrypted again, 
with the time stamp, using the key 𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐿 .𝐷𝐿,𝑖 as  𝐸𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐿.𝐷𝐿,𝑖 
(𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐿,𝑖
 (𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿,𝑖  ), 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿,𝑖  ). 
Upon receiving this, 𝐺𝐷𝐿validates the source by decrypting the data and verifying the time 
stamp. It then encrypts the data destined for the smart meter using the shared key between 
𝐺𝐷𝐿and 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔, 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐻 as 𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐿
(𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐷𝐿,𝑖
 (𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐿,𝑖)). The smart meter retrieves the 
original data by decrypting the data using 𝐾𝐺𝐷𝐿 .𝐷𝐿,𝑖 and 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝐺𝐷𝐻 . At 𝐺𝐷𝐿 and 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 , the 
source of the data is considered successfully authenticated if the data is successfully 
decrypted using the shared key of the source. The time stamps are used to verify the data 
freshness.   
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4.1.11 Security Analysis  
   The proposed scheme is evaluated against the following security characteristics - 
resilience against forward and backward secrecy, node capture, resilience against replication 
attacks, and secure data aggregation.  
 Forward and backward secrecy 
In a devices group with active smart devices 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 where a node may join or 
leave during the lifetime of the group, two security considerations arise.  
Backward secrecy: A new smart device 𝐷𝐻,𝑖  𝐷𝐿,𝑖 must not have permission to 
access any data that is communicated before it joins the session. 
Forward secrecy: In a case where a smart device 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 leaves the group, it must 
not have permission to access any future data.  
 
 Resilience against replication attacks 
   An attacker could replay old messages that have been obtained from previous 
communication. However, in our scheme time stamps are sent along with the data 
and each of the receiving entities verify them against the previously received time 
stamps, which are stored on the devices. The time stamp is used as a session token, 
which is expected by the receiver with a reasonable tolerance in value when checked 
against the periodicity of data expected. Each of 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 and 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 encrypts a time stamp 
with the data, which is sent from the appliances to the smart meter𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔.   
 Resilience against Sybil attacks 
   On Sybil attack, a malicious node introduces multiple fake identities to group 
controller node 𝐺𝐷𝐻  and 𝐺𝐷𝐿 in the HAN for illegitimate purpose. Our scheme 
provides an authentication to confirm that one node cannot pretend to be other, for 
example when a node 𝐷𝐻,𝑖  sends data to group controller𝐺𝐷𝐻 , it must compute a 
MAC on the data sent. The MAC is computed using the shared key between 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 and 
𝐺𝐷𝐻  no adversary node can pretend to be the node X. Furthermore, each node in 
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HAN has unique ID and its keys bound to its ID. If the compromised node uses a 
different ID from the stored ID in𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔, it doesn’t hold the valid keys related with 
fake ID.   
 Resistance to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack 
   Messages exchanged between smart meters 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 and 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 are crucial in a HAN. 
The data generated by the devices are encrypted using the key shared with the smart 
meter. It is forwarded to the smart meter via the group controllers without being 
decrypted at the group controllers. An attacker will therefore not have access to the 
data on the network in a direct form, except at the two end points. In addition to the 
encryption, the group controller authenticates the node either by verifying the MAC 
(Group H) or by being able to decrypt the contents and verify the time stamp (Group 
L), both of which are encrypted. So, an attacker will require guess two keys to be 
able to access the data sent by an end device. Thus the confidentiality of the data is 
achieved.     
 Scalability  
   An increase in the HAN size should not affect the overall performance. We use 
group key management mechanisms to address the scalability of the HAN. The HAN 
is divided into different groups of homogenous devices (such as  𝐻  and 𝐿 ) and 
corresponding group controllers such as (𝐺𝐷𝐻  and𝐺𝐷𝐿) with distributed management 
tasks, to make the HAN scalable and efficient. The scheme uses only symmetric keys 
unlike [44, 133] in which they apply public/private keys management and session 
keys. 
4.2 The Key Management Scheme for the Smart Grid Neighbourhood Area 
Network (NAN) (KM-NAN) 
4.2.1 The Smart Grid Network Model 
In this section, we present the Smart Grid network model considered for the discussion and 
detail the requirements for its secure operation. We also explain the potential security threats 
we consider for a case study to test the proposed solution. The Smart Grid network model 
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considered for our discussion, shown in Figure. 4-2, which comprises three network 
segments: 
 Home Area Network (HAN): one Smart Meter (SM) and N Smart Devices (SDs). 
This group of devices is interconnected in a Star topology with SM as the star point. 
 Neighborhood Area Network (NAN): mesh network (not necessary full mesh) of M 
SMs. SMs are divided into G groups. Group g (g = 1...G) has Mg SMs. Hence the 
following equation is considered: 
                                                       𝑀 = ∑ 𝑀𝑔𝐺𝑔=1                                                                   (1) 
One SM of each group is selected as Group Controller (GC). The GC is hereafter 
termed as the Gateway node, GW. 
 Wide Area Network (WAN): Network (e.g., Internet) that connects GCs to the 
Network Operations Centre (NOC).  
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Figure 4-2 Smart Grid Network Model 
 
The data generating elements are part of the HAN. This data traverses the entire network to 
reach the NOC. The smart meters, which are a part of the NAN, generate data as well as 
receive data from the NOC. Therefore traffic to the NAN elements is two-way. Data may or 
may not be forwarded into the HAN by the smart meters, depending upon the deployment 
requirement. 
4.2.2 Threat Model and Assumptions 
There are two basic types of threats that need to be countered - attacks that originate due to 
malicious users eavesdropping to monitor the wireless communications between the nodes 
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in the network and attacks that originate due to the capture of a node physically or causing 
it to fail. 
Eavesdropping: Unauthorized users may try to eavesdrop on exchanged data and control 
messages within HAN and NAN. The eavesdroppers can use the information exchanged and 
the exchange patterns to launch man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks or replay attacks to 
impersonate a node. Therefore, all nodes should be authenticated and all messages should 
be encrypted. The keys used for privacy should not be easily guessable. 
Node Capture: Physical node captures or forced failure of nodes such as in a DoS attack 
amount to a node capture attack. In such an event, if the keys on the node are captured, the 
attacker should not be able to gain access to the network. The solution should minimize the 
impact of such attack on the remaining nodes and ensure the rest of the network functions 
normally. Authentication Scheme for NAN 
In a neighborhood area network, authentication is required to secure routing in the network. 
Smart meters have to be registered with the group controller to obtain permission to 
communicate in the network. For our authentication process, we make the following 
assumptions: 
a. Smart meters are grouped together based on a policy and are aware of the 
group members. The events and functionalities of the policy are not in the 
scope of this paper. This work does not address the policy on which smart 
meters groups are constituted. 
b. Every smart meter in a group has a unique identity, which is a serial number 
and each group has a unique group identity, which are used in the 
authentication process. All network devices involved in the group 
authentication process know these details.   
c. The link layer between the smart meters and gateway are protected at the link 
layer. Which makes communication encrypted at the link layer.  
d. Every smart meter in a group maintains a wireless connection with its 
gateway and the network topology between the home smart meter and the 
gateway node is a tree. The topology between the gateway and the utility 
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could be a mesh. They form a cluster-tree topology between the SM and the 
gateway.  
e. The smart meters have pre-distributed shared symmetric keys, which are 
used for initiating the authentication process and keys during authentication.  
f. Symmetric cryptography yields a better cryptographic strength for a given 
key length compared to asymmetric cryptography. The resulting data length 
is close to the size of the input. 
g. Smart meters cooperate with one another to forward packets on multi-hop 
paths to the NOC. A routing protocol to handle the mesh topology is active 
and provides the shortest route from a given end device to the GW, within 
the group.  
h. GW nodes have sufficient power (more than the end devices) to be able to 
perform the forwarding from the group to the NOC and vice versa  
i. In the event of the failure of a gateway node, all nodes in the group will be 
unable to access the NOC, until the GW is reinstated/active. There is no 
fallback node that will take on the role of a gateway. The failure rates of the 
GW are low.    
j. The groups and the group gateways are pre-identified and formed. These 
formations are not ad hoc and therefore there is no need for a node to play 
the role of a gateway 
k. The nodes on the network are not time synchronized.  
l. The value of the clock ticks of a node cannot be retrieved to set the same 
clock value on another node. Such an operation is possible only with a reset 
of the node, which essentially implies that the clock tick value is lost since 
the clock is reset. It can be argued that such is the exact function of a time 
protocol such as ntp, but sufficient care is taken to ensure that this value is 
not accessed by any network function. 
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m. The NOC provides a central authentication service. It comprises a 
sufficiently large server with a fail-over configuration and able to maintain 
the state of all the devices on the network. Given the nature of the service 
requirement of the smart meters in the smart grid, all authentication attempts, 
except the one at startup upon installation must be approved before the NOC 
sends an authentication response to the node requesting authentication. 
n. The NOC maintains a history of the meta-data (originator-ID, timestamp, 
group-ID) over a sufficiently long period to derive statistics such as message 
arrival epochs, message arrival times, inter-message times, message size and 
activity profiles so that it knows when it can expect the next packet from a 
specific ID. Such a history is essential to detect malicious attack traffic since 
our scheme does not require the devices on the network to be time 
synchronized. 
4.2.3 Notations 
Having stated the assumptions made, we proceed with detailing the security scheme for the 
NAN scenario. The following subsection begins with a listing of the notations used to detail 
the security scheme. This is followed by the details of the authentication process. 
 
The scheme addresses two cases - smart meter in Multi-Hop (Mesh) and smart meters in star 
topology.  
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Table 4-2: Notations used for KMS-NAN   
4.2.4 Key management and authentication of Group Gateway 𝑮𝑾 
We now describe the method that is used by NOC to authenticate 𝐺𝑊𝑔. Figure 4-3 shows a 
NAN topology indicating the hierarchical authentication structure/path that is used for 𝐺𝑊𝑔 
authentication. For completeness, in the figure we also show SMs. The authentication of 
SMs is discussed in later sections. The group controller of a group g is denoted by 𝐺𝑊𝑔. The 
smart meter n of group g is denoted by 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔. 
NOC creates a random master key 𝐾𝑁𝑂𝐶. This key will be used to generate keys for each 
child 𝐺𝑊𝑔 (𝐺𝑊𝟏 and 𝐺𝑊𝟐. etc.)  
                            𝐾𝐺𝑊𝑔= ℱ (𝐾𝑁𝑂𝐶 ||𝐺𝑊𝑔)                             (2) 
 
where ℱ() is a secure one-way hash function and || is the concatenation operator. The key 
𝐾𝐺𝑊𝑔 is stored at the corresponding 𝐺𝑊𝒈. The NOC does not need to store it, since it can be 
generated from 𝐾𝑁𝑂𝐶. In a similar way, each child node 𝐺𝑊𝒈 produces shared keys for its 
𝐺 Unique group number 
𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 Smart meter ID 
𝐺𝑊𝑔 A gateway for a group of smart meters to the NOC 
𝑀𝐾𝑁𝑂𝐶 Master Key for NOC 
𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 Master key for the group Gateway 
𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝑛𝑜𝑐 Symmetric key generated by 
𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝑁𝑜𝑐 = F (𝑀𝐾𝑁𝑂𝐶 ||𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔), and shared with NOC, and 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔. 
𝐾𝐺𝑊,𝑆𝑀 Symmetric key generated by 𝐺𝑊𝑔, and shared with 𝐺𝑊𝑔, and 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 Existing smart meter for authenticating a new smart meter 
𝐾𝑆𝑀,𝑆𝑀 Symmetric key shared between 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔, and 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔 
𝐾𝐺𝑊𝑔 Symmetric key shared with NOC, and GW 
𝐴𝑉𝑖 Authentication value inside the group where 𝐴𝑉𝑖 = 𝐹 (𝑅||𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊) 
           R Random number generated by 𝐺𝑊𝑔 to produce 𝐴𝑉𝑖 
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own child nodes. For example, if 𝐺𝑊1 has several child nodes as group gateways, 𝐺𝑊1 uses 
its master key 𝐾𝐺𝑊1 to generate a key for each of its child nodes, 𝐺𝑊𝑔′: 
                                    𝐾𝐺𝑊𝑔′ = ℱ (𝐾𝐺𝑊1 ||𝐺𝑊𝑔′)                  (3) 
The keys generated are stored at the corresponding child nodes. Similarly, each of these 
nodes will generate keys for its child nodes and so on, until all the leaf nodes with no children 
have been reached. 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Authentication for Group Gateway 
4.2.5 Case 1- Star-Star Topology 
In this scenario, we consider a star for NAN topology in the group, with 𝐺𝑊𝑔 at the centre. 
The GW nodes directly communicate with the NOC. This scenario is simple since each SM 
has a direct link (one-hop) to its GW. This means that no network discovery needs to be 
made, since GW can detect its network. The process of SM authentication is also simple, 
because each SM can be directly authenticated by the 𝐺𝑊𝑔.  
First, the pre-deployment phase is discussed. This phase assigns the master key 𝑀𝐾𝑁𝑂𝐶 to 
the NOC and is depicted in Figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-4: Pre-deployment of a NAN in star topology 
 
Figure 4-5: Authentication of an end device in a NAN with star topology 
Secondly, the smart meter authentication is highlighted. Specifically, a 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔that wants to 
join a group needs to be authenticated by 𝐺𝑊𝑔. As shown in Figure 4-4, initially, the new 
𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔will send a request message to 𝐺𝑊𝑔. This message includes B, which is the encrypted 
message (serial number of new 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔) using symmetric key 𝐾𝑠𝑚,noc.  Identity number of 
new smart meter, 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔, and Timestamp, TS (this is used to mitigate the replay attacks). The 
gateway 𝐺𝑊𝑔 will re-encrypt the message using 𝐾𝐺𝑊𝑔 and forwards the message to NOC. 
The NOC received B and decrypted it using 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝑛𝑜𝑐 and in order to validating serial number 
of new 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔. NOC responds to 𝐺𝑊𝑔 with a confirmation after validating serial number of 
new 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔. NOC will encrypt (𝐾𝐺𝑊,𝑠𝑚, 𝑇𝑆) using 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝑛𝑜𝑐 and send it to the new 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔via 
𝐺𝑊𝑔. After 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔 receives the message it decrypts it using 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝑛𝑜𝑐 and obtains shared key 
NOC
SM1,1
GW1
SM2,1
GW2
SM3,1
MKNOC
MKNOC MKNOC
MKNOC MKNOC MKNOC
MKGW1
MKGW1 MKGW1 MKGW1
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with 𝐺𝑊𝑔 𝐾𝐺𝑊,𝑠𝑚 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔 then replies with an acknowledgement message encrypted with the 
key. 
4.2.6 Case Two - Multi-Hop (mesh) 
The SMs are interconnected in a partial mesh or a full-mesh topology. Each group in the 
NAN consists of a GW and its nodes. The GW nodes are in turn interconnected to the NOC 
in a star configuration i.e., all the GW nodes are one-hop away from the star point, the NOC. 
Nodes within a group will require multiple hops to reach either the GW or the NOC. Full-
mesh topology is happens where every SMs has a circuit connecting it to every other SMs 
in a group. Figure 4-6 illustrates this topology. In this case, there are six SMs that form a 
partial mesh topology between them with a multi-hop path to the NOC. A pre-installation 
phase comprises storing the shared key between the SM and the NOC, 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝑛𝑜𝑐, the ID of 
the device 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔, a group ID 𝐺 and a serial number 𝑆𝑁 on the devices. 
4.2.7 Network Discovery and Registration  
When a 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔is initally switched on, it requires learning about its neighbors in the network, 
which are within its range, in order to forward packets through them. To discover its 
neighbors, it broadcasts a Hello message and at the same time is listening for Hello packets 
that are broadcast by its neighbors (other 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔, 𝐺𝑊𝑔, or NOC). The network discovery 
process is repeated every T time units to accommodate updates in the NAN topology. After 
receiving a Hello message, each 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔 inserts information about its neighbour in the 
Neighbours table. These tables can be optionally sent to NOC, so that it has a total view of 
the NAN.   
4.2.8 Authentication of the Smart Meters, 𝑺𝑴𝒏𝒈 
When 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤 requests to join a group, it needs to be authenticated by 𝐺𝑊𝑔. There are some 
SMs that have no direct link to 𝐺𝑊𝑔. Therefore, the authentication method shown in Figure 
4-5 is not suitable, and we propose a two-step authentication scheme. The new SM, 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤, 
will be authenticated through another, already authenticated 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔, which is referred to as 
proxy𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔.  
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
Figure 4-6 Pre-deployment for a Multi-hop NAN topology 
Initially, the new 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤 sends an Authentication Request to the proxy 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔 Figure 4-7. 
This message includes the following information:  
a) Mi which is (serial number of new 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤, SNNSM) encrypted using 𝐾𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑁𝑂𝐶,  
b) Identity number of new 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔, ID𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔,  
c) Timestamp TS. 
The proxy𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔 encrypts Mi along with its identity and TS using the shared key between 
proxy𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑔 and 𝐺𝑊𝑔. After 𝐺𝑊𝑔 receives and decrypts the message, 𝐺𝑊𝑔 re-encrypts Mi 
using the key 𝐾𝐺𝑊𝑔. NOC will decrypt Mi using 𝐾𝑔,𝑛𝑜𝑐, check the serial number of new 
𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤, SNNSM, and validate 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤.  
The NOC sends an authentication response, addressed to the new SM. The message, Xi 
consists of the encrypted master key of 𝐺𝑊𝑔, 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 using 𝐾𝑠𝑚,noc. When the new 𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤 
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receives 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 , it sends an encrypted acknowledgement to 𝐺𝑊𝑔 , using 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 . 𝐺𝑊𝑔 
generates a random number R and multicasts the encrypted random number R, as a message, 
using shared key, 𝐾𝐺𝑊,𝑆𝑀 , thereby refreshing the keys of the group when the new SM, 
𝑆𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤  is authenticated. When all SMs receive the encrypted message they decrypt the 
message using 𝐾𝐺𝑊,𝑆𝑀 to obtain the random number R. Then, each SM applies a one-way 
hash function on the random number R to generate the authentication value AVi. This 
authentication value is used by the gateway to authenticate nodes within the group. For 
example, for a group of SM with numbers between 10 to 20, the GW will multicast the key 
to all SM within a time duration of 5s (timeout value) when using a wireless mesh network 
such as ZigBee or Wi-Fi. Figure 4-7 illustrates the following steps in a ladder diagram. 
a) SM sends an authentication request 
b) NOC validates data and sends an authentication response 
c) Authentication response contains 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 
d) GW sends R to New SM 
e) New SM sends an ACK to GW 
f) GW multicasts R to the group 
Following the authentication, the SM sends data to the NOC. The steps involved in 
communication are listed below. Notice the authenticated forwarding in steps (d), (e). The 
intermediate nodes use a MAC to check the integrity and source of the packet that arrived. 
Also, note that the source node will ascertain that its data is delivered only when it receives 
an acknowledgement from the NOC. The details of the communication phase are out of the 
scope of this discussion. 
a) SM decides neighbor to forward to, for a packet destined to the NOC 
b) SM generates its encryption key 𝐾𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤, ℱ’ (𝑅||𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔) where ℱ’ is the one-way-hash 
function 
c) SM generates a MAC for the message using 𝐾𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤 
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d) Neighbor receives the message with MAC and validates it. Knowing what node id it 
came from, it generates the forwarding key of the source using  
e) If successful, it generates a MAC and forwards it to a neighbor (to the GW, if it is 
the neighbor). If the MAC fails, the packet is simply dropped. 
Our scheme is scalable for the requirements of a Smart Grid. In our scheme, each gateway 
and its group transact individually with the NOC and have no interdependency on other 
gateways or groups, except for forwarding data to the NOC. When the devices are scaled, 
an appropriate number of gateways are included to match the number of groups formed. 
Each gateway and its group need access to keys for their own group, the gateway and the 
NOC. Each node will therefore have a pre-installed NOC key, a master GW key sent by the 
NOC and a random secret R sent by the group gateway. All other keys necessary are derived 
from this information. Therefore, our scheme is scalable to any number of end devices. 
However, we realize the need to limit the number of nodes per group to keep the number of 
paths low, the routing delays low and consequently the end-to-end delays low. 
4.2.9 Updating of 𝑴𝑲𝑮𝑾   
When 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 leaves its group and from the network, destroying old 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 and allocating a 
new master gateway key to all nodes 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 in that group is very crucial. It is because, the 
leaving node 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔  may be replaced by a vulnerable node to relay false message and 
communicate with other nodes therefore, 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊  revoking/re-keying is required. The 
𝑁𝑂𝐶 responsible to inform the other 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔  ∈ 𝐺𝑊𝑔 nodes in that group and send a new 
𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊, which is encrypted using 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝑛𝑜𝑐.  
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Figure 4-7 Protocol for NAN in a case 2 
The following are the process steps of the updating 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊: 
1. A smart meter node 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔  must send a network leaving request  𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑄  to the 
assigned dedicated node 𝐺𝑊𝑔 of that group.   𝐾𝐺𝑊,𝑆𝑀 ( 𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑄, TS, ID 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔)  
2. The 𝐺𝑊𝑔 will inform the other 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔  nodes in its group (multicast) and  𝑁𝑂𝐶 
(unicast) about the leave using the messages 𝐾𝐺𝑊,𝑆𝑀  ( 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 , TS, ID 𝐺𝑊 ) and 
𝐾𝐺𝑊,𝑁𝑂𝐶 ( 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 , TS, ID 𝐺𝑊 )  
3. Removing the node  𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔 with 𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑄  
4. 𝑁𝑂𝐶  regenerates a new master gateway key 𝑀𝐾′𝐺𝑊 and sends it to the specific 
gateway, which in turn multicasts it to all the remaining 𝑆𝑀𝑛,𝑔  in the group, 
encrypted using 𝐾𝑠𝑚,𝑛𝑜𝑐.   
 The updating of 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 process described above introduces a cost of re-keying. This cost 
has two factors:  
1. Additional processing overhead. Assume that the generation of a 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 key requires 
x CPU cycles. The processing overhead, Oproc noc = 1x (because NOC has to 
generate one key 𝑀𝐾𝐺𝑊 for 𝐺𝑊. 
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2. Communication overhead that includes two multicast and two unicast messages. The 
unicast messages are between the gateway and the NOC and the multicast messages 
are within the group. 
4.3 Security Analysis 
The authentication scheme is analysed against the two classes of threats mentioned in section 
4. Sybil attack is an impersonation attack that is the result of eavesdropping and the node 
capture attack is the physical nodes capture which is very likely in the context of Smart Grid 
network.  
The authentication scheme described in previous sub-section is two-way secure, meaning 
that after the authentication process, both parties new SM and GW can verify the authenticity 
of each other. The authenticity of GC is verified since the Authentication Request from SM 
is encrypted using GW’s key. Also, in the Authentication Response, GW sends the SN of 
new SM. Only GW and SM know the mapping of SN to the ID number of SM. The 
authenticity of new SM is veriﬁed in a similar way. First of all, the Authentication Response 
is encrypted using SM’s key and, therefore, only SM is able to decrypt it using its shared 
key. Also, the new SM provides to proxy SM both its ID number and SN, which provide 
additional security. 
Denial of service (DoS) makes a node as well as the service on it inaccessible by others. An 
attacker sends a large number of packets, malicious or otherwise, addressed to the node and 
effectively at a rate which can block out all other communication. This causes the node 
receiving the packets to exhaust its storage and computing power, processing the packets 
that arrive from the attacker. Such a risk is imminent in a multi-hop network where the 
communication between two end points is routed via intermediate smart meters. The 
proposed authentication scheme authenticates every participant on the network before 
accepting any traffic from it. While this reduces the probability of spurious data on the 
network, the spurious traffic remains a problem. If such traffic targets a gateway node, then, 
an attack can potentially incapacitate all nodes that communicate using that gateway. 
Additional means of detecting such intrusions and methods of isolating the attack traffic are 
necessary to handle such vulnerabilities.  
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Our scheme does not handle jamming attacks. Jamming attacks are DoS attacks that targets 
wireless communication frequency in the smart grid. When nodes are in close range, large 
amounts of noise may be generated in these appliances. It is difficult to avoid jamming in 
our scheme because the victim and its client may not catch the attack. In this kind of attack, 
the attacker prevents legal users from having access to information and services by targeting 
the victim’s device and the network connection. This attack stops the user from making 
outgoing connections on the smart grid. The communication can be jammed so as to make 
the signal noise very low, and this could lead to the failure of specific portions of the Smart 
Grid [134].  
4.3.1 Node capture attack 
Node capture attack is both a challenging and interesting attack with a goal taking control 
over a smart meter’s communication after gaining physically access [42].  This attack could 
easily be carried out because Smart meters are placed in customer premises and not within 
the utility’s provider physical premises. Abdullah et al [135] presented studies on the attacks 
and vulnerabilities of Smart meters in a NAN and listed out node attack as the least attended 
to yet significantly dangerous to the Smart Grid network. Most of the schemes discussed in 
[48, 50, 136-138] show a vulnerability to node capture attacks. A successful attack could 
reveal shared keys thereby permitting an attacker to participate in encryption and decryption 
process or in a worst case scenario, inject false data into the Smart Grid network to comprise 
other nodes.   
Our proposed group authentication scheme is secured against node capture attack. Even if 
the keys are captured by an attacker and used to send data, the data packet would get 
validated for forwarding, but the packet would be tagged as an invalid packet since the time 
stamp of the packet sent by the attacker would not match the timestamp value expected by 
the NOC. The NOC records the timestamps of all the packets it receives, node ID wise, so 
it knows what to expect in the next incoming packet from a particular node. However, if by 
some means the malicious node is able to retrieve the timestamp information from the 
captured node and set its local clock to that of the captured node, then the scheme will be 
effectively broken. This condition breaks the assumption number a, c, h. 
4.3.2 Replay Attack 
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Both schemes present in [50, 51] show a vulnerability to replay attack. Our scheme is secure 
against replay attacks because it uses shared keys for communication and as well as time 
stamps. Both the communicating parties, based on a shared random secret, generate the 
shared key. By knowing the shared random secret one cannot derive the shared secret key. 
Therefore, it will be computationally difficult for an attacker to generate data, which is 
validated with an appropriate time stamp. Similarly, replaying previously transmitted data 
will render the data invalid since the time stamps are encrypted along with the data and when 
verified at the receiving end will not match with the expected value of the time stamp 
recorded on the receiving device [139].  
In the event that an attacker, by some means is able to decrypt the captured packet and 
retrieve the contents of the packet, the node identity, the authentication value and its time 
stamp will be available to the attacker. Using them, valid data packets can be generated and 
spurious data can be sent to the NOC. However, it requires the attacker node to estimate the 
clock ticks of the active node and replay the packets for them to be accepted by the NOC.  
If the attacker is able to retrieve the value of the clock ticks of the node it has captured 
packets from, and regenerates the packets with valid time stamps, then the scheme can be 
broken. This again breaks the assumption (h) from the list of assumptions in section 5.2.2. 
However, such an attack is not termed as a replay attack, since the packets are re-crafted 
using the time stamp from the clock tick value synchronized with the node and other values 
from the captured packets.  
Replay attacks can be more harmful than Denial of Service attacks, and this is because they 
can result in remote activities even against encrypted packets. In article [15], the authors 
state that replay attacks can alter authentication packets, allowing them to gain unauthorized 
access to the AMI. Once the attacker obtains access privilege to AMIs or smart meters, 
he/she can easily inject control indicators into the systems. The attacker has to initially study 
the packets being transferred from the customer’s equipment to smart meters and examines 
these packets to identify the customer’s general levels of power usage. Subsequently, such 
an attacker can spoof transmitted packets, and inject signals into the system. To analyze the 
effect of replay attacks on AMI, we consider a scenario whereby there is a simple network 
topology, and Sender-S has created 2, 3, or 4 hop (overlapping) transmission routes to 
receiver-D through relays R1 and R2. In such a situation, the attacker would be in Sender 
S’s locality and eavesdrops on any packets being sent by S.  
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From the above, Sender A denotes the group of Smart meters “SM (L-SM)”, while the 
Relays R1 and R2 denote the Gateway GW, and Receiver B denotes the Network Operations 
Centre. Thus, as previously mentioned, the normal network route should include packets 
travelling from a group of smart meters through an intermediate SM, referred to H-SM, to 
the GW and the GW then forwards the packets to the NOC.   
However, as seen above, the attacker can carry out any of the following activities: 
1. The replay attacker can decide not to alter packets’ contents. Consider a situation 
where the PDR (i.e. the Packet Delivery Ratio) for all transmissions is ‘1’. If S sends a 
packet P1 and R1 receives this packet, followed by P2, the attacker eavesdrop on these 
transmissions. Subsequently, R1 forwards both P1 and P2 to R2. However, during intervals, 
the attacker can easily resend packet P1 to R1 again; thus, R1 is misled and resends P1 to 
R2, resulting in a delay in the time taken to send both packets P1 and P2.  
2. The attacker edits the packet header: The replay attacker can receive packet P1, edit 
this packet, and then resend several of these packets to R1, resulting in flooding of the 
network and higher time delay/discrepancy during transmission. 
 
The sender-to-receiver performance degradation resulting from the actions of the replay 
attacker can be measured by the equation: 
                                       Ωtdynamic (S D) = TS + NAV C (TS) + TD                              (3)                
Whereby: 
TS is the time to process message at Sender-S. 
TD is the time to process message at Receiver-D. 
NAV C (TS) is the time duration for communicating or sending packets between the sender 
(S) and receiver (D). 
Using a more simplified analysis, we assume packets are sent from the smart meters to the 
gateway in “S1” seconds, and from the gateway to the NOC in “S2” seconds. In such a 
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situation, a normal transmission from the sender to the receiver will take a maximum time 
interval of “S1 + S2” seconds. Considering a situation whereby a replay attacker eavesdrops 
on packets for “X1” seconds, and then replays these packets for “X2” seconds, the average 
time taken during a replay attack would be:  
                                                S12 + X2 + S22                                                            (4) 
Therefore, if an attacker listens during network packet transmissions for 100 seconds and 
then replays these packets for the next 100 seconds, applying the equation (2) above, time 
delay or discrepancy will be approximately 50% higher than the required time for sending 
packets. Furthermore, it can be deduced that when the hop count between nodes is increased 
(2 to 3 or 4), the time delay or discrepancy also increases. This is particularly based on the 
attacker’s location, since the attack takes place from the location of the sender, the replayed 
messages travel through the major parts of the network with longer pathways, thereby 
resulting in increased time delays during transmission. Therefore, one replay attacker can 
reduce the routing time for packets by as much as 50%-60%, while numerous attackers can 
result in even more time disruption during network transmissions. 
4.3.3 Sybil Attack  
In a Sybil attack, a malicious node assumes multiple fake identities and attempts to inject 
traffic into the network. Our scheme prevents vulnerability to such attacks by falling back 
on the need to validate the authentication value and time stamp value in a packet. The 
authentication value is derived from the random number shared by the gateway. This value 
is encrypted with the key shared with the gateway and verified at the gateway. So, in order 
to fake multiple identities, the attacker node must have access to all the shared keys of the 
nodes it intends to fake [139]. If the attacker is able to get these keys and the random value 
from the gateway, the ID of the node can be faked. However, in order to successfully 
transmit data the attacker will require having valid time stamps that the NOC can validate. 
Like in the earlier cases, the scheme will be broken if the attacker successfully synchronizes 
the clock tick values of the nodes that are being faked. In such a scenario, assumption (h) 
from the list of  assumptions in section 4.2.2 is broken.  
The attacker can simply re-initiate an authentication process, to overcome the time stamp 
problem. Re-authentication is a directed activity controlled by the NOC and therefore any 
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attempt to re-authenticate will immediately be detected by the NOC, thereby mitigating the 
attack. If this authentication attempt is successful, then the scheme breaks. This can occur if 
the assumption (l) from the list of assumptions in section 4.2.2 is broken. 
4.4 Summary 
 
Table 4-3: Key management issues resolved in KM-HAN, KM-NAN 
KM Issue Resolution 
Confidentiality Encrypted Key exchange 
Integrity ID encrypted SEN, TS 
Availability  Cryptographic key 
Authentication of source Authentication value 
We have included the security requirements for the HAN and NAN scenarios based on 
which the design of KM-HAN and KM-NAN have been done. These schemes have been 
shown to be resilient to attacks and the assumptions that the scenarios make to claim the 
resilience have illustrated the cases when the security scheme breaks.  
The typical key management problems that are addressed and resolved is in Table 4-3. We 
also compare the overheads of our schemes with two other schemes that are very similar to 
the scenarios we have considered. They are listed in Table 4-4. We observe that KM-NAN 
is economical, overall. The total number of keys required is four and only two keys are 
stored in the memory of any device, at any given time. Only one key is generated resulting   
Table 4-4: Comparison of the overheads of the security schemes 
Resources used in the security 
scheme 
Abdallah 
& Shen 
Demertzis 
et al 
KM-HAN/ 
KM-NAN 
Total keys for authentication & 
communication 
N/A N/A 4 
Number of keys stored in memory 
of end device (SM, NOC) / 
intermediate devices (H-SM, GW) 
2 2 2 
Number of keys exchanged 2 2+password 1 
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Number of keys generated Two pairs  2 1 
Key type  Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric 
Number of messages to 
authenticate 
2 Certificate 1 
in a reduction of computing overheads as well as delays. Each device authenticates with the 
other using only one message when compared to the multiple messages used by other 
schemes. We now discuss the implementation, simulation and security verification of KM-
HAN and KM-NAN in the forthcoming chapters. 
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Chapter Five: Implementation and Evaluation 
5. Introduction 
The previous chapter described the scheme of our novel key management solution for a 
Smart Grid’s communication layer. In this chapter we present the implementation of our 
work. Our work addresses the key management in the communication layer; therefore, our 
scheme has been divided into two different communication levels: HAN and NAN. We have 
therefore evaluated the performance of each of these levels separately and compared them 
with existing proposed schemes from the literature. In this chapter we provide a detailed 
description of the implementation setups and results of our proposed scheme. We describe 
the performance evaluation process and discuss the different simulation scenarios used to 
show the performance of each level of our scheme. To begin, we have implemented the first 
level of the communication layer in a Smart Grid HAN scheme and evaluated the energy 
conception. Our contributed secure scheme is evaluated on the real TelosB, which is an 
open-source platform that includes a mote with sensors and the development using the 
TinyOS platform. TinyOS is a small, open-source, energy-efficient software operating 
system that supports large-scale, self-configuring sensor networks. Both TelosB and TinyOS 
were developed by UC Berkeley [140]. The scheme has been evaluated on the real platform 
in terms of prevention in different types of attack, such as replay, node capture, Sybil, time 
complexity and amount of information. The evaluation was very detailed, with many results 
obtained through the execution of the programing used.  
5.1  Test bed Development 
5.1.1 TinyOS 
TinyOS is a small open-source operating system (OS) whose permissive, free software 
license enables programing power-embedded devices with limited amounts of RAM and 
flash. TinyOS was developed at UC Berkeley, which provides a framework for the most 
common type of motes’ application programming [141]. It supplies software designed for 
the component’s hardware elements, for example, sensing, communication, storage 
and routing. The TinyOS’s software component-based structure and event-driven execution 
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model provide particular roles by either another sensor’s software or a sensor’s hardware 
[140]. The software component includes the following:  
 Modules,  
Modules are components that have variables and executable code 
  Configurations  
Configurations are components that wire other components together 
  And application.  
In TinyOS the impalement of components of the application is different from regular 
programming. There are two-way directions in TinyOS that allow a user to issue a 
command to its provider and vice versa [142].  
5.1.2 NesC 
NesC (network-embedded systems C) is the programming language, with a set of 
cooperating tasks and processes that builds applications for the TinyOS platform. 
It is a programming language that provides the minimum memory requirements and enables 
the system to interact with the hardware by utilising asynchronous interrupts. Moreover, it 
provides an event-driven concurrency model that uses a C-based programming language 
with components wired together to run applications. 
Furthermore, it includes some types of the C libraries’ standards and syntax with some 
extensions, for example, commands and events added to accommodate its event-driven style 
to programming [143] .  
5.1.3 Selection of Hardware  
There are a lot of sensor motes available for implementation consideration for any WSN’s 
deployment, such as the Mica2, IMote2 and TelosB. Table 5-1 compares the characteristics 
of these motes [144]. 
 
 
 
 
109 
Table 5-1 compares the characteristics of these motes 
Sensors Motes TelosB MicaZ IMote2 
Processor Speed 8 Mhz 16 MHz 13-416 Mhz 
Memory Size 10 KB 512 KB 32 MB 
USB Interface Yes No Yes 
IEEE 802.15.4 
support 
Yes No Yes 
 
We have utilised TelosB motes figure 5-1 to implement our contributed secure scheme on a 
real WSN platform. TelosB motes are programmed to utilise a specialised coding language, 
NesC, and also integrate an IEEE 802.15.4-compliant radio and have a 250 kbps data rate. 
It suites sensors for detecting integrated light, temperature and humidity motes.  
 
Figure 5-1 TelosB sensor mote 
5.2 Home Area Network (HAN)  
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Figure 5-2 the implementation of HAN in TelosB motes 
 
Figure 5-3: Topology of a HAN 
An implementation of HAN scheme on TelosB motes figure 5-2, using TinyOS 2.1.2 has 
been done. AES was chosen for encryption. The key size is chosen as 16 bytes, the block 
size is 16 bytes and all input is processed with the same block size. The output is one block. 
SHA1 is used for generating a hash. Although SHA1 is advised as deprecated, it is valid for 
use until 2017. We consider generation of a signature equivalent to generating a message 
authentication code (MAC).  
The motes in a specific class encrypt the sensed data using AES with a block size of 16 bytes 
and then sign the encrypted block using SHA1. The application data is 7 bytes. AES 
encrypted data is 16 bytes and SHA1 gives a 20 byte output. The total application payload 
is 36 bytes long. Figure 5-5 indicates the time taken to encrypt the data on the sender mote 
and the time taken to decrypt the data on the receiving mote. Similarly, Figure 5-7 indicates 
the time taken to generate the SHA1 hash on the sender mote and time taken to generate the 
hash on the receiver side and compare it with the received 20-byte hash value. On an 
average, the privacy overheads are about 4.6 milliseconds and the authentication overheads 
amount to 13.9 milliseconds. With the security scheme in place, we could expect a minimum 
𝑮𝑳 
𝑫𝒊,𝑯 𝑫𝒊,𝑯 𝑫𝒊,𝑯 
𝑫𝒊,𝑳 𝑫𝒊,𝑳 𝑫𝒊,𝑳 
𝑮𝑯 
𝑺𝑴𝒏,𝒈 
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overhead of 18.5 milliseconds. This delay would add on to the normal operating delays 
(network delays) of such networks 
5.2.1 Development of the group controller 
The group controller program is implemented for the L-group of nodes, which only send the 
data to the group controller for onward transmission. The implementation consists of two 
programs, one on the end device and the other on the group controller. The program on the 
device does the following tasks: 
1. Record the sensed data periodically (set to five seconds) into a variable. 
2. Encrypt the node id, sensed data and the time stamp into an encrypted block. 
3. Generate a signature of the encrypted block using SHA1. 
4. Append the signature to the encrypted block to form the payload for transportation. 
5. Send the packet destined to the gateway controller using sendmsg(). 
6. Print the timestamp when the message was sent and the time taken to encrypt and 
time taken to sign  
A portion of the code is included below as an illustration. 
The program on the group controller performs the following tasks: 
1. Receive a packet from a downstream node 
2. Copy the signature block (MAC), compute a signature on the data part and verify 
the computed signature and the received signature. 
3. If the signatures match, process the packet further. Drop the packet if they don’t 
match. 
4. The data in the payload is decrypted to check the contents further. 
5. Check to see if the received node id is valid. If not, drop the packet 
5.2.2 Development Platform & Devices  
The development was done using the Eclipse IDE with a TinyOS plugin that provides for 
TinyOS function templates, syntax checks, wiring checks for modules and interfaces of 
TinyOS and pre-compilation checks such as internal and external references. The Eclipse 
IDE and TinyOS 2.1.2 package were installed on Ubuntu Linux 12.04 LTS Desktop version. 
This was set up on a Dell laptop with a 2.5 GHz processor and 8 MB RAM. The sensor 
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motes used were TelosB motes, described earlier. The compiled programs generated 
executable codes for the sensor motes and were downloaded on to the motes for operation.  
The programs included print statements for purposes of information and debugging (not 
included in figures 5-4 and 5-6). The output of these print statements was captured by using 
a terminal emulator program that could read the output from the mote’s serial (USB) port. 
The outputs from the motes illustrated in this chapter are screen captures of these outputs in 
the terminal emulator window. 
 
 
Figure 5-4: The sendmsg() task on the end device 
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Figure 5-5: Total time taken for encryption and decryption at sender and receiver nodes 
 
Figure 5-6: The receive() task on the end device 
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Figure 5-7: Outputs of ssender and receiver motes indicating timestamps in mu-secs (col 1), 
time to encrypt/decrypt (col 2) and time to sign/verify (col 3) 
 
 
Figure 5-8: Total time take for signing and verifying at the source and destination nodes 
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Figure 5-9: Energy consumption during the communications phase 
5.2.3 Energy Consumption 
   The proposed scheme uses only symmetric keys therefore, it is economical on both storage 
as well as energy consumption unlike [44, 133]. In terms of storage, each device in Group 
L stores a maximum of two keys and a node ID whereas a device in Group H stores a 
maximum of three keys and a node ID.   The energy consumption, based on the number of 
bits transmitted on the network; also it is significantly low since the encryption overheads 
are low. For example, using AES for encryption with a block cipher of 16, a data sample 16 
bits long, when encrypted remains 16 bits long; a data sample 24 bits long, when encrypted 
is 32 bits long. The encryption overhead, therefore, is a maximum of 15 bits, for any input 
data size. Authentication functions give a fixed signature size (typically 128 bits or 8 bytes 
long) regardless of the input size. Therefore, when the signature is sent along with the 
encrypted data, the total number of bits transmitted increases and hence the energy 
consumption is higher. The energy per bit transmitted is calculated assuming a data rate of 
250 Kbps and an active state current of 15 mA at 3.3V.For a Group L device 𝐷𝐿,𝑖 the data 
sample size is 16 bits (2 bytes), the node ID is 16 bits and the time stamp is 16 bits, totaling 
to 48 bits (6 bytes) of data. Similarly, for a Group H device 𝐷𝐻𝑖, the data size is 16 bits, the 
node ID is 16 bits, the time stamp is 16 bits and the message authentication code is 160 bits, 
totalling to 208 bits (26 bytes). Note that the byte count increases by 20 bytes with 
authentication. AES is used for encryption and SHA-1 is used for authentication. With 
authentication turned on, the energy consumption is markedly higher than when only 
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encryption is used. The Group L is assumed to have twenty-five devices and Group H is 
assumed to have ten devices. The devices send data every ten minutes via the own group 
controllers. The group controllers receive data from the devices, decrypt them, encrypt them 
using the shared key of the smart meter and forward the data to the smart meter.  A set of 
data from both the groups forwarded by the group controller to the smart meter is referred 
to as a cycle. Figure 5-9 shows that energy of the group controller for group L lasts around 
4300 cycles and that of group H lasts for 4000 cycles. 𝐷𝐿,𝑖and 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 last far beyond 4300 
cycles (4300 cycles at 600 secs per cycle implies 30 days.). However, the energy consumed 
by 𝐷𝐻,𝑖 is more than that consumed by𝐷𝐿,𝑖. 
5.2.4 Implementation of replay attack 
A Replay attack involves a malicious node capturing authentication/data packets sent from 
a home devices and re-sending them at a later point in time, expecting to authenticate and 
gain entry into the home network [145]. A separate mote was programmed to sniff the 
packets and replay them. This program would receive packets in promiscuous mode, make 
a copy in a buffer and resend them after a specific time delay, which could be programmed. 
For our experiments, this delay was programmed as five seconds. The packets would not be 
verified for their signatures or for their authenticity. Packets originating from specific nodes 
could be replayed.  An ideal packet replay program should be able to capture a set of packets 
into its buffers and play out the complete buffer when required. However, such a feature was 
not implemented due to the complexity of writing and reading data from a mote to an 
external file system. The following code illustrates the receiving of packets in promiscuous 
mode as well as in direct mode (packets addressed to the replay node). The direct mode 
provides a means of sending control packets to the reply node. The delay before transmitting 
the packet to be replayed is part of the code that queues the packet for replay, 
radioSendTask().  
Once the replayed packet reaches the HGC, the integrity check and the privacy checks are 
made and finally, the time stamp is verified. Upon verification of the time stamp, the time 
stamp of the replayed packet may not fall within the window of the next expected time stamp 
value. In a typical case, it will be less than the expected value and will cause the HGC to 
report an error and ignore the packet as well as the data it carries. The time stamp value is a 
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32-bit value and expressed as microseconds. This counter will wrap around after 
 
Figure 5-10: The replay attack program with promiscuous receive and resend 
a value of 232 and this condition is take care of when making the time stamp comparison. 
5.2.5 Implementation of node capture attack 
Randomly turning off the end nodes and assessing if the rest of the nodes were reachable 
to the HGC implemented the node capture attack. Since the HGC and the end nodes form a 
tree of depth one, the failure of one or more nodes did not affect the working of the rest of 
the nodes. When the HGC does not receive an expected update in a specific period, it 
event message_t *RadioSnoop.receive[am_id_t id](message_t *msg, 
                                    
void*payload,                                        
uint8_t len)  
{ 
    call Leds.led1Toggle(); return receive(msg, payload, len); 
  } 
 
event message_t *RadioReceive.receive[am_id_t id](message_t *msg, 
                                                   void *payload, 
                                                    uint8_t len) 
{ 
   call Leds.led1Toggle();   
   return receive(msg, payload, len); 
  } 
 
message_t* receive(message_t *msg, void *payload, uint8_t len) { 
    message_t *ret = msg; 
//If the packet is from REPLAYTHISNODE, queue it for Tx in 
//radioSendTask() 
if (call RadioAMPacket.source(msg) == REPLAYTHISNODE) { 
post radioSendTask(); 
atomic { 
      if (!radioFull) 
        { 
          ret = radioQueue[radioIn]; 
          radioQueue[radioIn] = msg; 
          radioIn = (radioIn + 1) % RADIO_QUEUE_LEN; 
          if (radioIn == RADIO_QUEUE_LEN) 
            radioFull = TRUE; 
          if ((!radioBusy) && radioFull) 
            { 
              radioBusy = TRUE; 
            } 
        } 
      else 
        drop(); 
        } 
      } return ret; 
  } 
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marks the node as inactive and waits for three successive missing updates to mark the node 
as dead. Once a node is marked as dead, all state information pertaining to that node will 
be removed, until the node restarts and begins to transmit again.  
5.2.6 Implementation of Sybil attack 
The Sybil attack was emulated by adding a mote with the program for an end device. In this 
case, the attacker mote was programmed with valid node ID, secret key pairs as registered 
in the HGC. The mote was programmed to randomly pick a node ID and use the associated 
key to send data upstream. Like in the case of the replay attack, the time stamp of the attacker 
mote gave away since the time stamp value of the attacker mote varied quite significantly 
from those of the other motes it attempted to spoof.  
5.3 Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN)  
The proposed scheme was implemented on TelosB motes using TinyOS version 2.1[140]. 
Six motes were used, one each in a role as the NOC and as a GW and four others in a mesh 
communicating to the NOC, via the GW. The motes were pre-loaded with the addresses of 
the NOC and the GW nodes as well as the master key of the NOC.  
Each of the motes had a separate program to receive a packet, check for its credentials and 
then forward it to the upstream or downstream node, as necessary. The intermediate nodes 
– the Proxy SM and the gateway performed the forwarding of packets. The NOC receives 
the packets and validates the identity and the time stamp sent along with the data and then 
provides an appropriate response. The NOC records the running time stamps in a circular 
buffer of size three; three previous time stamp values from a specific node are used to 
validate the time stamp received from a specific node. The code snippet below shows how   
 
Figure 5-11 Recording the received time stamps and storing them for comparison  
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the time stamps from a specific node are stored in a two-dimensional array. Once a packet 
is received, its time stamp is validated using the validate_TS() call, which finds out the 
deviation of the received time stamp, with the earlier samples. If the deviation is below a 
threshold (set to 10 % amounting to 8 ms), the packet is accepted. This threshold value is 
based on the one-way application packet delay from the device to the NOC.  
The intermediate nodes, ProxySM and the GW receive packets from downstream devices 
and forward them upstream. The ProxySM does one round of encryption for packets 
destined to upstream nodes and one round of decryption for packets destined to downstream 
nodes. Packets going upstream and packets going downstream are marked with different 
packet types for easy debugging. The functional packet types are assigned different packet 
types within the application packet. 
 
Figure 5-12 Different AM types for packets destined upstream and downstream with reference to the end device 
 
Figure 5-13: Application packet types for the authentication process 
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In a similar manner, the authentication packets are identified with specific 
application packet types that are part of the application data. This helps in gathering and 
maintaining the state information for authentication status of each node.  
The NOC and the GW nodes were switched on respectively and the GW authenticated with 
the NOC. Subsequently, the nodes were switched on, one-by-one. Note that the 
implementation on the motes did not use the link layer encryption facility. The nodes were 
physically located such that each node was in the radio range of only two other nodes. This 
ensured that there were at least two two-hop paths from the nodes to the GW.  The network 
topology is illustrated in Figure 5-15. 
Two specific measurements were made. The time taken for encryption, decryption (AES 
[147], with block size 16, key size 128 bits) was measured. Figure 5-14 provides a snapshot 
of the packet transit across the nodes labelled L-SM (leaf node), H-SM (intermediate node), 
GW (group gateway) and NOC (the NOC). Each line starts with a time stamp in 
microseconds, indicates the source and destination node addresses (L-SM and NOC only), 
followed by the application data size (33 Bytes), the time to encrypt/decrypt the packet 
contents on the node (in microseconds) and the name of the routine providing the 
information. 
 
Figure 5-14: Output of the motes from L-SM to NOC and back 
The corresponding outputs at each node in the path to the NOC is captured individually and 
illustrated in the Figures 5-16 to 5-19. Figure 5-16 represents the output at the mote labelled 
as NOC. The NOC node prints an output on receipt of a packet. It prints the timestamp when 
the packet was received, the immediate node from which it was received, the total number 
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of bytes and the action it takes. The output shows successful authentication response packets 
being sent (marked as –sendauthresp--). 
Each node prints out the time taken to decrypt the data and re-encrypt the data with the 
appropriate key for the next hop in the path to the NOC or to the end node, L-SM.  Note that 
the time is not synchronized across the motes and hence the timestamps across the motes do 
not correspond. They depend on when the mote has been turned on. If a packet has to be 
traced, we require to set a packet sequence number at source and track it. Since the NAN 
scheme does not require the data to be signed, the time required for signatures and the time 
required to verify them are not displayed. 
 
Figure 5-15: The topology of the NAN implementation using TelosB motes 
 
Figure 5-16: Output of the mote labeled NOC 
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Figure 5-17: Output at the mote labeled GW 
Figure 5-17 shows the output at the node labelled GW. This node received packets going to 
the NOC (--UPReceive--) as well as those going towards the end nodes (--DNReceive-
-). The packets being sent are labelled with the node they are sent to sendtohsm and 
sendtonoc. Other output details are similar to those on the NOC. The output at the H-SM 
is similar to that at the GW except that the packets being sent are labelled with the node they 
are sent to sendtosm and sendtogw.   
 
Figure 5-18: Output at the mote labeled H-SM 
Figure 5-19 shows the output at the L-SM. It originates the authentication request (marked 
as –-sendauthreq--) and forwards it to the upstream H-SM. Upon receiving a packet, it 
verifies the content and if an authentication response received, it prints the total time elapsed 
since the corresponding authentication request was sent as the round trip time for the 
authentication. All time units are in microseconds. 
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Figure 5-19: Output at the node labeled L-SM 
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 list the time taken for encryption and decryption on each node as the 
packet traverses the network from the L-SM to the NOC and back. The total of these times 
subtracted from the measured round trip times gives the total network delay. This network 
delay is across a total of six hops in case 2 and three hops in case 1.  
 
Table 5-2 Measurement of the scheme encryption and decryption times in Micro-seconds and RTT in 
Case1  
 
Table 5-3 Measurement of the scheme encryption and decryption times in Micro-seconds and RTT in 
Case2 
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Figure 5-20: Time taken for AES dencryption of a 16-byte block on motes in a mesh topology 
The total delay for the authentication process of a mote, using a two-hop path was measured. 
The average encryption and decryption times on end nodes are 6 ms and 6.2 ms, on 
intermediate nodes (authenticated forwarding), including the GW node 3.9 ms and 4.2 ms 
and on the NOC 8.2 ms and 6.5 ms. The average RTT from an end node to the NOC was 
196 ms. The average RTT between a pair of nodes on the network was 25 ms. The entire 
authentication process took 331 ms. 
 
 
Figure 5-21: Time taken for AES encryption of a 16-byte block on motes in a mesh topology 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
Figure 5-22: RTT from L-SM to NOC in mesh topology (3 hops) 
The time taken for encryption and decryption of a 16-byte block of the application 
packet is shown in Figures 5-20 and 5-21 respectively. This measurement was done using 
the microsecond timer implemented in TinyOS. The timer was fired before and after the 
encrypt/decrypt operations, within the application. Therefore, the measurement includes the 
TinyOS overheads (interrupt servicing, packet reception, etc.). The data set contains a 
hundred measurements on each mote and indicates the mean of the data set and the standard 
deviation. 
 
Figure 5-23:RTT from L-SM to NOC in star topology (1-hop) 
The path from the L-SM to the NOC is a three-hop path. Each mote in the path will 
require to process packets from its downstream, in addition to its own packets, which leads 
to an increase in the overall encryption time. This is evident from the increasing encryption 
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and decryption times as well as the increasing value of the standard deviation of the data set, 
which is plotted as an error bar. 
The round trip time (RTT) for an authentication packet (network transit time + processing 
time on each mote) from the L-SM to the NOC and back, was measured for the star and 
mesh topologies. Figures 5-22, 5-23 indicates the RTTs without and with the security turned 
on (labelled as RTT-SECURE). The RTT for the mesh (figure 5-23) topology is an order of 
magnitude higher than that for the star topology (figure 5-22). The limitation of the 
implementation is the inability to examine the performance of the authentication scheme 
when the number of nodes is scaled up. This requires physical configuration and deployment 
of a large number of motes. Specifically, the load on the gateway node and its impact on the 
authentication delay require evaluation. 
Such an evaluation is currently being attempted as a simulation in OPNET [146]. A network 
of nodes interconnected using ZigBee is simulated. These nodes, in a cluster-tree topology, 
are scaled up to large numbers towards two specific objectives. First, to measure end-to-end 
network delays (from the leaf nodes to the NOC, multi-hop path) and second, to emulate the 
application (authentication and sensor data) packet flows and measure the authentication 
delays, when nodes join/leave the network. Subsequently, the intent is to study the effect of 
physical node capture and node failures in terms of the extent of impact on node reachability 
and hence the portion of the network that is effectively non-functional.  
5.4 Replay attacks in a NAN 
A replay attack involves a malicious node capturing authentication/data packets sent from a 
smart meter and re-sending them at a later point in time, expecting to authenticate and gain 
entry into the network [145]. 
In the event of a replay attack, the attacker will resend a valid captured packet to the GW. 
Upon receipt, the GW will require to decrypt the packet using the shared key of the L-SM 
that it claims to arrive from. Following that, it forwards the packet to the NOC, which 
performs the same procedure and then implements the necessary checks on the content of 
the packet. 
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Figure 5-24: Screen capture of the output of the packet reply program (sniff and replay) 
We have two specific concerns in the case of a replay attack. By definition, a replay attack 
involves resending a previously captured packet to gain access/privileges to the AMI. The 
security control is located at the central server, but the intermediate nodes have to process 
the packets they receive.  
When the attacker repeatedly sends the replay packets, it causes the GW and the NOC to 
have to process the replayed packets to identify them. These packets are valid encrypted 
packets, which require being decrypted to examine the packet contents. This causes the 
processing load on the GW and NOC to increase. This increase can be substantial if the rate 
of the arrival of the replayed packets is sufficiently high, resulting in delays for traffic 
(authentication and data) from the other nodes, downstream. 
Our concern is specifically on H-SM and GW nodes, which are in the path of the 
downstream nodes that send data to the NOC. In addition to delay, the H-SM and GW nodes 
consume energy to process the malicious packets and this could drain the resources on these 
nodes. 
Both schemes present in [50, 51] show a vulnerability to replay attack. Our scheme is secure 
against replay attacks because it uses shared keys for communication and as well as time 
stamps. Both the communicating parties, based on a shared random secret, generate the 
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shared key. By knowing the shared random secret one cannot derive the shared secret key. 
Therefore, it will be computationally difficult for an attacker to generate data, which is 
validated with an appropriate time stamp. Similarly, replaying previously transmitted data 
will render the data invalid since the time stamps are encrypted along with the data and when 
verified at the receiving end will not match with the expected value of the time stamp 
recorded on the receiving device [139]. 
 
 
Figure 5-25: Modeling replay attack with the TelosB 
 
Figure 5-26: Flagging a duplicate authentication packet from the same node 
The replay program used for attacks in the HAN scenario was used for the NAN scenario as well. 
The program sniffs packets from a particular node promiscuously, makes a copy and resends the 
same packet after a specified time delay. Figure 5-24 illustrates the output of the sniff and replay 
program. The output indicates the packet number received with an inward arrow (<-) and the same 
packet is then transmitted. The packet number sent is indicated with an outward arrow (->). The 
NOC examines the time stamps and accepts the packet only if the timestamp of the packet is within 
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the acceptable time stamp deviation threshold. If the time stamp is not within the acceptable 
threshold and the application packet type is an authentication request, the NOC responds with a 
warning mentioning a duplicate authentication request from the specific node. Figure 5-26 
illustrates the code segment that flags the receipt of a duplicate authentication request from 
the same node that has been authenticated earlier. Such packets are discarded. Figure 5-27 
illustrates a duplication authentication attempt from a node that is already authenticated.  
The output is from the mote labelled as NOC. The figure shows the duplicate authentication 
packet received as “DUP Auth packet” with the received packet’s timestamp and timestamp 
at which the specific node was authenticated. Note that the received packet timestamp value 
could be higher or lower than the authentication epoch. This is to handle the timer counter 
overflow or wrap around at the remote nodes. 
 
Figure 5-27: Output of the mote labeled NOC indicating duplicate authentication requests from the same node 
5.4.1 Sybil attack 
Generating a Sybil attack requires that one node be able to take on different identities and 
masquerade as those nodes. The key to mitigating a Sybil attack is to detect it. In order to 
implement this attack, we initially wrote a program that could enable the mote to take on 
different identities and generate authentication requests. The assumption is that a 
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compromised node has enabled the attacker to gain the keys of the nodes whose IDs will be 
masqueraded. Using this information, the attacker will attempt to authenticate as the original 
node.  
 
Figure 5-28: Output at a node labeled NOC when a node assumes another node's ID (Sybil attack) 
Figure 5-28 shows the output of a test program that was initially used to realise the concept 
of the Sybil attack. The terminal on the left is the output of the program that is used by the 
attacker. The test program runs with the ID given to it and transmits ten packets to the 
receiver (NOC). The NOC tracks the packets received from each node and remembers when 
that node had authenticated last and what packets it expects from the node. It is therefore 
able to flag the receipt of unwarranted authentication request packets. In the first attempt, a 
node with ID successfully authenticates with the NOC, followed by the successful 
authentication of a node with ID 7. When the attacker masquerades with ID 5 (third attempt) 
and transmits a packet, the NOC (output on the terminal to the right in Figure 5-28) responds 
mentioning it expects packet number 10. It provides when the node had authenticated last. 
This program segments were then included in the programs on the mote and enabled 
launching a Sybil attack.  
The figure 5-29 shows the output of the NOC during an emulated Sybil attack. The attack 
emulation was done using a TelosB mote, which was programmed to change its ID 
randomly, between IDs 110 and 115 and attempt to authenticate with the NOC. The NOC 
key and the gateway key were stored in the memory of the mote, emulating a capture of an 
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authenticated mote. The first two pairs of messages show successful authentications from 
node IDs 111 and 112. Node 110 is already authenticated. The captured node attempts to 
authenticate as node 110 in the third pair of messages. The NOC verifies the request and 
reports a duplicate (DUP) authentication request. The authentication for node 110 was done 
at the local time 31380917. The registered serial number of the node to the one that is 
received does not match (SeN mismatch). The timestamp (TS) expected from node ID 110 
 
Figure 5-29: Output at the node labeled NOC, to a Sybil attack 
is 1981016 whereas the received TS in the packet is 1061893 and completely out of the 
allowed time drift margin of 500 microseconds. Similar messages are given when the 
authentication requests for 112 are repeated (4th and 6th pair of NOC messages). The fifth 
pair indicates a successful authentication of node with id 113 where all parameters match. 
That node was just turned ON.  
5.5 Summary 
This chapter dealt with the implementation of KM-HAN and KM-NAN on Telos-B motes. 
The functioning of the scheme was verified and several measurements were made. The end-
to-end delays were measured for the HAN and NAN scenario in addition to measuring other 
parameters such as the encryption, decryption times, signature and verification times which 
form a part of the total end-to-end delay. The network delays were calculated. Along with 
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the measurements, the attack scenarios were implemented and KM-HAN and KM-NAN 
were evaluated to check whether they were able to detect the attacks and make sure that the 
data was not processed. The total time for authentication in a NAN was measured. 
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Chapter Six: Simulation Study and Protocol Verification 
6. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the simulations of the HAN and NAN segments and the observations 
with respect to performance. The simulations were done after the implementations of the 
security schemes on physical motes. Following the simulation results, details of verifying 
the group authentication protocol using a security protocol verification tool is discussed. The 
tool provides a means of verifying the security features of the scheme and determining 
whether they are vulnerable to attacks. 
6.1 The need for simulation 
The implementations were done using a small set of physical motes. They yielded typical 
measurements in terms of cumulative delays. With these measurements as the basis, it was 
necessary to estimate typical delays in networks of scale. This is the primary need for 
simulation. It provided us with a means of constructing a large network of nodes, initiating 
traffic end-to-end and measuring the overall delays. Such measurements were made with the 
network of nodes in different topologies such as star, mesh and grid.  
The second reason is to understand the impact of topology on the availability of the 
nodes/network when nodes are attacked and rendered inoperative. This was studied 
specifically in the case of a NAN scenario, where the devices tend to form a more complex 
network to extend paths to the NOC. Reachability, in such an event, is an important criterion. 
Simulations provided a means of evaluating the availability of the network/service by 
estimating the reachability of nodes from the NOC, with and without attacks/failed nodes.  
6.2 Tools, limitations & methodology 
The simulations were done using the Riverbed Modeler 18.0 from Riverbed Technologies 
[146]. The modeller provides ZigBee nodes (end nodes, routers, and coordinators) with the 
IEEE 802.15.4 access protocol support. The modeller does not provide libraries to support 
the privacy functions, although there is support for secure sockets layer (SSL). Hence a 
specific application profile to emulate the security scheme was not possible. This was a 
limitation. We overcome this limitation by modelling the encryption, decryption, signature 
and verification as delays preceding the packet transmissions.  
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The ZigBee nodes without application profiles were used to form the networks of a hundred 
end devices interconnecting to ten coordinator nodes using 30 router nodes. This 
configuration was used for the NAN. A HAN was built on a similar scale with a hundred 
end devices. The following sections detail the topologies and the simulation results for the 
HAN and NAN, respectively. 
6.3 Modelling the HAN with the Riverbed Modeller  
6.3.1 Simulation set up 
The basic scenario for the HAN segment is a campus network where of wireless IoT devices 
from one wireless network connect to the service offered by remote servers. Figure 6-1 
shows the simulation HAN scenario using Riverbed Modeller 18. Two groups of devices, 
the L group and the H group are connected to their respective group controllers. The group 
controllers, in turn, are connected to the smart meter (not shown in Figure 6-1). The delay 
for the packets from the device to the NOC was considered as the performance measure of 
the security scheme, in that scenario.  
Figure 6-1: The simulated HAN scenario 
6.3.2 End-to-end delays 
The measured communication delay of the simulated HAN scenario, shown in figure 6-1 
was 5 milliseconds. The throughput recorded for the run was 3.76 Kbps (Figure 6-2).  
Subsequently, additional nodes were created to emulate a replay attack and the delays were 
observed. The replay attacks were directed to the group controllers. The delay from the 
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devices to the controllers increased as well as varied substantially. The average value was 
3.4 milliseconds with a deviation of +/-1.27 milliseconds (Figure 6-4). In effect, it clearly 
pointed out the processing load at the group controller causing the increased delay as well 
as the delay variations. 
  
Figure 6-2: Throughputs in the HAN segment 
 
Figure 6-3: End-to-end delay in HAN scenario (seconds)  
Similarly, the simulations were run, turning off nodes randomly and measuring the 
reachability. This emulated the node capture attack, where nodes are incapacitated. In such 
a case, the number of nodes reachable was measured against the number of failed nodes. 
The results were plotted (Figure 6-5). Predictably, the plot is a linear negative slope.  
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6.3.3 Simulation of Replay Attack 
 
Figure 6-4: Increase in end-to-end delay in the HAN (device to GC) during a replay attack 
 
Figure 6-5: Information transfer %age during node captures in the HAN 
6.4 Modelling the NAN with the Riverbed Modeller  
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The simulated network consisted of 10 groups. Each group had one ZigBee Coordinator, 3 
ZigBee Routers and 10 ZigBee End Devices (table 6-1). In figures 6-6 and 6-7, we show the 
modelling of the NAN within two networks using Riverbed Modeller 18 and the simulation 
parameters. Our aim is to determine the communication performance results of the security 
group communication scheme in the NAN environment. In particular we determine the 
delay, throughput, load and other results. 
Table 6-1 Simulation Parameters 
Simulation time (sec) 3600 
Number of Coordinator 3 10 
Number of Routers 30 
Number of End Devices 100 
 
Figure 6-6: Modeling the NAN in the mesh topology 
The simulations were carried out in two different network topologies: mesh and star. 
Moreover, the applications were configured based on the TelosB motes’ measurement 
results. These results are mean values across 10 different random network topologies and 
group configurations.  
6.4.1 Results  
The results indicate that the end-to-end delay in a mesh topology has a mean value of 1.2 
seconds due to the multi-hop paths whereas the star topology (single hop path) delay value 
has a lower average at 0.87 seconds. 
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Figure 6-7: Modeling the NAN in a star topology 
 
 
Figure 6-8: End-to-end delay in the NAN scenario 
Moreover, the global throughput is a global statistic, and any entity may add to its value. 
Additionally, the throughput of the network may diminish to unacceptable levels. It provides 
an overall idea of the general throughput of the NAN simulation scenario. In this simulation 
the Tree topology had the highest global throughput (bits/second). Figure 6-9 shows that the 
mesh case had the highest global throughput compared to the star topology.  
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Figure 6-9: Throughputs in the NAN scenario 
6.4.2 Node capture attack  
In this section, we evaluate our proposed scheme by means of computer simulations. We 
use the Riverbed Modeller 18 simulation tool [146]. The simulated network consists of 10 
groups. Each group has 10 ZigBee Coordinators, 50 ZigBee Routers, and 170 ZigBee End 
Devices. We generate 10 different mesh topologies and randomly assign nodes into groups. 
Our aim is to study the impact of the node capture attack on the proposed security of the 
group communication of Smart Grid. In particular, we determine the number of 
compromised nodes when an attacker has captured a subset of the nodes. That is, when the 
attacker has captured one or more nodes, attacker can attack other nodes of the group by 
exploiting the existing vulnerabilities of the group communication scheme in use. In this 
session, we compare our proposed secure group communications scheme with the [50] [51] 
based authentication. We simulate different numbers of captured nodes as follows: from 10 
to 100 captured nodes to launch a high-intensity node capture attack. Afterwards, for each 
of the two approaches [50] [51], in figure 6-10 we determine how many nodes the attacker 
is able to compromise as a result of the node capture attack.  
6.5 Performance study of the KM-NAN and illustration of the KM-NAN’s resilience 
on different communication network topologies in the NAN   
We tested our proposed scheme KM-NAN resilience against node capture attacks using 
different topologies (star, and mesh). The purpose of this is to determine the level of 
topology independence by simulating node capture attack using various topologies. 
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Figure 6-10: Comparing the number of compromised nodes in [50], [51], compared to KM-NAN 
Among various attacks in Smart Grids, node capture attack is a severe threat due to 
unattended nature of the sensor nodes. In a node capture attack threat, an intruder can 
capture/compromise a node (SM) to get the access to secure cryptographic keys, node 
identification, communication between node and the network and monitor by re-deploying 
the compromised node into the network [109, 110]. Once a node is compromised, it allows 
an intruder to execute various operations/attacks on the network and easily compromise the 
entire network. According to [111], there are three critical factors as mentioned below, 
which can lead intruder to compromise the entire network while triggering the node capture 
threat. 
The node deployment/topology play a critical role as it affects the scope of the node capture 
attacks. Generally, the scope can be defined based on the number of communication links 
such as, fewer the communication links between neighbouring nodes (i.e. tree topology), the 
greater the possibility that an intruder can threat entire network. At the other end, higher the 
communication links between neighbouring nodes (i.e. full/partial mesh topology), the 
smaller the possibility that an intruder can threat entire network. Therefore, node capture 
attacks seem to be less effective to mesh topology as compared to star topology, where there 
is only route from a child node to parent node.  
The node density also plays a critical role as it affects the scope of the node capture attacks. 
A node compromised in the larger density network can threat the larger section of network 
Star-based network deployment is characterized by central root node, connected at the 
highest level in the hierarchy as show in figure 6-34. Top-level node is connected to 2nd 
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level, whereas 2nd level nodes are connected to 3rd level and so forth. The levels of the star 
topology can be denoted by 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁: = {1, 2, … 𝑁}, where the 0𝑡ℎlevel is for top root.  
 
Figure 6-11: Network topology for simulating a node capture attack 
In a mesh network deployment, a node in each of the smart meter in NANs will communicate 
(transmit / receive) data by hoping from one node to another node until either the receiving 
node is reached or transmitted data reaches the mesh gateway from node to node. The data 
from the gateway is typically transmitted to central data station via a backhaul network. The 
GWs are connected as start topology to backhaul network and SMs are connected as partial 
mesh as each SM is not directly connected to each of the other SM in the network. 
6.5.1 Network Security Model 
It is considered that a group of Smart Meters (SMs) with one SM taking on the role of a 
gateway (GW) are interconnected in a manner that some SMs have a multi hop path to the 
gateway (GW). The GW interconnects to the central authentication point over the backhaul 
network. SMs that are children of other SMs use the multi-hop path to reach the GW node 
as shown in figure 6-33. It is assumed the NANs use encrypted communication based on 
random redistribution key approach. Each node is configured with a set of (𝐾) different 
keys from a key pool of (𝑃) keys. A pair of nodes with the range (𝑅) can initiate a secure 
connectivity only if appropriate assigned keys are shared between them. It is also assumed 
that every node is deployed in a promiscuous approach and is able to recognize sources of 
all messages initiating from its neighboring nodes. Based on this assumption, each node will 
inspect only the source node ID therefore this assumption will not incur significant 
communication overhead.  
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6.5.2 Network Threat Model and Performance Metrics 
It is assumed that an intruder can physical capture a limited number of SM nodes in a target 
region (ℝ) and turn them into threat node by extracting secure keys and measured data for 
NAN. Considering (𝐶) represents a set of nodes captured by intruder and for each node in 
set (𝐶), a set of secure key (𝐶𝑘) is considered as compromised. It also compromises all the 
links between nodes (𝑛𝑖 , 𝑛𝑗 ∈ 𝑁) in region (ℝ) to be exposed to intruder as a threat. It 
allows intruder to clone a capture node and collaboratively deploy them in the NAN. The 
resiliency of NAN star and mesh topology in Smart Grid against NC attack will be evaluated 
based on reachability of total nodes in the network after node captures. 
6.5.3 Network Topology and Simulation Setup 
To carry out evaluation of node capture attacks, two NAN topologies star and mesh. The 
NAN made of (𝑁) nodes is deployed over a region of (𝐴 ⊆ ℝ). Considering the fact that 
SM nodes in AMI will be deployed fixed, therefore a static network deployment has been 
assumed. Each node is assumed to be equipped with an omni-directional radio with fixed 
communication range (𝑅) based on Zigbee standard. To evaluate the resiliency of star and 
partial mesh topology in NAN in smart grid based on Zigbee network against node capture 
attack, Riverbed simulation tool [146] has been considered. In both star and mesh topology 
simulation of NAN, Zigbee network consist of coordinator (Gateway) and end devices 
(SMs). 
Case 1 – Star Topology: In this case, Zigbee nodes are deployed as star topology for NAN. 
In a NAN tree topology, there is a relationship of root (GW) and child (SM) node. The child 
node can communicate only with their parent node whereas the parents can communicate 
with their child and their own parent node. Therefore, child node (SM) always depends on 
the parent node for data availability, as there are no alternative routes for SM node to get 
target.  
Case 2 – Mesh Topology: In this case, Zigbee nodes are deployed as partial mesh topology 
for NAN. NAN Mesh topology is more flexible as it can allow each node to choose between 
multiple routes to transmit/receive data to the target location. It also allows the network to 
self-heal and search for other paths and so that data can be relay through.  
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Figure 6-12: Reachability of nodes after node captures/failures 
Node capture attacks in KM-NAN can significantly degrade network reachability. Based on 
the simulation results in figure 6-12, we observe that partial mesh topology is more resilient 
topology as compared to star topology for KM-NAN.  
6.6 Summary of Simulations 
We have resorted to simulations to explore the scale of end-to-end delays in the HAN and 
NAN scenario with the security overheads introduced by KM-HAN and KM-NAN, when 
their respective scenarios are scaled up to hundreds of nodes.  Typical network 
configurations included ten coordinators, thirty routers and a hundred nodes. End-to-end 
delay measurements were made on both KM-HAN and KM-NAN. In case of HAN, we 
observe that the end-to-end delay from the devices to the SM are 5 milliseconds and that for 
the NAN in the two topologies are 0.89 seconds and 1.2 seconds, respectively, for star and 
mesh topologies. Subsequently, the increase in the end-to-end delay as a consequence of 
replay attacks is measured.  Node capture attacks are simulated with random node failures 
and the number of nodes reachable is measured both for HAN and NAN.  
6.7 Verifying security parameters 
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The final step after the implementation and simulations is the verification of the security 
scheme. There are several automatic security protocol verification tools such as CoProVe 
[159], AVISPA [160], ProVerif [161] and Athena [162]. Scyther is a more recent tool that 
improves on most of the approaches with its speed and features [163]. It is designed to 
formally analyse security protocols, their security requirements and potential vulnerabilities. 
It is designed under the perfect or unbreakable encryption assumption, which means that an 
adversary learns nothing from an encrypted message unless he knows the decryption key 
[164]. 
6.7.1  Language of Scyther 
 
Scyther has its own specification language to describe protocols, roles, types of parameters, 
sending and receiving messages and so on. The code segment in figure 6-13 illustrates the 
various parameters and elements that we will use in our protocol formalization, including 
the definitions of predefined type, usertype, symmetric key, asymmetric keys, hashfunction, 
role, protocol, and message sending and receiving.  
The protocol named P0 is between two communicating entities, an Initiator and a Responder. 
The entities are declared as roles I and R.  The keyword fresh defines a value that exists in 
the session it is generated and Nonce is a keyword that defines a value that remains constant 
during the whole session. var defines a variable used to store a value received from the 
sender. T here are two types of keys, symmetric and asymmetric. A symmetric key defined 
by k(I, R) is a long-term value shared between A and B, and a message Ni encrypted by it is 
described as {Ni}k(I,R). Asymmetric keys are a key pair, including a private key denoted by 
(sk(I)) and a public key (pk(I)). hashfunction is a keyword used to define a hash function. If 
H is declared as a hashfunction, message H(Nj) signed by R can be denoted by {H(Nj)}sk(R). 
Message sending and receiving in Scyther can be specified by the pair send(s,r,m) and 
recv(s,r,m), where s is a sender, r is a receiver and m is a message. The send and recv 
functions are normally tagged with a number to indicate the corresponding messages. For 
example, a send_1(I,R,message) sent from I corresponds with a recv_1(I, R, message) in R. 
There are several other keywords and features in the language, but we have discussed here 
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only a few important ones that are mostly used in our verifications. 
 
Figure 6-13: Example Scyther code showing a two-agent protocol using symmetric keys 
6.7.2 Specifying security requirements in Scyther 
Having specified the security protocol actions, the security requirements that the protocol 
satisfies require to be checked. Scyther provides two keywords claim and match to specify 
security requirements. The security claims available are Alive, Nisynch, Secret and Commit. 
Alive is used to ensure that a party has executed some events (claim (I, Alive)). Nisynch 
indicates that all messages sent by the sender have been received by the recipient, e.g., (claim 
(I, Nisynch)). Any term that is intended to be a secret from an adversary is specified as 
claim(R,Secret,Ni), where the term Ni is intended to be a secret. Figure 6-13 illustrates this 
in the context of the simple protocol. Commit is used to make a commitment between the 
parties; claim(I,R,Commit,TS) means that role I promises TS to role R. 
In contrast to claim, match is used for two different purposes. This is similar to the “=” 
operator and its use for assigning a value to a variable as well as to check equality. In 
/* 
* Secrecy protocol 
* 
* Uses symmetric encryption 
*/ 
 
//The protocol description 
 
protocol  P0(I, R) 
{ 
role I 
{ 
fresh Ni: Nonce; 
 
send_1(I,R, {I,Ni}k(I,R) ); 
claim_i(I,Secret,Ni); 
} 
 
role R 
{ 
var Ni: Nonce; 
 
recv_1(I,R, {I,Ni}k(I,R) ); 
claim_r(R,Secret,Ni); 
} 
} 
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Scyther, a dependency on an equality (e.g., if (x == y), then… ) for executing following 
events can be specified by using match(v1, v2). The events following that statement will be 
executed only if the values of v1 and v2 match. The other use is to assign a value. If the 
value of v2 is to be assigned to v1, match (v1, v2) will provide for it.  Using these two 
keyword constructs, the security requirements are specified for checks.  
6.7.3 Executing the security protocol in Scyther 
Scyther tool provides a windowed interface to run the protocol specification. The 
specifications are stored in security protocol description files (.spdl files). These files are 
loaded into the windows interface, which interprets the specification and checks for the 
security requirements. The output is windows based and indicates whether the claims made 
have passed or there is a potential attack available. If available, the tool provides a visual 
summary of the run and illustrates how the attack is successful.  
The number of runs can be configured. Typically, the number of runs is set to five. The 
authors suggest that the number of runs should be at least one more than the number of roles 
[158]. If Scyther is able to clearly establish that the claims have passed, it responds with “No 
attacks” against the claims. If it is not able to commit there are no attacks, with the 
available number of runs (bounded state), it displays “no attacks within bounds”. 
This indicates that the protocol could require an higher number of runs or an unbounded run. 
 
6.7.4 Verification of KM-HAN and KM-NAN 
Both these protocols were specified and run. In the case of KM-HAN, three roles are used, 
one each for the end device, the group gateway and the smart meter. The objective is to 
ensure that the data generated at the device is kept a secret until it reaches the smart meter. 
The claim for data being kept a secret is made in the protocol description language. The 
verification is run for the default number of runs configured as well as unbounded runs. The 
runs were made for both groups L-group and H-group. The output for the unbounded runs 
indicates that there are no attacks for the L-group (figure 6-15) and no attack within bounds 
for the H-group (figure 6-14).  
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Figure 6-14: Output of unbounded runs for the H-group in the HAN 
In the case of KM-NAN, there are four roles, one each for the end smart meter, the 
intermediate smart meter, the gateway smart meter and the NOC.  The elements that require 
to be secret are – the data from the end SM, intended for the NOC, the gateway key sent by 
the NOC to the end SM and the authentication value sent by the gateway to the end SM. The 
verification was done for these claims as well as all claims were automatically verified in 
separate runs. Every verification run consisting of the default number of runs (five), took 
over 5 – 7 minutes. The results indicated the status as OK and that there were no attacks 
within bounds.  
 
Figure 6-15: Output of unbounded runs for the L-group in the HAN 
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Figure 6-16: Output of the runs for KM-NAN 
Figure 6-16 is the output of the verification run for the KM-NAN. While the status indicates 
OK, the verification indicates that there are no attacks within the bounds of the number of 
runs. 
6.8 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented two specific efforts – simulation studies of our proposal 
in the context of a large network and verifying the security of our proposed scheme using a 
security protocol verification tool.  The simulation studies illustrated that the end-to-end 
delays in the network remain fairly consistent in the case of the HAN. The increase in the 
delays in the presence of the replay attacks was measured and found to be not very high.  In 
case of node capture attacks, the number of nodes unreachable were linear. This was due the 
inherent star connectivity of the HAN segment.  
In the case of the NAN, the topology made a significant difference in terms of end-to-end 
delay. It impacted the delays observed during attacks. However, it demonstrated that a 
mesh/partial mesh topology is more resilient in the context of a node capture attack, 
compared to a star topology. When the reachability of the KM-NAN in the presence of node 
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capture attacks was compared with two other schemes [50], [51], KM-NAN performed 
better than both the schemes. 
The security claims of KM-HAN and KM-NAN were evaluated using the Scyther tool. Both 
the schemes verified as OK for the claims. However, they will require to be verified with a 
larger number of runs to ensure that there are indeed no attacks and verify them completely. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Future Work 
7. Introduction 
 
This thesis has presented a new key management scheme for Communication Layer in the 
Smart Grid (KMS-CL Smart Grid), to fulfil the proactive security needs of Smart Grids. 
This scheme is an integration of different communication layers of the SG including HAN 
and NAN. The aim of the scheme is to provide a key management for a large scale SG 
infrastructure based on the communication layer requirements, which can provide end-to-
end secure communication, resilience against node capture and replay attacks, Sybil attack 
and lightweight authentication protocol. This chapter provides a summary of thesis and 
mentions the future research in the subject area. This chapter has organized as follows. First 
we present the contributions of the research in Section 7.1. A summary of the KMS-CL 
Smart Grid scheme and thesis contributions is presented in Section 7.2. Several of research 
gaps have been highlighted in future work section 7.3. Finally, the conclusions are in Section 
7.4. 
7.1 Contributions 
In completing the basic research objectives mentioned in section 1.5, we make the five 
following contributions. 
1. Key management framework for a HAN, based on the HAN requirements:  
Our proposed key management solution is designed for fulfilling HAN 
security requirements. Towards that purpose we identify the various devices in a 
home, which are networked. After that we group the devices based on 
operational/functional factors such as their power consumption and the control 
functions required. Then, we identify the resource availability on each device and 
assess the impact of an attack on the device type. We then list the security 
requirements of each device group. Based on that we design a secure key 
management interaction scheme for the groups in HAN. The protocol has been 
evaluated by an implementation using TelosB motes and simulating a large scale SG 
using Riverbed Modeler 18.0. The evaluation results show an improvement in terms 
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of data confidentiality and resilience against node capture attacks. A detail of this 
security analysis is detailed in in chapter five.  
2. Key management framework for a NAN, based on the NAN network 
requirements  
The main components in NAN segment are smart meters, which form a large-
scale network. Therefore, to manage a large scale NAN, organising the NAN into 
groups of SMs is considered in our scheme. Group key management for NAN has 
been proposed. In order to achieve a secure end-to-end communication we assign a 
unique key to each node in the group. This unique key is shared only with the utility 
company server, and sends encrypted data through other nodes to the utility company 
Server without decryption at any non-utility company server. We have shown in 
chapter 4 that using this technique we achieve end-to-end confidentiality.  
3. A light-weight authentication scheme for devices in the NAN    
We have proposed a new, secure, group authentication scheme for NAN for 
Smart Grid. The main feature of our scheme is the ability to address security of all 
communication, which takes place in the network. A detailed of the scheme found 
in chapter 4 of this thesis.     
4. Implementation and evaluation of the key management and authentication 
scheme in typical Smart Grid scenarios using real environment by using 
TelosB motes, in chapter 5 
5. Performance study of the proposed KM-NAN and illustration of the KM-
NAN’s resilience on different communication network topologies in the 
NAN.   
Node capture attacks in the proposed KM-NAN can significantly threaten 
security and degrade network performance. Based on the simulation results, it is 
identified that partial mesh topology is more resilient topology as compared to star 
topology for KM-NAN against node capture attacks. As compared to KM-NAN star, 
KM-NAN mesh topology is more flexible as it can allow smart nodes to choose 
between multiple routes to transmit/receive data to the target location, if one of the 
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node(s) compromised. Due to the flexibility offered by mesh topology, it is not only 
resilient but also an ideal solution, easy to deploy in KM-NAN. 
7.2 Future work 
In this section, several of research issues have been highlighted for future work including    
7.2.1 Prevention in the Wide Area Network (WAN)  
It is a core network that covers a broad geographical area and uses communication circuits 
to connect several subsystems and smart meters with a control centre that is far from the 
subsystem and customer-side network [93]. In addition, it has to support the applications 
and the corresponding requirements in each of the different networks it connects. The WAN 
can connect using WiMAX, 3G/GSM/LTE or fibre optics. In the WAN, the characteristics 
and security requirements are fairly complex due to the hosts of grid applications and 
applications that are related to the operation of a utility, such as SCADA [152]. 
Because WANs have enormous network traffic, traditional security solutions are not 
efficient for handling such a large data flow. A common issue exists regarding how 
cryptographic keys can manage a large load of data as well as how to balance the scale of 
traffic, analysis and data. In addition, logically, the overhead and the load on it increases as 
the number of hosts increases [153]. 
7.2.2 Economics and Energy Storage Technology issues  
One of the challenges in the development of a Smart Grid is to balance all of the critical 
variables associated with the dynamic load control powered by ever-increasing renewable 
sources. The requirement to balance critical variables can be achieved through energy 
storage technology throughout the smart grid. With the advancement in smart grids, energy 
storage has become a key technology to develop a low-carbon physical-cyber power system 
[154]. An energy storage system can help to supply more flexibility and balance to the smart 
grid, providing a back-up to intermittent renewable energy and improving the management 
of distribution networks, reducing costs and improving energy efficiency and grid 
management. However, the development and deployment of energy storage technology has 
various barriers: technological barriers (increasing capacities and efficiencies, developing 
new technology for local and decentralised systems, integration with smart grid), market 
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and regulatory barriers (creating appropriate market signals and regulations), and strategic 
barriers (systematic and holistic approach). In addition to that, the main challenge in the 
development of energy storage is an economic one, which will be a main driver of how soon 
distributed storage solutions are adopted in a smart grid. The economic challenge can vary 
from case to case depending on various parameters, including where the storage is needed, 
its generation, transmission, distribution or consumer end.  
7.2.3 Big Data Challenges  
The upgrade of a traditional power grid into a Smart Grid provides utility service providers 
with exceptional capabilities for forecasting demand, consumer usage patterns, avoiding 
blackouts, improving unit assurance, energy market prices, control and maintenance data 
and more[155]. However, these advancements also generate exceptional volumes of data, 
speed and complexity, and it is expected that by 2020 the number of smart meters will grow 
rapidly, for example, to 240 million in Europe, 150 million in North America, 400 million 
in China and 60 million in Japan. The dynamic nature of the Smart Grid means that it 
requires constant adjustment based on the real-time information. Therefore, Smart Grid data 
architecture must be capable of coping with big data volumes for real-time response and 
sophisticated data analytics [156]. 
7.2.4 Substation Distribution/Automation System 
This is another important system, which is directly involved in substations towards the 
consumer and smart meters via AMI. Communication and monitoring systems will 
incorporate demand response and real-time pricing systems in order to improve the system 
reliability. Moreover, increasing Smart Grid communication integration through merging 
the current distinct hardware and software systems decreases cost and lowers redundancy 
[55]. 
The substation automation system helps to enhance the system reliability and 
communication between substations. To ensure a seamless data communication and 
information exchange across all the distribution networks, the substation automation system 
is aimed to define the scope to the whole network and provide compatibility with the 
common information model (CIM) for system reliability and communication [157]. Due to 
the heterogeneity and interoperability nature of the grid systems, the Common Information 
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Models (CIM) provides a standardised format to allow reliable communication within grid 
systems [26].    
7.3 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have proposed a security scheme for communication layer in Smart Grid 
in particularly for a HAN and a NAN. The enhanced scheme can be used to enable secure 
group-to-group communication of low-capability Smart Grid devices and to mitigate the 
negative effects of physical attacks and node capture attacks.  Moreover, we proposed a 
groups of SMs in a Neighbourhood Area Network that enable entire groups to authenticate 
themselves, rather than on at a time. In particular, the scenario of a multi-hop network is 
considered where the nodes require multiple hops to communicate with the NOC, which is 
the entity that issues the keys. Two topology scenarios, star-star and mesh are considered 
and separate authentication processes are defined for their operation. We propose a 
hierarchical control scheme for authentication; all nodes initially authenticate with the NOC 
and subsequently, the group gateway autonomously issues an authentication token to the 
authenticated members in its group. We mention how the proposed approach is two-way 
secure as both involved parties, the group controller and the smart meters, are able to 
successfully verify each other.  
The authentication scheme was implemented on real world environment using TelosB 
motes. We found out that the average encryption and decryption times on end nodes are 6 
ms and 6.2 ms, on intermediate nodes (authenticated forwarding), including the GW node 
3.9 ms and 4.2 ms and on the NOC 8.2 ms and 6.5 ms. The entire authentication process 
took 331 ms. 
We have also studied the performance of our scheme against node capture attacks, replay 
attacks and Sybil attack. Our results show that significant security improvements over 
traditional approaches can be achieved. Moreover, we have studied node capture attacks in 
the proposed KM-NAN can significantly degrade threaten network security. We identify 
that partial mesh topology is more resilient topology as compared to star topology for NAN, 
against node capture attacks. As compared to KM-NAN star, KM-NAN mesh topology is 
more flexible as it can allow smart nodes to choose between multiple routes to 
transmit/receive data to the target location, if one of the node(s) compromised. Due to the 
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flexibility offered by mesh topology, it is not only resilient but also an ideal solution with 
easy to deploy in KM-NAN. 
A security protocol verification tool, Scyther, was used to verify KM-HAN and KM-NAN 
security schemes. The tool indicates that the security scheme is verifies against any attacks 
that it can generate. This validates the security scheme, in addition to the analysis and 
implementation.  
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